Egalitarianism with a human face by Wollner, G.
EGALITARIANISM WITH A 
HUMAN FACE
SUBMITTED BY
GABRIEL WOLLNER
OF 
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
FOR THE 
PH.D. IN PHILOSOPHY
Abstract
My thesis vindicates the ideal of  egalitarianism with a human face by answering the 
threefold challenge that contemporary egalitarians fail to capture what really 
matters when it comes to distributions of  burdens and benefits among human 
beings, that egalitarian concerns apply only within specific institutional contexts, 
and that there is no account of  human nature that would furnish a commitment to 
distributive equality with a coherent foundation. The ideal of  egalitarianism with a 
human face marks a turn against both non-egalitarian variants of  humanism and 
non-humanist variants of  egalitarianism. 
 My thesis is divided into three parts. The first set of  arguments offers a 
powerful line of  reasoning in support of  the claim that our concern for the well-
being of  other people is egalitarian. I argue that the principle of  equality is in two 
important respects superior to both the priority view and a contractualist 
commitment to strict priority. The second set of  arguments maintains that whether 
or not our concern for other people is egalitarian does not depend on wether 
individuals share a common institution. I argue against the recently prominent idea 
that whether some are worse off  than others matters only among individuals who 
stand in a particular relation to each other. The final set of  arguments advocates a 
common humanity account of  basic equality. I argue that the idea of  common 
humanity offers a promising approach to many of  the problems associated with the 
question of  basic equality and may be invoked in support of  the claim that nobody 
should be better or worse off  than anybody else through no choice or fault of  his or 
her own. 
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INTRODUCTION
Egalitarianism with a human face
1. Preliminary remarks 
Alexander Dubcek believed in socialism as a way of  realizing important human 
values. At the same time he observed that by 1968 socialism in his country had 
actually become an enemy of  these values. His famous advocacy of  socialism with 
a human face captured this dual conviction.1 Dubcek and other reformers in 
socialist Czechoslovakia set out to revive the humanist sources of  socialism and 
restore the human face that socialism had lost. On the one hand, they had to 
overcome a deranged socialist status quo and insist that the rule of  unaccountable 
party elites, complete bureaucratic control, inefficient central planning and 
pervasive censorship did not comply with the "categorical imperative to overthrow 
all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being" (Marx 
1977, p.68). On the other hand, they had to deflect the specters of  a non-socialist 
alternative and insist that socialism had a unique claim to taking seriously the 
humanist "teaching that man is the highest being for man" (Marx 1977, p.68). 
Socialism with a human face marked a turn against both non-human variants of  
socialism and non-socialist variants of  humanism. 
 The predicament of  egalitarianism in contemporary political philosophy is 
of  course very different from that of  socialism in Warsaw Pact countries in the 
1960s. However, there are also important parallels. Egalitarians who believe that it 
is morally objectionable if  some are worse off  than others find themselves in a 
9
1  For a fuller version of this account and an exploration of the Dubcek analogy in a different 
philosophical context, see James Conant's introduction in Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human 
Face, ed. James Conant (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). p.xv. 
position similar to that of  reform socialists during the period of  the Prague Spring. 
They believe that equality is an important human value. At the same time they may 
have to worry that contemporary egalitarianism misunderstands the nature of  this 
value and the requirements it gives rise to. Those who believe that some kind of  
distributive equality is central to social justice face the objection that their doctrine 
has lost its human face. In its most recent developments, egalitarianism may have 
abandoned its humanist roots.
 Taking current debates about social justice and distributive ethics seriously, 
there are three questions which motivate the objection that egalitarianism has lost 
its human face. First: Does distributive equality really capture the nature of  our 
concern for the well-being of  other human beings? There are non-egalitarians who 
maintain that it does not matter whether some are worse off  than others. They 
argue that instead of  embracing comparative principles, one ought to focus on how 
people fare in absolute terms. To illustrate the alleged inhumanity of  egalitarianism, 
these critics draw on considerations like this: Egalitarians believe that it is better in 
one respect if  all were blind in a world in which half  are sighted, even though such 
an egalitarian levelling down is better for nobody. If  the non-egalitarian critics are 
right, distributive egalitarianism fails to exhibit a human face because it fails to 
capture a human value. Second: Under what conditions does equality arise as a 
moral demand among individuals? Some philosophers argue that even though 
relative shares sometimes matter, equality arises as a moral concern only in very 
specific circumstances, for example if  people share a common set of  institutions. 
These philosophers believe that comparative principles require a particular ground 
or trigger. If  their argument is sound, egalitarianism possesses an institutional 
rather than a human face. Third: In virtue of  which feature or property do human 
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beings enjoy egalitarian entitlements? Some philosophers object that those who 
believe that egalitarian principles apply to all human beings in virtue of  their 
humanity lack a coherent foundation for their view. There is no account of  basic 
human equality which is both coherent and supportive of  the normative 
commitments of  distributive egalitarianism. Egalitarianism fails to exhibit a human 
face because one cannot identify a relevant human property that would support a 
commitment to distributive equality. 
 My thesis vindicates the ideal of  egalitarianism with a human face by 
answering the threefold challenge that egalitarianism fails to capture what really 
matters when it comes to distributions of  burdens and benefits among human 
beings, that egalitarian concerns apply only within specific institutional contexts, 
and that there is no account of  human nature that would furnish distributive 
equality with a coherent foundation. My first set of  arguments offers a powerful 
line of  reasoning in support of  the claim that our concern for the well-being of  
other people is egalitarian. The second set of  arguments maintains that whether or 
not our concern for other people is egalitarian does not depend on wether 
individuals share a common institution. The final set of  arguments advocates a 
common humanity account of  basic equality and explains which human features 
give rise to the moral demand of  distributive equality. The ideal of  egalitarianism 
with a human face reclaims the humanist roots of  egalitarianism and marks a turn 
against both non-human variants of  egalitarianism and non-egalitarian variants of  
humanism.
2. The first set of arguments (chapters 1 to 3)  
There are three distributive principles that have emerged as the most promising 
alternatives or supplements to pure utilitarianism. Advocates of  the principle of  
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equality believe that it is in itself  bad if  some people are worse or better off  than 
others. Proponents of  the priority view believe that benefiting people matters more 
the worse off  they are in absolute terms. Contractualists, who believe that a 
distribution must be acceptable from each individual's point of  view, are committed 
to a principle of  strict priority for the worst-off  individual. The first part of  my 
thesis offers a line of  reasoning in support of  the principle of  equality. Chapters 1 
and 2 establish the premises, which I shall employ when providing two arguments 
for the principle of  equality in chapter 3. My arguments operate on two levels. First, 
they rely on intuitions about what we believe is the all things considered right thing 
to do in particular cases. Second, they hinge on more abstract considerations 
concerning the characteristics and features of  principles governing the allocation of  
burdens and benefits among individuals. 
 I argue in chapters 1 and 2 that the principle of  equality, the priority view 
and a contractualist commitment to strict priority each fall victim to a serious 
objection and violate at least one condition or requirement that intuitively a sound 
distributive view would have to satisfy. The principle of  equality appears initially 
plausible because it explains why one ought to benefit those who are worse off  than 
others even if  in doing so one would fail to maximise overall well-being. However, 
there are cases in which the principle of  equality delivers wrong verdicts regarding 
what ought to be done. If  one can achieve an equal distribution only by worsening 
the situation of  the better off, the principle of  equality gives one a reason to level 
down and make people worse off. The principle of  equality thus fails to 
accommodate the apparently important conviction that one distribution can be 
better than another, only if  it is better for somebody. The priority view appears 
superior to the principle of  equality. It explains why it is more important to confer 
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benefits on those who are badly off  but does not face the levelling down objection. 
Unfortunately, the priority view fails to distinguish between cases involving the 
interests of  just one individual and cases where the interests of  several individuals 
are at stake. Because proponents of  the priority view apply the same priority-
weighted principle to cases involving trade-offs within one particular individual's 
life and trade-offs between the lives of  different individuals, the priority view fails to 
take seriously the separateness of  persons. A contractualist commitment to strict 
priority avoids the problems of  both the principle of  equality and the priority view. 
It explains why one ought to benefit the worse-off  without recommending levelling 
down or failing to distinguish between one- and many-person cases. Unfortunately, 
a contractualist commitment to strict priority fails to account for the significance of  
numbers. Contractualist egalitarianism cannot explain how the number of  people 
affected matters for what distribution one ought to choose. The conclusion of  my 
arguments in chapters 1 and 2 is simple: None of  the three distributive views that 
appear initially promising succeeds in jointly satisfying our considered convictions 
about the person-affecting nature of  value, the significance of  the separateness of  
persons and the importance of  numbers. 
 Chapter 3 takes this trilemma of  distributive ethics as its starting point and 
presents two arguments in support of  the principle of  equality. First: I argue that in 
facing the trilemma, one ought to give up on the condition of  person-affectingness. 
If  this choice is justified, the objection faced by the principle of  equality is less 
powerful than the other two objections. This observation leaves the principle of  
equality with a comparative advantage over its rivals. Second: On the level of  all 
things considered verdicts, the challenge is to devise a distributive view which 
explains why we ought to benefit the worse off  even if  we thereby fail to maximise 
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overall well-being, why most of  the time we should not make people worse off  to 
achieve equality, and why often we ought to do what benefits the greater number. I 
argue that in order to arrive at these verdicts in a number of  important cases, one 
will have to appeal to the principle of  equality. The principle of  equality is, all 
things considered, part of  the truth about distributive ethics. If  my arguments are 
sound, an essential part of  our concern for the well-being of  other human beings is 
captured by the principle of  equality.
3. The second set of arguments (chapters 4 and 5)   
There are philosophers who argue that whether some are worse off  than others 
matters only between individuals who stand in a particular relation to each other. 
More precisely, they believe that egalitarian demands are triggered by particular 
interactions. Some of  these philosophers believe that our concern for other people 
gives us a reason to aim for an egalitarian distribution of  goods if  and only if  we 
stand in a relation of  coercion to them. Others believe that moral demands take on 
a distributive and comparative form if  and only if  individuals reciprocally cooperate 
with each other. Still others seem convinced that egalitarian demands arise only in 
cases where interaction between individuals exhibits certain higher-order features, 
for example where it is governed by rules or mutual expectations. I argue in 
chapters 4 and 5 of  my thesis that neither are any of  these particular claims true nor 
are there good reasons to believe in the general idea that egalitarian demands arise 
only from special contexts of  interaction. 
 The claim that a particular type of  interaction serves as a trigger or ground 
of  egalitarian demands comprises two ideas. The first idea is that a particular type 
of  interaction is necessary for egalitarian demands, and the second idea is that such 
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interaction is sufficient: Equality arises as moral demand if  and only if  individuals 
interact with each other in the relevant way. There are then two questions one might 
ask about any particular candidate trigger. First: Is it the case that demands of  
equality arise if  individuals interact with each other in the relevant way, e.g., if  they 
share an institution or coerce each other? Second: Is it the case that equality does 
not arise as a moral demand if  individuals do not interact with each other in the 
relevant way, e.g., if  they do not share an institution or do not coerce each other? 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the second question. I argue that two prominent 
approaches to the grounds of  egalitarian justice, namely A.J. Julius's account 
building on the notion of  framing and Andrea Sangiovanni's account building on 
the notion of  reciprocity, fail to vindicate their preferred type of  interaction as 
necessary for equality. Likewise, they both fail to establish the claim that, in order 
to serve as a ground of  egalitarian distributive justice, interaction has to exhibit 
certain higher-order features. Equality is not an institutional value. Chapter 5 
focuses on the first question. I argue that the idea of  coercion as a trigger of  
equality is neither as plausible nor as powerful as it may initially appear. Those who 
believe that some form of  coercion is sufficient for egalitarian demands will have to 
account for the significance of  coercion, argue that equality arises in response to 
coercion and identify particular acts as relevantly coercive. This threefold challenge, 
I argue, cannot be met.
4. The third set of arguments (chapter 6) 
In virtue of  what feature or property do human beings possess equal moral status? 
My sixth and final chapter takes up the question of  basic equality, which until very 
recently has been neglected by contemporary egalitarians. It is easy to see why the 
15
question should not be neglected. An account of  basic equality is pertinent to a 
number of  important egalitarian arguments. Egalitarians will, for example, have to 
explain how the bearers of  egalitarian entitlements differ from those who do not 
enjoy the status of  basic equality. Similarly, they will have to explain in what 
respects the entitlement bearers relevantly resemble each other, for example to 
determine the metric of  their preferred egalitarian entitlement. Anyone relying on 
the idea of  basic equality faces a threefold challenge. It is difficult to identify a 
property that is possessed equally by all human beings, draws the right line between 
human and non-human beings, and possesses the kind of  normative significance we 
attach to the status of  basic equality. An additional problem arises for egalitarians 
who believe that nobody should be worse off  than anybody else through no fault or 
choice of  his or her own. It seems that the most promising approach to the problem 
of  basic equality is incompatible with a version of  egalitarianism that is sensitive to 
considerations of  individual responsibility and compensates for internal 
endowment deficits. 
 I shall address this challenge and develop an account of  common humanity 
as family resemblance. My account of  basic equality is compatible with a 
responsibility-sensitive version of  the principle of  equality and it meets the threefold 
challenge of  variation, scope and significance. The idea of  common humanity as 
family resemblance appears independently plausible and may be invoked in support 
of  the claim that nobody should be better or worse off  than anybody else through 
no choice or fault of  his or her own. This principle may after all provide 
egalitarianism with a human face. 
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CHAPTER 1
 Equality, levelling down and person-affectingness 2
       
1. Preliminary remarks 
Advocates of  the levelling down objection maintain that the principle of  equality 
violates an important condition that a sound distributive view would have to 
satisfy:3 "If  inequality is bad, its disappearance must be in one way a change for the 
better, however this change occurs. Suppose that those who are better off  suffer 
some misfortune, so that they become as badly off  as everyone else. Since these 
events would remove the inequality, they must be in one way welcome (...), even 
though they would be worse for some people, and better for no one. This 
implication seems to many quite absurd" (Parfit 2002, p.98). It appears that the 
principle of  equality, because it implies that an equal distribution is in one respect 
better than an unequal distribution even though it may not be better for anybody, 
17
2 Some of the material presented in this chapter has previously been submitted as part of my M.Phil. 
thesis (Reasons for equality and the levelling down objection) to the University of Oxford in 2007. I am 
grateful to Alan Ryan and Jerry Cohen for discussing this earlier material with me. 
3  It is difficult to track down the origin of the levelling down objection in contemporary debates 
about equality and justice. Thomas Scanlon (1976, p.9 ff.) discusses an early version of the objection 
in his review of Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia: "If the evil of being relatively disadvantaged 
justifies eliminating inequalities by redistribution, however, it may be asked whether it does not 
provide an equally strong reason for simply worsening the position of the better off when 
redistribution is not possible." Joseph Raz (1986, p. 227) introduces a similar objection in his 
discussion of equality in The Morality of Freedom: "Egalitarian principles often lead to waste. If there 
is not enough of the benefit to go round then whatever of it we have should be wasted rather than 
given to, or allowed to be retained by some." Harry Frankfurt (1987, p.30) raises a related objection 
and argues that "allocating resources equally will reduce aggregate utility" and under conditions of 
scarcity be "morally grotesque." 
violates a deep conviction about the person-affecting nature of  value. Various 
proponents of  egalitarianism respond to the levelling down objection in different 
ways. I am interested in egalitarians who argue that properly understood, the 
principle of  equality does not violate the condition of  person-affectingness. There 
are two ways of  arguing in support of  this claim. Firstly, egalitarians may argue that 
the principle of  equality does not even give us a pro tanto reason to level down. 
There is no respect in which an unequal distribution that is better for some and 
worse for none is worse than an equal distribution that is worse for some and better 
for none. Secondly, egalitarians may argue that equality is always good for 
somebody, even if  achieved through levelling down. The aim of  this chapter is to 
show that both these arguments fail. Telic egalitarians will have to admit that their 
normative commitment to equality violates the principle of  person-affectingness. 
 My argument proceeds in three steps. I shall firstly elaborate on the nature of  
the levelling down objection and offer what I think is the most appropriate way to 
think of  it. I secondly examine Thomas Christiano's attempt to vindicate the claim 
that equality does not even give us a pro tanto reason to level down and argue that it 
fails.4 Egalitarians should insist that making somebody worse off  without making 
anyone better off  can in some respects be good. I thirdly examine John Broome's 
attempt to argue that equality is always good for somebody even if  achieved 
through levelling down and argue that it also fails to convince.5 It is not the case 
that reducing inequality is always good for somebody. 
18
4 I shall rely on his arguments in Christiano (2007, 2008) and Christiano and Braynen (2008).
5 Broome's response to the levelling down objection can be reconstructed from a number of papers, 
including Broome (1989, 1991, 2002 and forthcoming).
2. The levelling down objection properly understood 
Advocates of  the levelling down objection rely on cases where the principle of  
equality delivers counterintuitive verdicts on the goodness or badness of  
distributions. Consider a simple case.
Case (1):  Imagine that somebody has two children, the first one 
   suffering from a very strong headache, the second one 
   suffering from a mild headache. Assume that there is one 
   aspirin pill, which normally would completely alleviate the 
   pain. Unfortunately, the child suffering from a very strong 
   headache has some additional condition nullifying the effect of  
   aspirin and the pill would be wasted on her. What should one 
   do with the pill?
If  one believes that inequality is in itself  bad, there is something wrong with giving 
the pill to the child suffering from a mild headache. Alleviating the pain of  the child 
suffering from a mild headache would increase the inequality between the two 
children. Advocates of  the principle of  equality may of  course appeal to the 
pluralist nature of  their outlook and argue that it is better, all things considered, if  
the pill goes to the child with the mild headache. However, there still seems to be 
something deeply wrong with a principle implying that a situation which is worse 
for some and better for none, i.e., the situation where the pill would be wasted, is 
still in one respect better, i.e., the respect of  equality. Can there be anything good 
about achieving (or advancing) equality through making (or leaving) some people 
worse off  without making anyone else better off ? An inclination to answer this 
question negatively puts pressure on the principle of  equality. 
19
 Derek Parfit seems to believe that the force of  the levelling down objection 
does not depend on the truth of  the person-affecting claim.6 I do not think that 
Parfit is right. If  it is true that one outcome can be worse than another even though 
it is not worse for anybody, the egalitarian claim that an unequal distribution which 
is not worse for anybody is still in some respect worse, would be unproblematic. 
Without a commitment to the person-affecting nature of  value, the levelling down 
objection would lose its force as an objection to the principle of  equality. As 
recently argued by Joseph Raz (2008, p.7 ff.), the objection would merely illustrate 
a twofold predicament, which in fact is a feature of  any pluralist theory. First: 
Leaving the person-affecting claim to one side, one may understand the levelling 
down objection as turning on the observation that, from the point of  view of  
equality alone, the egalitarian will have to be indifferent "between achieving 
equality by making people who are better off  worse off  and achieving equality by 
making people who are worse off  better off" (Raz 2008, p.7). However, this 
observation does not sustain an objection to the principle of  equality. After all, we 
do not object to the liberal on the ground that her commitment to a principle of  
freedom would leave her indifferent between everyone being free and well off  and 
everyone being free and badly off. From the point of  view of  one value alone, the 
extent to which the realisation of  that value serves another value is irrelevant.7 
Second: One may then think that the objection is forceful because it shows that 
there are cases where the realisation of  equality comes at the cost of  another very 
important value, namely well-being. But again, this observation does not speak 
20
6 He says: "The person-affecting claim has, I think, less force than, and cannot be used to strengthen, 
the Levelling Down Objection" (Parfit, 2002, p.115). 
7  As Parfit explains, and as virtually all egalitarians insist, egalitarianism is a position which 
recognizes other values besides equality, and embraces for example the principle of  utility. 
against egalitarianism. Nobody thinks that a situation in which the promotion of  
liberty and the promotion of  well-being come into conflict with each other, such 
that a loss in well-being may be outweighed by a gain in liberty, would deal a 
decisive blow to somebody who believes in the importance of  liberty. Any version 
of  pluralism will have to accommodate trade-offs between different values and 
commitments.
 I believe that the levelling down objection will have to rely on a commitment 
to the person-affecting nature of  value and one should conceive of  its force in terms 
of  four inconsistent propositions. Each proposition of  the set (a) to (d) below 
appears initially plausible and any subset of  three can jointly be held, yet they 
cannot all be true together:8 
 
 (a) Equality is valuable and there is something good about the 
  disappearance of  inequality.
 (b) Equality gives a pro tanto reason for levelling down, at 
  least when there are no other ways to achieve equality.
 (c) A situation, distribution or action can only be good if  it is 
  good for somebody.
 (d) There is nobody for whom levelling down is good.
The levelling down objection is informed by subscribing to propositions (b), (c), and 
(d), which supports a denial of  (a): Because equality gives us a pro tanto reason to 
level down, while there is no one for whom levelling down is good, and something 
21
8 This exposition builds on a suggestion by Jerry Cohen, which was developed at graduate seminars 
in Oxford and at Columbia University, and discussed in personal conversation.  
can only be good if  it is good for somebody, we should not believe in the principle 
of  equality. If  one believes in the principle of  equality, one should maintain 
proposition (a). This can be done in at least three different ways. To defend equality 
against the levelling down argument, one can reject either (b), (c), or (d), or in fact a 
combination of  these. The present discussion is concerned with egalitarian 
responses that focus on (b) and (d). Some egalitarians attempt to rescue the 
principle of  equality by rejecting (b).9 Thomas Christiano argues that the principle 
of  equality does not give us a pro tanto reason for levelling down, even if  that 
would be the only way to achieve equality. A second strategy maintains that (d) is 
false. John Broome argues that some people always benefit from equality, even if  
achieved through levelling down. Although all egalitarian in spirit, these positions 
differ in important respects. Because one cannot coherently subscribe to all of  them, 
the diversity of  egalitarian responses to levelling down triggers a question: Which 
egalitarian response, if  any, is the right one? I shall argue that both Christiano's and 
Broome's responses fail. 
3. Does equality give us a reason to level down? 
Thomas Christiano argues that, properly understood, the principle of  equality does 
not require levelling down and he thus rejects proposition (b) of  the objection.10 
Overall, his argument pursues a dual strategy: Firstly, he tries to defend a principle 
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9  Some other attempts of arguing against (b) are found in different versions of "conditional 
egalitarianism" or "anti-inegalitarianism," as for example advocated by Andrew Mason (2001) or 
Ingmar Persson (2008). I shall discuss their views only in passing and focus on Thomas Christiano's 
position. For a fuller discussion of conditional egalitarianism, see for example Holtug (2007) and 
Brown (unpublished).
10 This position is developed in Christiano (2007, 2008) and Christiano and Braynen (2008).
of  equality on the basis of  supposedly uncontroversial premises. Secondly, he aims 
at showing how the levelling down objection can be defeated. These two strands of  
argument mutually support each other: Christiano’s defence of  equality supports an 
egalitarian principle which defeats levelling down, while this defeat speaks in favour 
of  that principle. The central idea of  his position is this: Because the notion of  well-
being is essential to equality, egalitarians can, in virtue of  their belief  in equality, 
prefer inegalitarian Pareto-superior distributions to egalitarian Pareto-inferior 
distributions. Consequently, equality does not give us reason to level down. The first 
two sub-sections offer a brief  summary of  Christiano's reasoning; the third one 
presents three arguments against it.
3.1 Three arguments for a common good conception of equality
Christiano claims that a principle of  equality must incorporate a notion of  well-
being, or more generally a conception of  the common good: "The principle of  
equality I defend has two inseparable dimensions: it implies that justice is 
concerned with the common good and it implies that the common good is ideally 
just only to the extent that it is egalitarian. The common good and distributive 
dimensions are both essential to the principle of  equality I defend" (Christiano 
2007, p.44). The distributive dimension of  equality appears familiar. Egalitarians 
understand equality as a relational property of  different persons' shares in some 
good, or as a comparative function determining the size of  the share that each 
individual is entitled to. But why should one think that the importance of  well-
being is somehow built into the principle of  equality? Christiano’s answer to this 
question builds on the idea of  a "common good conception of  equality," which he 
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argues is superior to a "merely structural conception" (Christiano and Braynen 
2008, p.395). He offers three reasons in its support. 
 Firstly, Christiano argues that without a close link to well-being, equality 
could not have the significance that egalitarians attribute to it.11 We only consider 
some forms of  inequality as significant: "There is an internal connection between 
the idea of  equality and the value of  the relevant fundamental good that is 
equalised. (…) If  it was not true that more well-being was better than less, there 
would be no point to equality" (Christiano 2007, p.72). What matters from the 
point of  view of  equality are equal shares of  the fundamental good of  well-being. 
Secondly, Christiano points out how the assumption that egalitarians are concerned 
with the distribution of  a good of  which it is better to have more, is crucial for 
defeating the rival position of  sufficientarianism.12 The idea that it is generally 
better to enjoy more well-being than less renders the claim that there is something 
like a level or threshold of  sufficiency implausible. Finally, Christiano asserts that 
egalitarians need a foundational argument for their belief  in the value of  equality. 
Because the importance of  well-being figures as a premise in such an argument, we 
have to assume that the importance of  well-being is essential to egalitarianism: 
"Since the proposition that more substantial good is a necessary condition for there 
being a rationale for the principle of  equality in the substantial good, the right 
account of  the principle of  equality must somehow include the idea that equalities 
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11  Note that this passage should not be understood as offering an argument in support of a welfare 
metric. The point is that the egalitarian concern presupposes some fundamental good of which it is 
better to have more. 
12  See Christiano and Braynen (2008, p.398). For advocates of a sufficientarian position, see for 
example Harry Frankfurt (1987, 1997) and Roger Crisp (2003, 2004). For an egalitarian response to 
the sufficientarian, see: Casal (2007) and Temkin (2003a, 2003b).
in which everyone is better off  are better than inequalities in which everyone is 
worse off" (Christiano and Braynen 2008, p.398). 
 The argument for equality that Christiano has in mind establishes an 
egalitarian principle from four main premises; each of  which is supposedly much 
less contentious than the substantive egalitarian conclusion:13 Firstly, there is the 
fundamental importance of  well-being which gives us reasons to promote 
individual human well-being. The notion of  well-being captures the quality of  a 
person’s life, which is of  intrinsic value.14 The good of  well-being is such that people 
ought to have more of  it rather than less. Secondly, human beings enjoy a 
fundamentally equal status. This fundamental equality is grounded in people’s 
equal basic capacity "to be authorities in the realm of  value" (Christiano 2008, p.
17). Human beings possess the equal status of  personhood in virtue of  their ability 
to “recognise, appreciate, engage with, harmonise with, and produce intrinsic 
goods” (Christiano 2008, p.14).15 Thirdly, there are no relevant differences that 
would require or justify differential treatment. Standard candidates, such as 
considerations of  desert or merit, according to Christiano, fail to undermine the no 
relevant differences-thesis.16 Fourthly, there are two principles of  justice. The 
generic principle of  justice requires that we treat similar cases alike.17 The principle 
of  propriety requires that, as a matter of  justice, we determine an individual's share 
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13 I discuss a generalized version of  this argument in my final chapter. 
14 See Christiano (2008, p.18). 
15  I will discuss the question of basic equality in the final chapter and cast some doubt on the 
plausibility of Christiano's assumptions. For the point of the present discussion, however, I simply 
take them as given. 
16 See Christiano (2008, p.24).
17 See Christiano (2008, p.20). 
on the morally relevant reasons alone and thus make sure that everybody receives 
his or her due. For example, reasons to give some good to somebody, must 
exclusively be grounded in the relevant characteristics of  the person in question. 
Jointly held, these four premises support the principle of  equality. Because 
individuals enjoy equal status and there are no relevant differences between them, 
the two basic principles of  justice ensure that any reason to promote a person's well-
being applies to all individuals equally: "If  there is a reason for any person to be 
brought to a certain level of  well-being, then the same reason holds for every person 
to be brought to that level of  well-being" (Christiano 2007, p.62). Equality is based 
on the pursuit of  each individual’s well-being up to the maximum point compatible 
with the generic principle of  justice and the principle of  propriety. Alternative 
distributive principles are eliminated as they clash with one or several of  the 
premises. Utilitarianism, for example, fails to recognise the generic principle of  
justice: "Only equality of  well-being is compatible with the fundamental value of  
well-being, the generic principle of  justice, equality of  the person and the absence of 
relevant differences" (Christiano 2007, p.63). This line of  reasoning completes the 
first strand of  Christiano's argument: Because we can defend a principle of  equality 
on a premise asserting the fundamental importance of  well-being, well-being is 
essential to equality. But how does this position defeat the levelling down objection? 
3.2 How the common good conception defeats levelling down
Christiano believes that because well-being is essential to equality, egalitarians can 
prefer Pareto-superior inegalitarian distributions to Pareto-inferior egalitarian 
distributions. The principle of  equality implies that "all inequalities are unjust," but 
also that "some inequalities are less unjust than some equalities, namely those in 
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which everyone is worse off" (Christiano and Braynen 2008, p.394). The key idea is 
to maintain that while only Pareto-optimal equality is fully just, equality is not 
always better (or more just) than inequality. Christiano argues that we should 
evaluate any less than fully equal distribution in terms of  its shortcoming from what 
the ideal egalitarian distribution would be: "In each circumstance there exists an 
ideal distribution (or the ideally just distribution), and (...) in evaluating how just 
the world is, it will matter how far your actual distribution is from the ideal 
distribution" (Christiano and Braynen 2008, p.395). One should understand 
Christiano as pursuing a three-step strategy to defeat levelling down. In ranking 
different distributions, we firstly determine what would be ideally just, we secondly 
devise a rule of  approximation by which we determine the shortcoming of  each 
distribution from the ideally just distribution, and we finally generate a ranking of  
the relevant distributions, such that some inegalitarian distributions exhibit greater 
proximity to ideal egalitarian justice than some egalitarian distributions.18
 For a tighter grip on this strategy, consider [Circumstance 1], where A and B 
are two individuals, I and II stand for different distributions and the figures refer to 
cardinally, interpersonally comparable levels of  holdings of  one's preferred metric:19 
 I II 
A 2  3
B 2 7
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18 See Christiano and Braynen (2008, p.400).
19  I agree with Parfit (2002, p.83) who concedes that these "figures misleadingly suggest precision." 
Whenever, throughout this thesis, I make use of figures, I rely on the idea that we can roughly 
capture how well off people are and make some sense of the differences between their levels of well-
being.
To avoid the levelling down objection, Christiano will have to argue that even from 
the point of  view of  equality, distribution II is better than distribution I. But how 
would the principle of  equality deliver that conclusion? According to Christiano, 
the egalitarian will firstly have to determine the ideal egalitarian distribution. The 
ideal distribution is one where everybody would enjoy the highest feasible average 
level of  well-being.20 The highest feasible average level of  well-being is 5, i.e., the 
average well-being of  distribution II, while a situation in which every individual 
enjoyed the highest feasible average level of  well-being would be a distribution in 
which both A and B are at level 5. Referring back to the argument that Christiano 
offers in support of  his common good conception of  equality, the ideal egalitarian 
distribution maximises well-being subject to the two principles of  justice, that is, it 
achieves the maximum individual well-being compatible with everyone else being at 
the same level, which would be distribution III below:
 I II III
A 2  3 5
B 2 7 5
Distribution III may not be feasible and the choice we actually face may just be 
between I and II; however, distribution III is the ideal egalitarian distribution. 
Relying on III as a point of  reference, one should next employ a method of  
approximation to determine how far off  each feasible distribution is from the 
egalitarian ideal. Christiano believes that a plausible rule of  approximation would 
have to satisfy four conditions. It would have to recommend the ideal egalitarian 
distribution if  feasible, never favour Pareto-inferior states over Pareto-superior 
states, and diverge from utilitarian rankings but not depart too much from the 
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20 See Christiano and Braynen (2008, p.405).
difference principle.21 A plausible candidate which satisfies these conditions is the 
"difference summation rule of  approximation" (Christiano and Braynen 2008, p.
409). The basic idea behind this rule is simple: "The state in which the sum of  
differences from the ideal egalitarian distribution is smallest is closer to the ideal of  
equality and so is the more just state" (Christiano and Braynen 2008, p.409). 
Applying this rule to [Circumstance 1] delivers the result that defeats levelling 
down:22 Because the sum of  differences between II and III is smaller (the added 
differences between A's and B's well-being in each distribution is 4), than the sum of 
differences between I and III (here the difference is 6), II is better than I. This 
ranking delivers the intended result. Even from the point of  view of  equality alone, 
an equal distribution in which some are better off  and nobody is worse off, cannot 
be worse.
 We are now in the position to put an intuitive gloss on Christiano’s principle 
of  equality and his defeat of  levelling down: Because it is better to have more well-
being than less, egalitarian justice is fully realised by an equal distribution that is 
Pareto-non-comparable to the feasible Pareto-optimum. Pareto-inferior distributions 
and unequal distributions both contravene the requirements of  equality. Because 
well-being is essential to our egalitarian concern, it can be a requirement of  equality 
to make people worse off, only if  other people are thereby made better off. Equality 
thus does not give us a pro tanto reason to level down, even if  there is no other way 
to achieve equality.
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21  Some of theses conditions are rather obvious. For the rationale behind those that are not, see 
Christiano and Braynen (2008, p.408).
22 Christiano and Braynen ultimately reject the "difference summation approximation" and replaces 
it with a more complex "divergence rule of approximation" (p.412 ff.). For my present argument, 
reliance on the much simpler difference summation approximation is sufficient. 
3.3 Three arguments against Christiano
I am sceptical about Christiano’s response to the levelling down objection and 
believe that egalitarians, in their search for an effective response to levelling down, 
should look elsewhere. Three arguments support this claim. The first argument 
presents a dilemma that Christiano cannot avoid and which undermines his overall 
strategy of  combining an argument for equality with a response to the levelling 
down objection. The second and third arguments cast doubt on the common good 
conception of  equality, which enables Christiano's response to levelling down. The 
second argument shows that Christiano's reasoning against the so-called structural 
conception of  equality is inconclusive. The third argument turns against the 
common good conception and highlights what I think are some of  its significant 
shortcomings. Jointly, these arguments support my claim that the levelling down 
objection cannot be avoided by arguing that equality does not give us a pro tanto 
reason to level down. 
 My first argument targets Christiano's dual argumentative strategy. He 
intends to establish his egalitarian position on the basis of  four premises. At the 
same time he seeks to defeat the levelling down objection. I argue that Christiano 
cannot achieve both of  these aims, or at least not in the way he imagines. He faces 
the dilemma of  either begging the question against alternative distributive principles 
or of  having to bite the bullet of  levelling down. Given his overall aspirations, either 
option is unattractive. Consider [Circumstance 1] familiar from above:
 I II 
A 2  3
B 2 7
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Christiano claims that egalitarians can prefer II to I on grounds of  their egalitarian 
commitment, a preference which defeats the levelling down objection. However, 
preferring II to I violates at least one of  the principles originally supporting 
Christiano's conception of  equality. Christiano thinks that II is preferable to I 
because it is better if  B enjoys more than 3 units of  well-being. But if  there is a 
reason for B to have more than 3 units of  well-being, the generic principle of  justice 
in combination with the assumption of  equal status and the no relevant differences 
thesis tells us that the same reason applies to A. In ranking II above I, Christiano 
violates the generic principle of  justice: He does not treat similar cases, and by 
definition the cases of  A and B are similar in the relevant respects, alike. Violating 
the generic principle of  justice has significant adverse consequences. The generic 
principle plays a central role in the overall dialectic of  Christiano’s argument, for he 
rejects utilitarianism as a candidate distributive principle precisely because it 
violates the generic principle of  justice.23 If  the principle of  equality also violates 
the generic principle of  justice, Christiano's argument for equality begs the question. 
How could Christiano avoid violating the generic principle? It appears that in 
ranking distributions I and II, at least one of  the principles supporting Christiano’s 
egalitarian position will have to yield. Arguing that there are relevant differences 
between A and B, which would justify an unequal distribution, or assuming that it 
is not the case that A and B enjoy a fundamentally equal status, not only seems ad 
hoc, but would stand in deep tension with the egalitarian spirit of  Christiano’s 
enterprise. Violating the principle of  well-being then appears to be the only 
alternative option. But Christiano has a good reason not to do so: Sticking to the 
principle of  generic justice and accepting a violation of  the principle that more well-
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23  See Christiano (2007, p.63).
being is better than less, one would have to prefer I to II. Christiano would again 
face the levelling down objection. 
 This observation gives rise to a second point. One may interpret my 
argument as simply raising a problem internal to Christiano's position, 
undermining his joint attempt to argue for equality and concurrently defeat the 
levelling down objection. However, the argument also raises a more general 
concern. If  one believes that an individual's distributive share should be a function 
of  some relevant characteristic she possesses, for example her deservingness (i.e., if  
one believes in the principle of  propriety in combination with a substantive view 
about the relevant individual feature), and if  one also believes that relevantly similar 
cases ought to be treated equally (i.e., if  one believes in the principle of  generic 
justice), then a commitment to Pareto-optimality will inevitably give rise to tough 
choices. There will be cases, just like [Circumstance 1], where one's commitments 
cannot jointly be satisfied. If  one believes that at least sometimes one's 
commitments to generic justice etc. should trump Pareto-optimality, one will have 
to face some version of  the levelling down objection. But if  Pareto-optimality 
always gains the upper hand, one will have a hard time defending one's preferred 
distributive principle against competing views on the ground that these would 
violate important principles of  justice. If  in avoiding the shortcomings of  pure 
utilitarianism one pays heed to the principle of  generic justice and the principle of  
propriety, avoiding the levelling down objection by arguing that the principle of  
equality never offers a reason to level down becomes unavailable.
 My second argument calls into question the reasoning that Christiano offers 
against a merely structural conception of  equality, i.e., against a conception of  
equality which "evaluates distributions of  goods exclusively in terms of  the 
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comparisons across persons" (Christiano and Braynen 2008, p.395). I believe that 
Christiano's arguments are inconclusive for they only support the claim that well-
being is normatively significant. Advocates of  the structural conception can take the 
significance of  well-being on board without embracing Christiano's common good 
conception. Christiano commits what one might call a welfarist fallacy. The fallacy 
is that of  inferring a common good conception of  equality, which as a matter of  
egalitarian principle "favours states in which everyone is better off  to those in which 
everyone is worse off" (Christiano and Braynen 2008, p.395), from the significance 
of  well-being. One can quite plausibly believe that well-being is important and still 
maintain that structural equality possesses independent value. The loss of  
individual well-being occurring in a levelling down situation, so the argument may 
go, is to be weighed against the goodness of  maintaining equality. There is nothing 
wrong with believing that important and valuable equality is equality of  well-being 
while simultaneously subscribing to a conception of  equality that sometimes prefers 
Pareto-inferior distributions to Pareto-superior alternatives.
 An additional remark supplements this response. It seems that Christiano 
fails to appreciate the different ways in which the significance of  well-being may be 
incorporated into the egalitarian outlook. There are at least three general 
possibilities. Egalitarians might firstly believe that a concern for well-being is built 
into the principle of  equality, such that well-being is always to be promoted and 
Pareto-superior distributions always to be preferred to Pareto-inferior ones. This is 
the position that Christiano takes. However, egalitarians could also believe that 
while the significance of  well-being is germane to the egalitarian concern, the idea 
that well-being is always to be promoted is not. They could, for example, believe 
that individuals have equal claims to well-being, while the egalitarian concern is 
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with these claims being satisfied proportionally.24 Such an account would furnish a 
response to the sufficientarian (the requirement that equal claims be satisfied 
equally may not be satisfied by ensuring that everybody gets enough) and none of  
the considerations offered by Christiano speak against the soundness of  its 
foundations. Thirdly, egalitarians could refer to the pluralist nature of  their outlook. 
Equality simply is not all that matters. Granting that well-being is of  independent 
significance delivers the egalitarian preference for equality at a higher level. It seems 
that Christiano's arguments do not give us a conclusive reason to prefer his 
common good conception of  equality to an alternative view that is both structural 
and pluralist in the sense just offered. 
 My third argument highlights some of  the shortcomings of  Christiano's 
response to the levelling down objection. I believe that there are cases where his 
common good conception of  equality fails to adequately account for what appear 
to be powerful considered convictions. Consider two simple cases. First:25 Assume 
that there are two religious groups who would equally benefit from public provision 
of  facilities needed to exercise their religion. Assume that each religious group 
requires one facility strictly dedicated to its own purposes, as sharing would defeat 
the point of  the facility. Unfortunately, the budget that the municipality has been 
allocated by the federal level for the public provision of  religious facilities is very 
small, such that at most one building project could be realised. If  the municipality 
does not spend that part of  its budget on religious facilities, the federal level will 
simply cut the funds. The municipality has three options: It could build a mosque, a 
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24 Egalitarians may rely on Broome's theory of "fairness as the proportionate satisfaction of claims" 
to motivate their egalitarian commitment, c.f. Broome (1999).
25 Jonathan Wolff offers a similar case involving the provision of racially segregated swimming pools 
in Wolff  (2001). 
synagogue, or neither. What should happen? Second:26 Imagine that a white racist 
who is terminally ill donates his liver on the condition that it only be given to a 
white man. There are two patients awaiting a liver transplant, one white and one 
black, and they both equally fulfil the criteria usually relied upon in organ 
allocation, such as urgency, need and capacity to benefit. If  the conditional 
donation is accepted by the health authorities, the white man will be saved and the 
black man will die. If  the conditional donation is not accepted, they both die. 
Should the conditional donation be accepted? 
 My argument against Christiano builds on three observations. To begin with, 
Christiano's argument for equality can be relied upon in explaining the difficulty of  
the choice faced in each case. The potential recipients of  a benefit appear to be 
equal in the respect relevant to the distribution of  the good at hand, there are no 
morally relevant differences between them and it would be good for them to receive 
the benefit. However, under the circumstances of  the respective case, these 
considerations pull in opposite directions. There is a strong reason to give the good 
to somebody (the significance of  well-being speaks in its favour) but unfortunately, 
there also is a strong reason not to give the good to anybody, or in other words to 
pursue the option that produces less of  the good, for this is the only way to honour 
the principle of  generic justice. There are now two further observations about 
Christiano's commitments in the context of  these cases. First: Even if  we agreed 
that, all things considered, one ought to build a mosque (or synagogue) and accept 
the conditional liver donation, Christiano's justification for pursuing that option 
appears odd. Christiano will have to argue that giving the racist's liver to the white 
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26 This case builds on an example discussed by Wilkinson (2007). I am grateful to Andrew Williams 
for bringing this article to my attention. 
patient, or providing only one religious community with a building, is the option 
preferable from the point of  view of  egalitarian justice. However, that promoting 
unfair inequality is better in terms of  egalitarian justice is clearly the wrong thing to 
say. The following justification seems to capture our reasoning much more 
accurately: Accepting the conditional donation promotes unfair inequality, 
however, that option may still be all things considered justified, for saving a life is 
more important than achieving fairness. Unfortunately, a justification 
differentiating between the dimensions of  fair equality and well-being is unavailable 
to Christiano. Second: One might very plausibly believe that not funding any 
building and not accepting the racist's liver is what one ought to do all things 
considered. The two examples are clear cases of  levelling down and Christiano 
cannot support what may very well be the right thing to do.
 There is one final implication of  the common good conception of  equality 
that is worth pointing out. Imagine that Jane is offered some benefit that would 
make her much better off  than everyone around her, say some privilege or extra-
resource such as an inheritance from a remote and wealthy uncle living abroad.27 
The testament of  the uncle says that all of  his money, which he kept in a suitcase 
under his bed, should be given to Jane if  she agrees to spend it in ways that 
exclusively enhance her own well-being, or otherwise be burned. As it happens, 
Jane decides to forgo the benefit of  the inheritance and she offers considerations of  
egalitarian justice in support of  doing so. She says: "I believe that as a matter of  
egalitarian justice, I should not be better off  than anyone else. And if  the 
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27  Jane finds herself in a similar scenario in Jerry Cohen's discussion of justice and the Pareto-
principle, where she benefits from extra-manna that has fallen on her plot of land, see Cohen (2008, 
p.317). 
inheritance could only benefit me but nobody else, I prefer that the money be 
burned." If  Christiano's common good conception of  equality is correct, then Jane 
does not only make a mistake in refusing the inheritance, but she is wrong in 
invoking considerations of  egalitarian justice to justify her decision. She 
misunderstands, Christiano would have to say, the nature of  egalitarianism. 
However, this is not true. The justification she offers appears perfectly coherent and 
her decision admirably egalitarian.
4. Is inequality bad for individuals? 
Egalitarians might embrace a second strategy and argue that proposition (d) of  the 
levelling down objection is false. It is not the case that there is nobody for whom 
levelling down is good. This claim asserts that inequality as such is bad for 
individuals. The following line of  reasoning accounts for its effectiveness against 
the levelling down objection. Because inequality harms individuals, and levelling 
down diminishes inequality, there is somebody who benefits from levelling down, 
namely the otherwise worse off. Consequently the original objection loses its force: 
As the proponent of  the levelling down objection would have to admit, there is 
nothing wrong with considering one scenario better than another if  there is 
someone for whom that scenario is in fact better. The plausibility of  a position that 
accounts for the badness of  inequality as an individual harm is the focus of  the 
present section. 
 The claim that inequality is bad for individuals has been defended by John 
Broome.28 I briefly outline the thrust of  Broome’s position and employ his theory of 
fairness to develop an egalitarian response to the levelling down objection. Initially, 
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this response appears powerful because it follows from what many people believe 
about equality and it really deprives the original objection of  much of  its force. I 
will argue, however, that Broome’s theory fails to satisfactorily account for the 
badness or wrongness of  inequality. Firstly, I question the claim that inequality is 
always bad for individuals. Secondly, I will show that even if  inequality were bad 
for individuals, Broome's approach would often fail to support what, from the point 
of  view of  equality, appears to be the right ranking of  distributions. 
4.1 John Broome and the badness of inequality 
John Broome argues that inequality is bad for individuals: “Since what is bad about 
inequality is its unfairness, inequality is clearly a harm suffered by individuals”
(Broome 1991, p.199). This claim is supported by a theory of  fairness and equality. 
It is helpful to briefly reconstruct Broome’s reasoning in terms of  four propositions.
i. Claims are the objects of fairness
Receiving a good or benefit creates well-being. The fact that a person would benefit 
from a particular good provides one with a reason to give it to her. Different kinds 
of  reasons play a role in determining who gets what. Because one reason for giving 
a particular good to an individual might conflict with another reason to give that 
good to somebody else, we need a mechanism for balancing reasons in cases of  
conflict. One way of  doing so would be to weigh reasons against each other. We 
would give the good in question to the person who has the stronger reasons on her 
side. Broome rejects this simple procedure to determine who should get what. He 
distinguishes between different types of  distributive reasons. Within the set of  
relevant reasons for giving a particular good to a person some reasons are special. 
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These special reasons are claims: “Some of  these reasons are duties owed to the 
candidate herself, and others are not. I shall call the former claims that the 
candidate has to the good” (Broome 1999, p.114). Claims are the objects of  
fairness.29 
ii. Fairness requires the proportionate satisfaction of claims
Fairness is concerned with the mediation of  claims. Claims can conflict, for 
example, when two individuals have a claim to the same good. Fairness requires 
that in such cases claims be satisfied proportionally. The claim of  a given individual 
ought to be satisfied to the same degree that similar claims of  other individuals are 
satisfied: “The heart of  my suggestion is that fairness is concerned only with how 
well each person’s claim is satisfied compared with how well other people’s are 
satisfied. It is concerned only with relative satisfaction, not absolute satisfaction” 
(Broome 1999, p.117). The premise that some people sometimes have equal claims 
to a good establishes a link between fairness and equality: “Whenever people have 
equal claims to something, then fairness requires they should have equal shares of  
it. It is in some respect bad if  they do not: it is unfair. So this account of  fairness 
provides a basis for explaining the badness of  inequality and the goodness of  
equality” (Broome 1991, p.197). 
iii. Complaints capture the badness of unfair inequality
The badness of  inequality is an individual harm and it gives rise to complaints. 
Broome argues that fairness is a personal good. Individuals enjoy the good or 
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29 Claims are to be distinguished from both ordinary reasons and side-constraints. The three types of 
reasons differ from each other in important respects, for example in how they are to be balanced or 
weighed in cases of  conflict, see Broome (1999, p.114 ff).
benefit from being treated fairly. Conversely, unfairness is a harm suffered by 
individuals. Not to have one’s claim satisfied in proportion to the level of  
satisfaction enjoyed by others is harmful. Treating people unfairly makes them 
worse off. The harm caused by unfair inequalities is captured by the notion of  a 
complaint. According to Broome's theory of  fairness, and assuming that people 
have equal claims to the good in question, a person P's complaint depends on the 
difference between her level of  well-being (WP) and that enjoyed by others; it may 
for example be a function of  the difference between (WP) and average well-being 
(WAverage): 
 [C] Complaint P = | WP -  WAverage  |     30
For person P to have a complaint, she neither has to feel harmed, nor does she 
actually have to complain.31 A complaint simply arises from the unfairness of  
inequality. 
iv. The badness of inequality is part of a complete goodness function
A theory of  equality evaluates and ranks different distributions of  resources or well-
being by employing a goodness function. According to Broome, the overall 
goodness of  a distribution (G*) is determined by the amount of  overall well-being 
in that situation (W*), minus the inequality induced by unfairness (I*):
 [G] G* = W* – I*
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30  “For instance a person’s complaint might be a non-linear function of the difference between her 
income and the mean” (Temkin, 1993, p.17).
31 See Broome (1989, p.15).
The badness of  inequality (I*) is an individual harm. This harm is captured and 
assessed in terms of  a complaint, which, as mentioned above, is a function of  the 
difference between the respective individual well-being and the average well-being. 
Personal goodness mirrors the structure of  (G*) and substitutes complaints as the 
individual measure of  inequality. How good a distribution is for person P depends 
on her absolute well-being minus her complaint:
 [PG] GP = WP  -  | WP -  WAverage |
This personal goodness function captures the idea that unfair inequality creates 
complaints, which should be thought of  as an individual harm. Unfair inequality 
makes people worse off. 
4.2 The badness of inequality and levelling down
Propositions (i) to (iv) offer the building blocks for an egalitarian response to the 
levelling down objection. Because inequality is in fact bad for individuals, and 
because levelling down diminishes inequality, there are individuals who benefit 
from levelling down. Once one recognizes that unfair inequality is bad for 
individuals, the claim that levelling down is in (at least) one respect good appears 
unproblematic. To understand this way of  responding to levelling down, I suggest 
distinguishing between two different modes of  assessing the goodness of  a 
distribution. One mode, label it [mode 1], only focuses on absolute levels of  well-
being and fails to take into consideration the badness of  inequality. This is the mode 
presupposed by those who advance the levelling down objection. The second mode 
of  assessing the goodness of  a distribution, label it [mode 2], includes the badness 
of  inequality as expressed by [PG]. 
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 The egalitarian response to levelling down is this: What is presented as a 
troubling case by proponents of  the objection in [mode 1] ceases to be an instance 
of  levelling down once one correctly applies [mode 2]. Let us reconsider a scenario 
invoked by proponents of  the levelling down objection in support of  their case, e.g., 
[Circumstance 1] from above: 
 I II
A 2  3
B 2 7
The question raised by the critic of  equality is this: How can distribution I be in any 
respect better than II? Drawing on Broome, the egalitarian now has a good 
response. The presentation of  [Circumstance 1] relies on the wrong mode of  
assessing the goodness of  a distribution. In distribution II, A's well-being has to be 
discounted by her inequality complaint. Because A enjoys less than the average 
absolute level of  well-being, the distributions look different when correctly applying 
[mode 2], giving rise to [Circumstance 1']:
 I II
A 2 1
B 2 7
In [Circumstance 1], the average well-being in II is 5, and A, given her absolute 
well-being of  3, has a complaint of  the magnitude 2. Discounting accordingly, her 
[mode 2] well-being only amounts to 1. It is thus not true that there is no one for 
whom levelling down is good. For person A, distribution I is better than distribution 
II.  The claim that inequality is bad for individuals defeats the levelling down 
objection by modifying the assessment of  distributions. If  Broome is right, 
proposition (d) of  the original formulation of  the levelling down objection is false.
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4.3 Two arguments against Broome
However, there are at least two arguments that speak against Broome's response to 
levelling down. My first argument shows that it is implausible to conceive of  
unfairness or inequality as an individual harm. Secondly, I believe that the 
conceptual framework provided by Broome does not suffice to fully explain the 
badness of  inequality. 
4.3.1 The first argument: What is the harm of inequality?
I seriously doubt whether inequality is in fact always an individual harm. What 
does it mean to say that inequality is bad for individuals? How is it that a relational 
property such as inequality can inflict harm? Taking sides with Derek Parfit (2002), 
Brad Hooker (2005) and Joseph Raz (2008), I argue that these questions cannot be 
answered in a satisfactory manner. The argument I am going to present for my 
position proceeds in five steps (i) – (v) and works by elimination: I will consider 
various candidate explanations, which may render the badness of  inequality claim 
plausible, and argue that each of  them fails. After due consideration, the claim that 
inequality is bad for individuals turns out untenable.
i. The harm of inequality is not the harm of being badly off
There is an obvious sense in which unfairness is bad for individuals. Unfairness is 
bad for me because had I not been treated unfairly, I might have been better off  in 
absolute terms. If  four pieces of  chocolate are distributed between my sister and 
me, an unfair distribution under which she receives three pieces is bad for me 
because I only receive one. Under a fair distribution, I would receive two pieces and 
the difference to what I actually have may be called the harm inflicted by 
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unfairness. This harm is in fact a personal harm. However, the harm is neither due 
to the badness of  unfair inequality, nor is it the kind of  harm presupposed by 
Broome’s theory of  fairness. Fairness merely requires that claims be satisfied 
proportionally. If  we both only received one piece and left the rest undistributed, no 
unfairness harm would be inflicted upon me. I am harmed by being badly off, yet 
this harm is different from the badness of  unfair inequality.
ii. The harm of inequality is different from the effects of inequality
How individuals fare relative to each other determines the extent of  the harm 
suffered. But can a relation cause harm? A number of  examples supporting a 
positive answer to this question spring to mind. If  individuals A and B compete for 
one place at university, while the quality of  secondary schooling is a decisive factor 
in gaining admission, the fact that individual A received schooling that is better 
than that of  B may harm B. The personal harm consists in B's not gaining 
admission to university. The domain of  positional goods provides ample material to 
construct similar examples.32 However, in identifying the source of  harm, we must 
be careful not to mistake the consequences of  the relation for the relation itself. I 
suspect that in all examples to be constructed in analogy to the university 
admissions case, it is not the unfairness itself  that causes individual harm, but 
rather the result of  the unfairness in the context of  a specific setting. It is not a 
relation that does the harming, but the consequences of  that relation. The 
connection between the two elements can be very intricate, yet it is important to 
keep the distinction.33 If  we had two university places on offer, the unfairness of  
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32 For a discussion of  positional goods, see for example Brighouse and Swift (2006).
33 For a discussion of  the bad effects of  inequality, see Scanlon (2003) and O'Neill (2008). 
unequal schooling would persist, but the kind of  harm we have been concerned 
with would disappear. The nature of  the relation between the different levels of  
education is only instrumental to the harm which rendered the example convincing. 
Because one can eliminate the consequences without eliminating the unfairness, the 
harm of  the former cannot exhaust that of  the latter. 
iii. The harm of inequality is different from the harm of knowing about it
One might try to rescue the idea that relations induce harm by introducing the 
condition of  knowledge. To know that others are better off  than I am, to know that 
I am the victim of  an unfair inequality causes harm, even if  only in the form of  
distress or regret. The knowledge that people with the same claims receive more, or 
are treated better than I am might give rise to feelings of  anger or misery that have a 
negative effect on my well-being. In this sense, a relation can induce harm. 
However, there is a simple consideration that speaks against this interpretation. To 
base the badness of  inequality on the knowledge of  inequality turns out 
unsatisfactory from an egalitarian point of  view. Is there not something bad about 
inequalities, even if  nobody is aware of  them? Are secret inequalities, say between 
different members of  society, less objectionable than known inequalities? Instead of 
alleviating inequalities through redistribution, shall we just ensure that nobody 
knows about them? Posing these questions suffices to render the knowledge-based 
account of  harm unconvincing. 
iv. Equality is not an environmental benefit
Joseph Raz (2008) considers the possibility of  understanding equality as conferring 
an environmental benefit. Just like living in a beautiful valley, living in 
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circumstances of  fair equality may confer a benefit, where the benefit "consists of  
nothing more than living in a certain environment" (Raz 2008, p.11). One may 
think that the benefits of  living in an egalitarian society are not exhausted by the 
consequences of  fair equality, such as the absence of  status differentials, but that 
living in such a society is of  independent value. If  correct, this picture avoids the 
mistake of  confusing fairness and its effects. However, there are two considerations 
which render the claim that equality is an environmental benefit implausible. 
Firstly, one ought to be sceptical about the idea of  a personal environmental value. 
It seems that the benefits coming along with living in a beautiful valley supervene 
on the effects that certain aspects of  the environment have on people, such as 
providing fresh air and space for lengthy hikes. To be sure, it makes perfect sense to 
say that a beautiful valley has value that is independent of  the provision of  these 
opportunities; however, it is not so clear in what sense this independent value 
confers a benefit on anyone. And if  we are sceptical of  the valley as conferring 
environmental benefits, we ought to be sceptical about the prospects of  making 
sense of  equality as an environmental benefit. Secondly, the idea of  an 
environmental benefit seems to presuppose awareness. As Raz points out, we could 
only benefit from intrinsic environmental values by "experiencing their 
presence" (Raz 2008, p.12). But if  we need to be aware of  equality to benefit from 
it, or, conversely, aware of  an unfair inequality to be harmed by it, then the 
problems already discussed in (iii) re-emerge. Are we prepared to admit that 
ignorance about inequality is the same as the absence of  that inequality? Note that 
the awareness condition comes with another serious drawback: It severely limits the 
scope of  the egalitarian concern. Am I really aware of  all relevant inequalities? And 
do the distant needy really experience the presence of  the inequality between 
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themselves and me? It seems that the environmental benefit understanding of  
equality disappoints on too many counts. It should not serve as the background 
against which we render plausible the claim that inequality is bad for individuals. 
v. A more encompassing notion of harm does not help either
As explaining how unfair inequality as such adversely affects a particular individual 
turns out to be rather difficult, advocates of  the badness of  inequality claim may 
expand on what they mean by a harm. Instead of  assuming that a harm must be 
suffered by a particular subject at a particular point in time, they could draw on 
Thomas Nagel's attempt to account for the badness of  death in the absence of  a 
subject suffering it and consider things as harmful to a person that "do not take 
place within the boundaries of  his body and his mind" (Nagel 1979a, p.6). Consider 
two simple cases. It seems plausible to believe that there is a sense in which the fact 
that a wife betrayed her husband constitutes a harm, it makes his life go worse, even 
if  he never learns about the betrayal. It is likewise plausible to believe that a 
deceased scientist is harmed, even after his death, when it turns out that his 
apparent scientific discoveries had rested on a deep mistake. Had his theory been 
correct, he would have had a better life. Note that even though there is no 
discernible impact on the mind or body of  the respective individual, it still seems 
plausible to speak of  people suffering a harm. And maybe the case of  unfair 
inequality can be treated analogously: The fact that I am the victim of  an unfairness 
harms me, maybe in just the way that a betrayed husband is harmed, even if  I am 
unaware of  the unfairness and even if  it does not have any further effects on me.
 However, there is a simple general question that causes serious trouble for 
advocates of  this response: "What would be best for someone, or would be most in 
47
this person's interests, or would make this person's life go, for him, as well as 
possible?" (Parfit 1984, p.493). I believe that there is no answer to this question on 
which the analogy just developed would offer a convincing account of  the badness 
of  inequality claim. One might think that the claim about the betrayed husband and 
the deceased scientist are most plausible when one thinks of  what makes someone's 
life go best in terms of  preferences or ends. The husband is harmed because he has 
his preference for a true and honest relationship frustrated.34 However, while such a 
preference satisfaction or ends realisation approach may render some examples 
plausible, it fails in the case of  fairness and equality. Clearly, the badness of  unfair 
inequality should not depend on people having a preference for fairness. Whether 
or not a distribution between two individuals is fair is independent of  whether or 
not the people in that distribution have a preference for a fair distribution. In 
response to this problem one may, instead of  relying on people's preferences or 
ends, think that it is objectively bad for a husband to be betrayed, or for a scientist to 
have spent his life developing a mistaken theory.35 However, there are two 
observations that speak against an objective list theory in this particular 
argumentative context. It firstly seems that in relying on such an account, the 
advocate of  the badness of  inequality claim is walking a very thin line. Why should 
the objective list only contain values that are good for somebody?36 Once a notion 
of  what is good for people lies upstream from their interests or preferences, why 
"can't the boundaries of  the objectively good extend beyond what is good for 
someone?" (Temkin 2000, p.145). It seems that by embracing an objective list 
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34 In Parfit's terminology (1984, p.494) one would presuppose a "success theory of  self-interest".
35 In Parfit's terminology (1984, p.499) one would presuppose a "objective list theory of  self-interest". 
36 Larry Temkin develops this point in a slightly different context, see Temkin (1993, p.276).
account, the egalitarian runs up against the condition of  person-affectingness, the 
violation of  which she originally set out to avoid. There is secondly the question of  
what meaning the objective list strategy gives to the notion of  something being 
good for somebody. If  any objective value is understood as being good for 
somebody, one will be unable to discriminate between what is and is not person-
affecting in a more robust sense of  the term. It seems that one is blurring an 
important distinction, for example between directly harming somebody and 
violating an objective normative requirement. As long as the exact harm-inducing 
mechanism remains obscure, the violation of  any ideal could be said to harm 
individuals. I believe that these considerations are sufficient to dismiss the strategy 
of  defending the badness of  inequality claim by relying on a more encompassing 
notion of  harm.
4.3.2 The second argument: The remaining badness of inequality  
I believe that a response to the levelling down objection which builds on the claim 
that inequality is bad for individuals fails to explain the badness of  some substantial 
and worrisome inequalities. The badness of  inequality response distinguishes 
between different modes of  assessing the goodness of  a distribution. On the one 
hand, there is [mode 1], which focuses solely on absolute levels of  well-being. On 
the other hand, there is [mode 2], which takes into consideration the badness of  
inequality. An argument in favour of  [mode 2] supports a response to the levelling 
down objection: What proponents of  the objection present as a case of  levelling 
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down in [mode 1], ceases to be an instance of  levelling down once one correctly 
applies [mode 2]. But is this response convincing? I argue that it is not.37
  Consider another circumstance, [circumstance 2], which again involves two 
alternative distributions that in [mode1] appear like this: 
 I II
A 2 4
B 2 8
In distribution I, individuals A and B are equally well off  at the level of  2. In 
distribution II, both individuals are better off, yet they are better off  to unequal 
extents. Because of  this inequality, [mode1] misrepresents distribution II. Relying 
on the claim that inequality is bad for individuals, A’s well-being in scenario II 
should be discounted by her inequality complaint. [Mode 2] thus delivers the more 
adequate picture: 
 I II
A 2 2
B 2 8
The badness of  the inequality of  absolute holdings in distribution II is captured by 
the re-description of  the situation offered by [mode2]. From the perspective of  
[mode1], both individuals are better off  in scenario II. However, the additional 
benefits are distributed unequally and the resulting inequality harms the worse-off  
person. From the perspective of  [mode 2], distribution II only makes individual B 
better off  because the harm done by the inequality offsets A’s initial gain in well-
being. The new situation resembles a levelling down case; however, as [mode 2] 
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37 My argument offers a fuller development of a point that Larry Temkin raises against John Broome 
in defense of  his saint and sinner case, see Temkin (2000, p.148).
already takes the badness of  inequality into account, there is no more reason to 
think that I is better than II. 
 This verdict avoids the levelling down objection. However, there is also 
something deeply strange about it. An egalitarian who believes that inequality is an 
individual harm seems committed to two claims. First: Well-Being properly 
understood incorporates a badness of  inequality discount. Second: There is 
something wrong with people enjoying unequal holdings of  the relevant distributive 
metric. When considering [circumstance 2], one realises that this dual commitment 
gives rise to a problem. On the one hand, the egalitarian will believe that [mode 2] 
captures the situation most accurately. On the other hand, she will have no 
objection to the inequality of  distribution II, which under [mode 2] still obtains 
between A and B. In ranking distribution II over distribution I, and in maintaining 
that there is no respect in which I is better than II, the badness of  inequality 
egalitarian will have to refrain from taking issues with a situation of  unfair 
inequality. Because [mode 2] already takes into consideration what is to be said 
about the badness of  inequality, there are no conceptual tools at the egalitarian's 
disposal to condemn the inequality of  distribution II. Arguing once more that 
inequality is bad for individuals would be a case of  illegitimate double counting. 
One cannot rely on the inequality discount as often as one finds convenient. But if  
the levels of  well-being in [mode2] are the ones of  genuine significance, and if  
[mode 2] well-being is the relevant metric of  egalitarian justice, should not the 
egalitarian be worried about the inequality that obtains in distribution II?
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5. Conclusion
I have argued that, properly understood, the levelling down objection forces the 
egalitarian to give up (at least) one of  three beliefs. To maintain that equality is 
valuable, egalitarians could maintain that equality does not even give us a pro tanto 
reason to level down, they could argue that levelling down is in fact good for 
individuals, or they could deny that a distribution or action can only be good if  it is 
good for somebody. I have shown that both the first and the second strategy fail. 
Thomas Christiano's advocacy of  a common good conception of  equality fails to 
convince, for it runs together two commitments that ought to be kept separate, 
namely a commitment to the significance of  equality and a commitment to the 
significance of  well-being. As I have argued, an egalitarian who does not take this 
distinction seriously finds herself  in a position where she is unable to account for a 
number of  important considered convictions and fails to vindicate her distributive 
commitment against alternative principles, such as utilitarianism. When there is no 
other way to achieve equality, the egalitarian commitment provides a pro tanto 
reason to level down. John Broome's argument that unfair inequality is always bad 
for individuals also fails to convince, for even though unfair inequality is sometimes 
bad for people, it is not clear how a relational property can itself  be bad for 
somebody. Because the badness of  inequality cannot be exhausted in terms of  
individual harms, achieving equality can be good even though it is not good for 
anybody. If  my arguments are sound, the only way for the egalitarian to avoid the 
force of  the levelling down objection is to give up on the claim of  person-
affectingness. I shall return to this option in chapter 3.
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 CHAPTER 2
 Priority, numbers and the separateness of persons 38
1.  Preliminary remarks       
Philosophers disappointed with the principle of  equality have turned towards 
alternative distributive views. To avoid the counterintuitive implications of  telic 
egalitarianism, such as the levelling down objection, they have come to endorse 
various ways of  giving priority to the worse off.39 Proponents of  Derek Parfit's 
priority view believe that benefiting people matters more the worse off  they are in 
absolute terms.40 Advocates of  a contractualist position inspired by Thomas Nagel 
endorse, because they believe that a distribution will have to be acceptable from 
each individual's point of  view, a principle of  strict priority for the worst off  
individual.41 I shall argue that just like the principle of  equality, each of  these views 
violates one condition or requirement that intuitively a sound distribution would 
have to satisfy. The priority view fails to take seriously the moral significance of  the 
boundary between different individuals and violates the separateness of  persons 
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38  Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at a graduate conference in Pavia and at a 
colloquium at the Ludwig Maximilian University Munich. I am grateful to audiences there for 
helpful comments.
39 Richard Arneson, for example, has come to modify his formerly luck egalitarian position and now 
defends a version of  "responsibility-catering prioritarianism," see Arneson (2000). 
40  The priority view has been formulated by Derek Parfit in his "Equality or Priority," delivered as 
the Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas in 1991. My references refer to the reprinted 
versions Parfit (1997) and Parfit (2002).
41  The contractualist position that I shall be concerned with here is formulated by Thomas Nagel 
(1979b, 1991).
requirement.42 The contractualist commitment to strict priority remains 
insufficiently sensitive to the number of  people affected by each distributive option 
and violates the important conviction that the numbers count.43 Considerations of  
numbers and the separateness of  persons defeat two prominent contemporary 
versions of  prioritarianism. 
 Section 2 discusses the separateness of  persons objection against Parfit's 
priority view. I consider various responses to the objection and argue that pure 
versions of  the priority view fail to take the separateness of  persons seriously. 
Section 3 explains how the numbers objection threatens to undermine the 
contractualist commitment to strict priority. I distinguish between three instances of 
the objection and argue that contractualists could only come to terms with it by 
adopting a pluralist stance. 
2.  The priority view and the separateness of persons requirement
Derek Parfit (2002, p.101 ff.) offers the priority view as an alternative to telic 
egalitarianism and argues that, (a) “benefiting people matters more the worse off  
these people are”, (b) not “because these people are worse off  than others”, but (c) 
because “utility has diminishing moral importance." The priority view does not fall 
victim to the objections which respectively face the principle of  utility and the 
principle of  equality. It explains why we sometimes should not simply maximise 
overall well-being, it avoids the levelling down objection and delivers the correct 
judgment in a simple case that fuels scepticism about pure utilitarianism.44 
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42 This objection has recently been raised by Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve (2009).
43 For a seminal formulation of  the numbers problem, see Taurek (1977).
44 This is a case discussed by Nagel (1979b, p.123).
Case (2): Imagine that somebody has two children and considers where to 
  move. Moving to the city would benefit the disabled and very 
  badly-off  child, for it is only there she could receive therapy and 
  treatment. Moving to the countryside, however, would benefit the 
  healthy child. The benefit that would accrue to the healthy child from 
  moving to the countryside is larger than the benefit that would accrue 
  to the disabled child from moving to the city. Where should one 
  move?
The priority view succeeds in delivering the correct verdict on this case and explains 
why one should move to the city. Unfortunately, the priority view invites another 
objection. Consider a variation of  case (2):45
Case (2*): Imagine that somebody is expecting a child. There is a 50% chance 
  that the child will be disabled and a 50% chance that the child will be 
  born healthy. Assume that one has to decide where to move before 
  the actual condition of  the child is known. One could move to the 
  countryside, which would leave a healthy child very well off  but a 
  disabled child very badly off. Alternatively, one could move to the 
  city, which would leave a healthy child merely well off, but be better 
  for a disabled child. Under this option, due to the availability of  
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45 In their original article, Otsuka and Voorhoeve discuss a number of cases, including the choice of 
medical treatment under conditions of uncertainty. For matters of simplicity, I shall employ a 
variant of case (2), which Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009, p.188) only mention briefly in response to a 
critic.
  treatment and therapy, the otherwise disabled child would be merely 
  badly off. Where should one move?
The force of  the challenge created by the introduction of  case (2*) does not rest on 
a substantive judgement about which option to pursue. The point is that a shift in 
judgement occurs when moving from case (2) to case (2*). Assume that the burdens 
and benefits accruing to a disabled and a healthy child under each option would be 
the same in each case. Even if  one believes that such a profile of  burdens and 
benefits justified a move to the countryside in case (2*), say one believes that even 
when applying the appropriate priority weighting the great countryside prospects 
for a potentially healthy child gain the upper hand, one still may not be justified in 
moving to the countryside in case (2).46 Otsuka and Voorhoeve argue that this 
observation about the shift in judgment that occurs when moving from the two-
person case (2) to the one-person case (2*) warrants two conclusions. Firstly, they 
believe that the extent to which one attaches additional significance to the well-
being of  somebody if  he or she is badly off  depends on whether that person is 
worse off  than others. This insight undermines the pure priority view. If  Otsuka and 
Voorhoeve are right, then (b) is false. Our considered convictions in case (2) and 
case (2*) illustrate "why it matters that some are worse off  than others." Secondly, 
the mistake that the prioritarian makes in offering (b) as her reasoning in support of 
(a) is that of  not taking seriously what has been called the separateness of  persons. 
When deciding what to do in the intrapersonal case, one could justify a decision to 
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46 Whether or not one would be justified in moving to the countryside in case (2) will depend on the 
magnitude and distribution of the respective burdens and benefits. To make the point against the 
priority view, it is enough to think of a case where the magnitude and distribution of benefits is such 
that they merely tip the balance in favor of  moving to the countryside in case (2*).   
move to the countryside "on the grounds that one was looking after that very same 
child's interest in flourishing" (Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009, p.188). Making up 
one's mind about what to do in the interpersonal case, this justification is not 
available. Unlike a group of  people, "a single person has a unity that renders it 
permissible to balance (expected) burdens and benefits against each other" (Otsuka 
and Voorhoeve 2009, p.179). The objection is not just that the pure priority view 
would deliver the wrong judgement all things considered, but that it is in principle 
insensitive to the distinction between cases involving trade-offs within one 
particular individual's life and trade-offs between the lives of  different individuals. 
The priority view permits the same form of  priority-weighted balancing, regardless 
of  whether the burdens and benefits accrue to a single individual or to different 
persons. It fails to recognise the separateness of  persons.
 There are three things that I have to say about the pure priority view and the 
separateness of  persons requirement. Firstly, I argue that the first conclusion offered 
above is unwarranted: It is not strictly speaking true that the observed shift in 
judgement supports the claim that it matters whether or not some are worse off  
than others. Secondly, I argue that the separateness of  persons objection still 
undermines the pure priority view and I defend Otsuka's and Voorhoeve's objection 
against two types of  critics. The first type of  critic is sceptical about the notion of  
the separateness of  persons and regards it as a mere "dogma of  deontology."47 In 
response to this critic, I distinguish between different types of  raising a separateness 
of  persons objection and argue that Otsuka's and Voorhoeve's argument only 
presupposes a very thin requirement, which even the consequentialist critic should 
have reason to accept. The second type of  critic argues that the pure priority view 
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47 For example Norcross (2009).  
can be rescued at little cost, for example by denying that the alleged shift in 
judgement takes place.48 I argue that such a rescue is not to be had. Pure versions of 
the priority view fall victim to the separateness of  persons objection.
2.1  On why it may not matter whether some are worse off than others
My first observation aims at making clear the force of  the separateness of  persons 
objection. I believe that the argument presented by Otsuka and Voorhoeve does not 
warrant the conclusion that it matters whether some are worse off  than others. It is 
not true that, in order to explain the shift in judgement that occurs when moving 
from case (2*) to case (2), one would need to "invoke interpersonal considerations 
that are essentially relational" (Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009, p.185). It is a mistake 
to argue that the priority view is mistaken because "in ruling out such essentially 
comparative considerations, it ignores the moral significance of  the separateness of  
persons" (Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009, p.185). The priority view is mistaken 
because it fails to take seriously the significance of  the separateness of  persons. 
However, one can take the separateness of  persons seriously without invoking 
considerations that are relational and comparative. One would need to present a 
different argument, that is, an argument not provided by Voorhoeve and Otsuka,49 
to show that one can only comply with the separateness of  persons requirement 
through recognizing the significance of  comparative considerations. To understand 
how the two considerations come apart, consider ways in which one can take the 
separateness of  persons seriously, at least in the way that the notion has been 
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48 For example O'Neill (2009).
49 I will argue that Otsuka and Voorhoeve have good reason to stick to a minimal understanding of 
the separateness of  persons in subsection 2.2.1 below. 
invoked against the priority view, and still remain insensitive to whether or not 
some are worse off  than others.
 The significance of  the separateness of  persons is not equivalent to the 
significance of  the fact that some are worse off  than others. One might think that 
our considered convictions in cases (2) and (2*) show that whether benefiting 
people matters more the worse off  they are is a function of  whether they are worse 
off  than others. I believe, however, that the question of  relative well-being is only of 
secondary or derivative importance. What really matters is whether the burdens and 
benefits in question would accrue to a single person or to different individuals. A 
further variant of  the cases discussed above clarifies what I have in mind:50
Case (2**): Imagine that somebody is expecting two children. She knows that one 
  of  them will be healthy and the other one will be disabled, while each 
  of  them has the same chance of  ending up in either condition. Each 
  of  them has a 50% chance of  being born healthy and a 50% chance of  
  ending up disabled, while the outcomes are inversely correlated. 
  Assume that the expecting parent has to decide where to move before 
  their actual conditions are known. She could move to the 
  countryside, which would leave a healthy child very well off  but a 
  disabled child very badly off. Alternatively, she could move to the 
  city which would leave a healthy child merely well off, but be better 
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50  Interestingly, a variant of this case is discussed by Otsuka and Voorhoeve in response to a view 
they call ex ante prioritarianism (Otsuka and Voorhoeve, 2008, p.196). However, they seem to be 
unaware of  the implications that this case has for their overall argument. 
  for a disabled child, which under that option, due to treatment and 
  therapy, would be merely badly off. Where should she move?
My point does not hinge on any particular substantive judgement about what to do 
in case (2**). However, I believe that there are two things that can be said about it. 
Firstly, there will be inequality between the two children. The disabled child will be 
worse off  than the healthy child. Moving to the countryside will increase that 
inequality, though moving to the city will diminish it. Secondly, in deciding which 
option to pursue, there is no separateness of  persons objection to be raised against 
employing the same priority weighted function as in the single person case (2*). If  
one thinks that it is permissible to move to the countryside in a case where one 
child has a 50% chance of  being born disabled, one may also think that it is 
permissible to move to the countryside in a case where two children have a 50% 
chance of  being born disabled. The reasoning in support of  such a verdict would be 
this: Just as in the single person case (2*), one can appeal to the interest of  each 
individual in the two-person case (2**). If  one can justify a move to the countryside 
to a child with a 50% chance of  being born disabled in case (2*), one can justify 
moving to the countryside to a child with the same prospects in case (2**). The 
justification for moving to the countryside respects the separateness of  persons, 
even though moving to the countryside is the option that increases the inequality 
between the worse-off  and the better-off. One might object to a principle that treats 
cases (2*) and (2**) equivalently, such as ex ante prioritarianism,on other grounds.51 
However, ex ante prioritarianism is a position that satisfies the separateness of  
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51  Unlike standard prioritarianism, ex ante prioritarianism does not apply expected value reasoning 
to priority-weighted outcomes, but gives priority to those with the lowest expected-utility prospects. 
persons requirement as introduced by Otsuka and Voorhoeve and still remains 
insensitive to whether or not some are worse off  than others. The separateness of  
persons objection does not deliver a genuinely egalitarian concern. 
2.2  Defending the separateness of persons objection against two critics
I believe that the separateness of  persons objection still undermines the pure 
priority view. There are two ways in which one could resist such a conclusion. 
Some might argue that because the idea of  the separateness of  persons is 
notoriously ambiguous and controversial, mere appeal to it will not succeed in 
undermining an otherwise plausible normative principle. Until we clarify, interpret 
and defend the notion of  the separateness of  persons, it does not rule out 
anything.52 Others believe that the prioritarian could simply resist the line of  
argument offered by Otsuka and Voorhoeve, for example by denying that the 
relevant shift in judgement occurs when moving from case (2) to case (2*). I shall 
respond to each critic in turn.  
 
2.2.1  The "dogma of deontology" objection
The idea of  the separateness of  persons has often been invoked in opposition to 
utilitarian positions.53 But even though there seems to a be a reasonably clear 
meaning to the idea of  the separateness of  persons, i.e., the idea that the boundaries 
between individual lives are morally significant, it is not so clear what that 
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52 For an exploration of  the force of  the separateness of  persons, see for example Brink (1993).
53  The idea underpinning the separateness of persons has been discussed among others by Rawls 
(1999, p.26), Nagel (1970, p.142), Williams (1981, p.3) and Nozick (1974, p.33).
significance actually amounts to.54 Utilitarians may defend themselves against a 
separateness of  persons objection by arguing that it does not in fact rule out any of  
their particular commitments. Iwao Hirose (2009), for example, maintains that the 
separateness of  persons requirement is compatible with the aggregation of  burdens 
and benefits across individuals. Alistair Norcross (2009, p.76) argues that because 
"the charge is often made, but rarely explained in any detail, much less argued for 
(...) the separateness of  persons objection poses no special threat to 
consequentialism." David Brink (1993, p.253) believes that the idea of  the 
separateness of  persons does not support a contractualist or deontological 
commitment, and also does not rule out consequentialist or teleological theories: "I 
am skeptical that the separateness of  persons can play successfully either the 
negative or the constructive role." If  it is true that the separateness of  persons 
objection is a mere "deontological dogma," then maybe it poses no special threat to 
the priority view either. I respond to this challenge by distinguishing between three 
different ways of  pressing a separateness of  persons objection against a distributive 
view. While some ways of  making the objection would require further argument, 
the particular objection made by Otsuka and Voorhoeve only relies on a very thin 
requirement.  
 Firstly, the idea of  the separateness of  persons can be invoked to formulate a 
scope-based objection against a particular distributive view. Such an objection 
claims that proponents of  the distributive view under attack make a mistake about 
the scope of  their preferred distributive principle. More precisely, the objection takes 
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54 Parfit refers to the idea of the separateness of persons as "one of the fundamental facts underlying 
all reasons for acting" captured by the observation: "We are different people, each with his own life 
to lead" (Parfit, 1984, p.329).
issue with the claim that a given distributive principle is appropriately applied in 
intra- and interpersonal cases alike. The moral significance of  the boundary 
between individual lives is referred to when arguing that there is a relevant 
difference between choices affecting multiple individuals and choices affecting just 
one individual.55 This difference, it is claimed, renders it inappropriate to apply one 
and the same principle to both instances. To take the idea of  the separateness of  
persons seriously is to insist that different distributive principles apply in each case. 
Note that pressing a separateness of  persons scope objection is compatible with 
maintaining that the proposed distributive principle is adequate as a principle for 
settling either only intra- or only interpersonal questions. There are different ways 
of  making a scope mistake. One might wrongly apply a principle that is adequate 
for intrapersonal cases to questions of  interpersonal conflict. This seems to be part 
of  Rawls's concern when he objects that, "the utilitarian extends to society the 
principle of  choice for one man" (Rawls 1999, p.28). Alternatively, one might 
wrongly apply a principle that is appropriate in cases of  interpersonal conflict to 
intrapersonal questions.56 
 Secondly, the idea of  the separateness of  persons might be invoked to 
formulate a non-scope-based objection. Here the moral significance of  boundaries 
between individual lives is thought to eliminate a given distributive principle as 
appropriate for settling interpersonal distributive conflicts. The claim is not that 
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55 Scope-based arguments illustrate how the idea of the separateness of persons relates to the idea of 
the unity of persons. The separateness of persons A and B is equivalent to the lack of unity of A and 
B as a group, i.e., a unity which they individually possess.   
56  As Nagel (1979b, p.120) notes, this would be "the reverse of Rawls' argument: no special 
distributive principle should apply within within  human lives because that would be to extend to the 
individual the principle of  choice appropriate for society."
different principles have to apply depending on whether one is dealing with intra- or 
interpersonal cases, but simply that a given principle fails to take seriously the 
morally relevant characteristics of  the interpersonal case at hand. One might reject 
some distributive principle because it violates the requirements coming along with 
the separateness of  persons, and still believe that some other principle should 
govern both intra- and interpersonal cases. An egalitarian who is committed to a 
reductionist view of  personal identity might, for example, object to utilitarianism on 
the ground that it fails to take seriously the separateness of  persons, and argue that 
an egalitarian distributive principle should apply to both intrapersonal and 
interpersonal cases.57 In illustration of  the distinction between content and scope-
based objections, consider two claims:
 (P1) The sum of  expected benefits should be maximized within an 
  individual person's life. 
 (P1*) The sum of  expected benefits should be maximized across the lives of  
  different individuals.
If  one presses a non-scope-based separateness of  persons objection, one rejects 
(P1*) because it fails to take seriously the boundaries between individuals but one 
remains neutral on whether there is some alternative principle (Pn*) such that one 
can simultaneously believe in (Pn) and (Pn*). If  one presses a separateness of  
persons scope objection, one claims that it is wrong to hold both (P1) and (P1*) 
because one thinks that one and the same principle must not be applied to single 
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57  For a reductionist view about personal identity, see Parfit (1984). For the argument that an 
egalitarian concern appropriately applies within one person's life, see McKerlie (2001).
and multiple individual cases alike. Each objection relies on the idea of  the 
separateness of  persons. 
 Thirdly, one could argue that instead of  mattering directly for the scope and 
content of  one's preferred distributive principle, the separateness of  persons imposes 
requirements on the reasoning behind one's preferred distributive principles, for 
their mode of  justification, or the method by which one arrives at them. One 
objects to a distributive view because the reasoning it offers in support of  its 
principles does not reflect the moral significance of  boundaries between individuals. 
Call this the justification objection. Rawls does not only object to utilitarianism 
because "many people are fused into one" (Rawls 1999, p.26), but he finds fault 
with the impartial spectator reasoning employed in its support. It seems that for 
Scanlon (1998) and Nagel (1979a), the separateness of  persons requirement is 
primarily about the acceptability of  principles to individuals. To respect the fact that 
we each have our own life to lead, principles ought to be acceptable from each 
individual's point of  view. When pressing a separateness of  persons objection one 
might take issue with the content and scope of  a distributive principle, or with the 
justification offered in its support.  
 It is often the case that these various objections go hand in hand. If  one 
objects to a specific justificatory mode, it is likely that there is also something wrong 
with the principles it gives rise to. However, the three objections are logically 
independent. David Brink, for example, argues that the justificatory mode of  
contractualism offers a plausible interpretation of  the separateness of  persons 
requirement, but objects to the anti-aggregative conclusions that Nagel's or 
Scanlon's criteria of  unanimity or non-rejectability give rise to.58 The independence 
65
58 See for example Brink (1993, p.264 ff).
of  different ways of  making a separateness of  persons objection is important for 
two reasons. It might firstly be the case that the best argument available only 
supports one of  the objections. A distributive view vulnerable to a scope-based 
objection might, for example, still get the content of  interpersonal principles right. 
Secondly, different objections correspond to different ways of  taking the 
separateness of  persons seriously. Whether the moral significance of  the boundaries 
between individuals primarily imposes requirements on the justification of  
normative principles or whether it matters directly for the content and scope of  
these principles will have a bearing on one's wider normative commitments and the 
project one is engaged in. 
 One can rely on these observations when making three points in response to 
the objection of  "deontological dogma." First: The separateness of  persons 
objection put forward by Otsuka and Voorhoeve is a scope-based objection. They 
turn against the priority view on the ground that it employs the exact same principle 
in both the inter- and the intrapersonal case. However, they remain uncommitted on 
the question of  whether some version of  the priority view is appropriate for settling 
the interpersonal distribution of  burdens and benefits. Second: Out of  the three 
different types of  objections, scope-based objections are established most easily. A 
scope-based objection can be pressed without presupposing a full interpretation of  
the separateness of  persons requirement. Indeed, one can understand a particular 
scope-based objection as part of  such interpretation. The interpretation is offered 
employing one's considered convictions in a particular case of  distributive conflict. 
Third: Otsuka and Voorhoeve convincingly present such a case. While it may be 
true that some ways of  invoking the separateness of  persons are obscure, and one 
cannot simply refer to the notion without offering a well-argued interpretation of  its 
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normative requirements, the particular objection made by Otsuka and Voorhoeve is 
far off  from merely invoking a "deontological dogma."
2.2.2  Deny the shift? 
Advocates of  the priority view could turn against Otsuka's and Voorhoeve's scope-
based objection by denying that a shift occurs when moving from case (2*) to case 
(2).59 Maybe we should reconsider our considered conviction in light of  a good 
reason for why the two cases should in fact be treated on par? One could assimilate 
the individual case under risk to the two-person case and argue that the former 
should be treated like the latter. Alternatively, one could provide an argument in 
support of  the claim that the principle appropriate for the one-person case should 
also apply in the two person-case. I consider an argument in support of  the first 
strategy and argue that it fails. 
 Martin O'Neill argues that, "even one person cases, when they involve risk, 
can involve the sort of  trade-offs that Otsuka and Voorhoeve see as being 
characteristic only of  many-person distributive cases" (O'Neill 2009, p.16). His 
reasoning advances two central claims. First: We should think of  cases imposing 
risks on individuals as trade-offs between different future persons.60 Second: If  it is 
permissible to choose the option that would benefit the better-off  future person in 
the one-person case involving risk, e.g., move to the countryside in case (2*), it is 
permissible to pursue the option that would benefit the person actually better off  in 
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59 This is a strategy suggested by Martin O'Neill (2009, p.16 ff). 
60  He says: "According to the Priority View, given that outcomes rather than prospects are the 
bearers of moral value, the claims of particular individuals under conditions of risk are effectively 
proxies or stand-ins for the claims of the possible future individuals (that is, their different future 
selves) who will endure those outcomes" (O'Neill, 2009, p.17).
the two-person case.61 The first claim seems to deliver the rationale for the second 
claim, while it itself  rests on an auxiliary observation: Because outcomes are 
morally more important than prospects, the justification in terms of  prospects, 
which Otsuka and Voorhoeve offer in support of  the claim that it may be 
permissible to do what would benefit a healthy child in the one-person risk case, is 
insufficient.62
 My response to O'Neill is threefold. Firstly, I do not believe that the auxiliary 
observation is true. The claim that outcomes are, other things being equal, more 
important than prospects, is compatible with the claim that prospects can justify 
pursuing one course of  action rather than another. Consider a case where the 
presence or absence of  a justification in terms of  prospects matters crucially for the 
permissibility of  an option. Assume that in a case where two employees, a clerk and 
a secretary, have been taken hostage by a bank robber, the police will have to choose 
which of  two options to pursue. Option A, which entails blowing up part of  the 
building, will certainly lead to the death of  the secretary but certainly save the clerk. 
Option B, which entails sending in a SWAT team, will give both the secretary and 
the clerk an objective 50% chance of  survival, while one of  them will certainly be 
killed. Which option should the police pursue?63 It seems clear that option B is 
better than option A. In fact, it seems impermissible to pursue option A if  option B 
is also available. If  only one of  two individuals can be saved, then one ought to give 
everybody an equal chance for being saved. However, the impermissibility of  option 
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61 See O'Neill (2009, p.18).
62 See O'Neill (2009, p.17).
63  This case is structurally similar to cases that Broome considers when discussing fairness and 
equality under conditions of uncertainty, which in turn are based on an example introduced by Peter 
Diamond, see: Broome (1991, p.185 ff) and Diamond (1967).
A can only be explained in terms of  prospects. It is the fairness in the distribution of 
prospects that explains why A is to be preferred to B. From the point of  view of  an 
impartial theory exclusively focused on outcomes, one ought to be indifferent 
between options A and B. Note that prioritarians could respond by arguing that 
prospects do in fact confer benefits upon individuals, that these benefits should be 
considered when assessing outcomes and one thus ought to prefer policy B to policy 
A. While this might be a generally plausible line of  thought, it is not available in the 
particular context at hand. It is the point of  Martin O'Neill's response to the scope 
objection to deny the significance of  prospects and insist on the importance of  
actual outcomes. If  prospects matter, for example, as discounted or surrogate 
outcomes, then one might well be right in claiming that what in virtue of  certain 
prospects is permissible in case (2*), for lack of  such a prospect is impermissible in 
case (2).
 Secondly, I am sceptical about the first central claim. One should not think 
about risk in terms of  trade-offs between future persons. In the case of  the bank 
robber and the police, assimilating trade-offs between different future people to 
trade-offs between actual individuals creates a simple problem: It is neither clear 
how many future individuals would be involved under each option, nor how one 
should conceive of  the trade-off  of  burdens and benefits between them. Option B, it 
seems, would contain a future living secretary, a future dead secretary, a future 
living clerk and a future dead clerk. But what future people populate option A? And 
how exactly does one know, which future person one ought to benefit? Advocates of 
O'Neill's strategy may respond that one should only think about risk in terms of  
future people when dealing with a case involving just one individual. This response, 
however, fails to convince for two reasons. Firstly, the response appears ad hoc: 
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Why should questions of  risk be approached in fundamentally different ways in 
each case? Secondly, note that the future-person reasoning runs up against a 
problem, even when only applied in a one-person case: Imagine an individual 
facing a situation where one option occurs with a likelihood of  one third and 
another option with the likelihood of  two thirds. How does one account for these 
probabilities? Assuming that it is difficult to deal with fractions of  future people, the 
most natural way of  accommodating these probabilities may be by thinking of  the 
risk as a trade-off  between differently seized groups of  future individuals. But this 
approach will have another unwelcome consequence: The question of  whether and 
how the numbers should count, would arise even in one person-cases. Given the 
difficulties involved in answering questions about numbers, one should think twice 
before committing to an understanding of  risk as a trade-off  between future 
persons.
 My third response questions the second central claim. It is not the case that a 
similar profile of  burdens and benefits would render benefiting the better-off  
individual permissible in the one- and two-person cases alike. One might plausibly 
think that our considered convictions in case (2) and case (2*) are enough to discard 
O'Neill's claim. The fact that we assess (2) and (2*) differently speaks against 
O'Neill's two central claims and the auxiliary observation, rather than the other way 
around. However, there is another consideration one can draw on in response to 
O'Neill. Even if  we granted that prospects do not matter, and even if  we agreed that 
risk should be conceived of  as a trade-off  between future persons, there still remains 
a good explanation for why our judgement from the one-person case does not carry 
over to the two-person case: My two future selves bear a different relationship to 
each other than two actual persons do. They are both my future selves and they 
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both share a common past self, whereas there is no such link in the case of  two 
actual individuals. An individual life has a kind of  unity which explains the 
relationship between present and future selves.64 And the fact that this different 
relationship should matter for how we trade off  burdens and benefits should not 
come as a surprise: The unity of  persons is the flip-side of  the separateness of  
persons. It is not only the case that our convictions stand against O'Neill's second 
central claim, but there are good reasons which confirm this conviction and explain 
why it is justified. 
3.  Nagel's contractualism and the numbers objection
Thomas Nagel claims to take the separateness of  persons requirement seriously 
when arguing that in cases involving more than one individual, any claim to a 
scarce good must be justified in light of  the claims of  others. Three ideas are central 
to his version of  contractualism: The criterion of  universal acceptability, the 
method of  pairwise comparison and the resulting principle of  strict priority. First: 
Nagel (1970) believes that because moral reasoning involves putting oneself  into the 
shoes of  others, the distribution of  a good must be acceptable from every 
individual’s point of  view. Second: To achieve universal acceptability, one ought to 
proceed by pairwise comparison. If  individuals A, B and C each have a claim to 
some indivisible good G, one begins by asking whether A’s claim to G is stronger 
than B’s claim to G. A’s claim to G is stronger than B’s claim to G if  A has a greater 
complaint than B in the case of  not receiving G. If  A has such a greater complaint, 
71
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between different present people can be illustrated by an example of Nozick. Presumably, the idea 
that "we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later" (Nozick, 1974, p.32) applies primarily where 
I am making the sacrifice of  going to the dentist for my own future selves.
one then checks whether A’s claim is stronger than C’s claim. If  it is, A receives the 
good in question. If  it is not, one compares B’s claim to C’s claim etc. Third: In 
determining the magnitude of  a complaint, it matters how well off  the claimant is 
and it is more difficult to justify giving a benefit to somebody who is already better 
off. Considering whether or not a distribution is universally acceptable, one thus 
focuses on the point of  view of  the worst-off  individual: "Where there is conflict of  
interests, no result can be acceptable to everyone. But it is possible to assess each 
result from each point of  view to try to find the one that is least unacceptable to the 
person to whom it is most unacceptable. This means that any other alternative will 
be more unacceptable to someone than this alternative is to anyone. The preferred 
alternative is in that sense the least unacceptable, considered from each person's 
point of  view separately" (Nagel 1979b, p.123). Jointly, the requirement of  universal 
acceptability and the claim that it is harder to justify benefiting somebody who is 
already better off  deliver the principle of  lexical or strict priority: One distribution is 
better than another, if  it is better for the respectively worst-off  individual. 
 Nagel's position seems to deliver the right results. The contractualist 
egalitarian commitment to strict priority succeeds in explaining why we ought to 
benefit the worst-off  and avoids both the separateness of  persons objection and the 
levelling down objection. Because the requirement of  universal acceptability, which 
gives rise to the method of  pairwise comparison and is satisfied by strict priority for 
the worst-off, applies only in cases involving conflicting claims of  different 
individuals, contractualist egalitarians can explain the shift that occurs when 
moving from the intra- to the interpersonal case. However, contractualist 
egalitarianism falls victim to a different objection. Unfortunately, there are cases 
where the contractualist egalitarian commitment to strict priority gives rise to a 
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problem. Consider another simple case:
Case (3):  Imagine that somebody has 10 children and considers where 
   to move. Moving to the city would be slightly better for one of  
   the children whose mild hay fever would improve under that 
   option. Moving to the countryside, however, would be 
   significantly better for the other nine children. Where should 
   one move?
It seems that even though a move to the countryside would make the worst-off  
child slightly worse off, one should move to the countryside and thereby confer a 
significant benefit on the other nine children. Unfortunately, this judgement is not 
to be had if  one believes in the principle of  strict priority. If  one believes that one 
distribution is better than another just in case it is better for the respectively worst-
off  individual, one cannot prefer a distribution that is worse for the worst-off  
individual, even if  it leaves the worst-off  individual only slightly worse off  and is 
significantly better for a great number of  people. The contractualist commitment to 
strict priority is insufficiently sensitive to the number of  people affected by each 
option.
 As I shall argue, Thomas Nagel's contractualist commitment to the method 
of  pairwise comparison and the principle of  strict priority is vulnerable to three 
kinds of  numbers objections. I introduce each objection and argue that apparent 
responses to each objection fail. One could try and resist the numbers objection by 
supplementing Nagel's formulation of  the pairwise comparison approach, for 
example through modifying one's understanding of  what considerations give rise to 
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individual complaints. I believe that all such attempts fail. The only way of  coming 
to terms with the numbers objection is to adopt a pluralist perspective.
3.1  Three instances of the numbers objection
Nagel’s solution of  achieving a universally acceptable distribution through pairwise 
comparison encounters what I call the numbers problem. This problem arises in 
cases involving the allocation of  burdens and benefits between differently sized 
groups of  individuals. I consider three instances of  this problem. The first one is 
that of  case (3) introduced in the introduction above, call it the "many weaker 
claims" - instance: Nagel’s solution fails to accommodate our considered 
convictions in cases where the weaker claims of  a great number of  people stand 
against the stronger claims of  fewer individuals. Applying the method of  pairwise 
comparison, the claim of  one child suffering from a mild hay fever would beat the 
claims of  all other nine healthy children. Counterintuitively, moving to the city 
would turn out to be the course of  action required. 
 Secondly, the method of  pairwise comparison sometimes fails to deliver a 
transitive ranking of  distributive options involving various individuals. Call this the 
"transitivity" - instance of  the numbers problem:65 
Case (4): Assume one can allocate three pills among (a) the members of  a 
  group of  three, and (b) an additional fourth person. All four people 
  have all four limbs paralysed. If  one gives a pill to a member of  the 
  group of  three, she will have use of  both arms restored and each 
  additional pill would be wasted on her. If  one gives one pill to the 
  fourth person, she will have the use of  one arm restored, a second pill 
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  would restore her second arm, and a third pill would also restore one 
  of  her legs. It seems that one is faced with four reasonable options. 
  One could (i) give each member of  the group a pill and none to the 
  fourth person, (ii) give two members of  the group a pill and one to the 
  single person, (iii) give one pill to a group member and two to the 
  fourth person, and (iv) give all pills to the single individual. How 
  should the pills be allocated between the four individuals?
It is not straightforwardly clear how the three pills ought to be allocated between 
the four individuals. However, the principles informing one's decision-making 
should single out one distribution as superior to others. Now think about the 
options in case (4) from Nagel’s point of  view. Option (i) should be preferred to 
option (ii) because the complaint of  a group member not having two arms restored 
would be greater than the complaint of  the single individual not having one arm 
restored. Option (ii) would be preferred to (iii) because the complaint of  a group 
member not having two arms restored is greater than the complaint of  the single 
individual not having a second arm restored. Similarly, option (iii) should be 
preferred to option (iv) because the complaint of  a group member not having two 
arms restored is greater than the complaint of  the single individual not having his 
leg restored. Option (iv), however, should be preferred to option (i) because the 
single individual’s complaint against not having three limbs restored is greater than 
each group member's claim against not having two arms restored. One thus ends up 
with a choice-defeating cycle of  preferences or ranking of  the different options: (i) > 
(ii) > (iii) > (iv) > (i).
 Thirdly, consider how one versus many rescue cases raise another problem 
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for Nagel’s account of pairwise comparison.66  Consider case (5), where Nagel’s 
method apparently fails to deliver the right result:67
Case (5): Imagine that somebody is in a boat, the tide is rising and she faces 
  two options. She could head north and rescue a single individual 
  called David who is stranded on a rock and would otherwise drown 
  in the rising sea. Alternatively, she could head south and rescue a 
  group of  50 people who are in the same situation as David sitting on 
  a different rock. It is impossible to rescue the group of  50 and David. 
  Should the person in the boat head north or should she head south?
Without taking a stance on how exactly this distributive conflict ought to be 
resolved, I believe that any reasonable way of  allocating the benefit of  being 
rescued between David and the 50 should render it more likely that one rescues the 
50. But what does Nagel’s method of  pairwise comparison require in this case? 
Remember that Nagel proposes that a distribution of  burdens and benefits should 
be acceptable from the point of  view of  those for whom it is least acceptable. 
Rescuing 50 would leave David with the complaint of  certain death. Rescuing 
David would leave each of  the other 50 with the complaint of  certain death. 
Tossing a coin to decide whether to head north or south leaves both David and the 
group of  50 with a 50% chance of  survival. It seems that this lottery approach 
provides the solution most acceptable to those it is least acceptable for. If  the coin 
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66  These cases are introduced by John Taurek (1977) and Elisabeth Anscombe (1967). One could 
think that case (5) is similar to case (3) considered above. However, case (5) is different, as here 
individuals do not have differential claims to the good in question. 
67 This draws on Taurek (1977).
comes off  heads and one rescues David, each individual at least had a 50% chance 
of  being rescued, which is more acceptable than not having had a chance of  being 
rescued. If  the coin comes off  tails and one rescues the group of  50, David at least 
had a ½ chance of  being rescued, which is more acceptable than not having had the 
chance of  being rescued.68 It seems that Nagel's method of  pairwise comparison 
would require to toss a coin. Unfortunately, this solution does not sit well with 
some important considered convictions. Would one really be prepared to rescue 
David in case the coin comes off  heads? I believe that other options, such as 
rescuing the greater number, or running a weighted lottery would more adequately 
reflect our judgements in this particular case.
3.2  An objection to the "many weaker claims" objection rejected
Defending the method of  pairwise comparison, its advocates could respond to the 
intuitive objection raised through case (3) by modifying their understanding of  what 
gives rise to a complaint. They could respond to the "many weaker claims" -
objection by denying that in the case under consideration, the claims of  the many 
are in fact weaker. Currently, case (3) presents a problem because we have assumed 
that the worst-off  individual would always have the greatest complaint in case of  
not choosing the option that would be better for her. We think that one should 
move to the city because that would leave the worst-off  individual better offer, such 
as in a representation of  case (3), which for the moment leaves considerations of  
how many healthy children there are aside:   
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68 This line of  reasoning draws on Parfit’s (2003) analysis of  Scanlon’s contractualist position.
City Countryside
Hay fever Child 19 18
Healthy Child 20 30
Not relying on any considerations having to do with the number of  people involved, 
advocates of  pairwise comparison could pre-empt the force of  case (3) by arguing 
that even if  we are considering what to do when there is just one healthy child and 
one child suffering from hay fever, we ought to move to the countryside. Doing so 
would require a modified understanding of  what gives rise to a complaint. 
Advocates of  pairwise comparison could argue that the size of  a person's complaint 
is not only a function of  her absolute level of  well-being under each option, such 
that her complaint against an option is bigger the worse off  she would respectively 
be, but also of  how great her loss would be compared to that alternative distribution 
which would be most beneficial to her.69 We ought to move to the countryside, so 
the argument may go, because the loss-induced complaint of  the healthy child 
against the city option is greater than the absolute level-induced complaint that the 
hay fever child would have against the countryside option. It seems that if  this 
response convinces in cases where there is one individual that stands to benefit from 
pursuing the option that does not benefit the worst-off  individual, it also delivers 
the intuitively correct judgment in the original version of  case (3) involving ten 
healthy children. 
 Unfortunately, there are two considerations that speak against rescuing the 
method of  pairwise comparison from case (3) by making complaints a function of  
individual losses. Firstly, consider a case put forward in an argument by Alex 
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69 This option is discussed by Scanlon (1998, p. 213). I follow Alex Voorhoeve's exposition of it, c.f. 
Voorhoeve (2010, p.2).
Voorhoeve (2010). Imagine that you are at the centre of  a circular island, that there 
are 900 individuals located around the shore of  the island, that all 900 individuals 
suffer from a disease that will kill them after 1000 days, that all 900 individuals have 
just been infected and the disease progresses day by day, that you possess a 
medicine that could stop the disease and leave the individual in the state she was in 
when given the medicine, and that the individuals are located a one-day drive from 
one another around the island. Imagine that you can take one of  two roads to get to 
the shore and start driving round the island on a one-way road delivering the 
medicine. Using the first road it will take you a day to get to the shore, you will be 
able to cure individual 1 after one day, cure individual 2 after two days and so on. 
Using the second road it will take you two days to get to the shore, you will reach it 
further to the west and you will be able to cure individual 900 after two days, 
individual 1 after three days, individual 2 after four days and so on. Choosing the 
second road would leave everyone somewhat worse off  but individual 900 
significantly better off. Consider a simple table, where the numbers indicate the 
number of  days each individual would have to wait, and thus the level of  disease 
progression at which they would be cured under each option:
First Road Second Road
Individual 1 1 3
Individual 2 2 4
... ... ...
Individual 899 899 901
Individual 900 900 2
It seems that when deciding which road to take, you should take the first road. 
Doing so would be better for the worst-off  individual, the second-worst-off  
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individual and so on. However, using the amended method of  pairwise comparison 
where the size of  a complaint is a function of  both absolute well-being and 
potential loss, you ought to take road two. Taking the second road, the worst-off  
individual is only minimally worse off  than the worst-off  individual under the first 
road option. However, if  you take the first road, individual 900 could complain that 
she will have to forgo a benefit of  898. Nobody would have a comparable loss/
benefit-induced complaint against taking the second road. 
 The second worry concerns the effectiveness of  the proposed response 
against other variants of  case (3). Advocates of  pairwise comparison cannot always 
expect the benefit/loss complaint to deliver the intuitively correct response. We 
could think of  cases where the benefit forgone by healthy children when moving to 
the city would be just as big as the benefit forgone by a disabled child when moving 
to the countryside, but where the number of  healthy children gives us a decisive 
reason to move to the countryside. Would one move to the city just to make one 
child that is slightly worse off  than her siblings better off, even if  one's other 200 
children would benefit from moving to the countryside? It seems that having the 
losses count does not go all the way in successfully deflecting the challenge that 
case (3) poses to contractualist egalitarianism.
3.3  A response to the intransitivity challenge rebutted
One may attempt to rescue the method of  pairwise comparison from the second 
instance of  the numbers problem and argue that the intransitivity objection does 
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indeed fail. There is one such attempted rescue that is worth considering.70 Hsieh, 
Strudler and Wasserman (2007) have suggested that an intransitive ranking arises 
only if  one restricts pairwise comparison to a sequence of  binary choices, whereas 
the method of  pairwise comparison properly understood presupposes that an 
individual complaint is assessed against the background of  all available alternatives. 
I shall argue that this response fails.
 Hsieh's, Strudler's and Wassermann's (2007) alternative interpretation of  the 
method of  pairwise comparison, which they claim is both superior to Otsuka's 
interpretation and avoids the intransitivity problem, comprises three steps. It is set 
against the background of  a simple observation, namely the observation that in the 
case introduced by Otsuka, the situation of  the respectively worst-off  individual 
would be the same under each distributive alternative. Regardless of  what one does, 
the worst-off  individual(s) will always end up limbless. The first step then consists 
of  a claim about how to understand a complaint: Hsieh, Strudler and Wassermann 
suggest that instead of  understanding the complaint of  the worst-off  individual as 
primarily a function of  the size of  the benefit potentially forgone, one should 
assume that the worst-off  individual has a complaint if  and only if  she could be 
made better off  without anyone else thereby being made as badly off  as she is. If  
one could go from a situation in which a person is limbless to a situation in which 
she has one arm restored, without it being the case that somebody else thereby 
becomes limbless, then the person would have a complaint in case that option is not 
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70  Frances Kamm (2005) has produced another twofold response. She argues that advocates of 
pairwise comparison could deny that the size of the benefit matters for the strength of individual 
complaints. She also suggests that a distinction between different ways of conferring a benefit may 
help avoid the intransitive cycle. For a critical assessment of these two strands of argument, see 
Hsieh, Strudler and Wasserman (2007). 
pursued. The second step argues that instead of  understanding pairwise comparison 
as concerned with pairs of  alternatives, it should "look at all four alternatives 
together" (Hsieh et al. 2007, p.505). The idea is that a person's complaint should be 
assessed against a background of  feasible alternatives: "If  different alternatives are 
available or existing alternatives are no longer available, her complaint about a 
given alternative may change" (Hsieh et al. 2007, p.503). The third step runs these 
claims together and delivers a new ranking of  the options (i) to (iv) in case (4). 
Applying Hsieh's, Strudler's and Wasserman's notion of  a complaint while looking 
at all four alternatives simultaneously delivers the following picture: There is 
nobody who would have a complaint if  one chose option (i) or option (ii), because 
there is no alternative that would make the worst-off  better off  without making 
anyone else as badly off. However, choosing distributive option (iii) or (iv), there 
would be at least one worst-off  person, one member of  the group of  three in (iii) 
and two members of  the group of  three in (iv), who could be made better off  
without anyone else becoming as badly off. Choosing option (ii) over (iii), for 
example, would make one limbless person better off  without anyone else thereby 
becoming limbless. This reasoning delivers the following ranking: (i) = (ii) > (iii) = 
(iv). This ranking may be incomplete (it does not single out one superior option), 
however, it is not intransitive. Otsuka's objection, it appears, is misguided. 
 There is a simple way of  responding to this particular argument. Note that 
the response put forward by Hsieh et al. relies on the assumption that whether or 
not somebody has a complaint is a function of  the available alternatives. 
Consequently, whether it is permissible or required to pursue a particular option 
will also depend on the available alternatives. There are of  course cases where it is 
clearly true that what I am permitted or required to do depends on the available 
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alternatives. Whether or not I am required, or maybe even permitted to save Peter 
from drowning, depends on whether I could also rescue Peter and Mary from 
drowning. However, there are other cases where such dependence on available 
alternatives has problematic implications. Consider the ranking of  options that 
Hsieh's et al. interpretation of  the complaint model delivers when applied to the 
original version of  case (4): (i) = (ii) > (iii) = (iv). We either ought to give a pill to 
each of  the members of  the group of  three, or give a pill to two members of  this 
group and one pill to the single individual. We ought to be indifferent between these 
two options, though they are both superior to (iii) and (iv). One of  the 
recommendations implied by this picture is this: We ought to bring about (i) rather 
than (iii). But now imagine that option (ii) is removed from the feasible set. Assume 
that it is, for whatever reason, no longer possible to give a pill to each of  the 
members of  the group of  three. The removal of  (ii) has an interesting implication: 
Option (i) is no longer preferred to (iii). Because it is no longer possible to make the 
limbless members of  the group of  three better off  without making anyone else 
limbless, there is no more complaint against distribution (iii), nor in fact against 
distribution (iv). The new ranking is: (i) = (iii) = (iv). But if  it was previously the 
case that we ought to bring about (i) rather than (iii), why should we become 
indifferent between these two options only because some independent alternative is 
removed from the feasible set? The solution advocated by Hsieh, Strudler and 
Wasserman violates the plausible principle that "if  x is to be preferred to y when 
they are elements of  the feasible set S, then x must be preferred to y when they are 
elements of  the feasible set T which is a subset of  S" (Otsuka 2004, p.420). Imagine 
that in a version of  case (4) where all options are available, there is a decisive moral 
reason that somebody has not to bring about option (ii), for instance, if  doing so 
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would prevent her from discharging another obligation entirely independent of  the 
case at hand. It seems uncontroversial that under these circumstances one is 
required to do (i). But as option (ii), that is, an option it was permissible for or even 
required not to pursue in the first place, and which one had no intentions of  
bringing about, becomes unavailable, one is no longer required to pursue option (i). 
Under the Hsieh et al. model, whether or not one is required to pursue a particular 
option will depend on the absence or presence of  options one may permissibly 
refrain from pursuing. This, I believe, is a good reason to turn against their 
account.71 
 
3.4  Why pluralism is the only way of responding to the numbers objection
There are three basic strategies that advocates of  contractualism and pairwise 
comparison could pursue in fending off  the numbers objection. Firstly, they could 
try and render the method of  pairwise comparison sensitive to number concerns, 
for example by allowing that aggregates of  individual claims matter for the 
acceptability of  a distribution. Secondly, they could try to explain the significance 
of  numbers from within their individualist framework and without allowing that 
claims of  different individuals be aggregated. Thirdly, they could become pluralist 
and allow that considerations of  numbers be balanced against the individualist 
approach of  pairwise comparison. The present section argues that only this last 
option is in fact available to them.  
 The first strategy is dismissed easily. The idea that a distribution has to be 
acceptable from each individual's point of  view lies at the heart of  the contractualist 
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71  I shall offer a full defense of this claim in chapter 3, where I discuss Frances Kamm's argument 
that violating the independence of  irrelevant alternatives condition may be unproblematic. 
commitment. To allow that a greater number of  claims outweighs a smaller number 
of  equally strong or even stronger claims would not only leave contractualism 
without a foundation, but render it vulnerable to the same type of  objection (for 
example that of  not taking seriously the separateness of  persons), which other 
views fall victim to and the avoidance of  which accounted for the attraction of  
contractualist egalitarianism in the first place. As Nagel himself  notes, employing 
the first strategy would be to give up on the contractualist framework: “But if  
egalitarian urgency is itself  sensitive to numbers in this way, it does not seem that 
any form of  unanimity criterion could explain the foundation of  the view” (Nagel 
1979b, p.125). The first strategy thus ought to be rejected.
 The second strategy can only be dismissed by an argument that proceeds by 
elimination. So far, none of  the proposed attempts to generate a concern for 
numbers from the individualist premises of  contractualism and within the method 
of  pairwise comparison has succeeded. I shall briefly recapitulate two prominent 
attempts to resist the objection of  the rescue case (5) and explain why they fail.72 
Frances Kamm and Thomas Scanlon argue that when equally strong claims conflict 
with each other, the number of  claimants should serve as a tie-breaker, for 
otherwise we would deny the significance of  the presence of  each additional 
claimant.73 By tossing a coin to decide whether to rescue David or the 50 in case 
(5), we are denying the significance of  49 individuals, because we would also toss a 
coin to decide whom to rescue in a case where we could only rescue one of  two 
individuals. However, the idea that additional individuals would have a legitimate 
complaint about their presence not making a difference to the decision-making 
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72 For a more exhaustive treatment of  these various attempts, see Otsuka (2006a).
73 See: Scanlon (1998, p.232) and Kamm (1993, p.101).
procedure in case the option of  tossing a coin is maintained in case (5), does not 
support a duty to save the greater number. Firstly, the significance of  the presence of 
an individual can be acknowledged without changing one's preferred allocation 
mechanism, and secondly, changing one's allocation mechanism so as to 
incorporate the significance of  the additional individual does not mean that we 
ought to simply save the greater number.74 
 Relying on a well-known device of  Rawls's, the individualist contractualist 
could alternatively employ the idea of  choice from behind a veil of  ignorance to 
explain why we ought to save the greater number in case (5).75 Given that one is 
always more likely to end up in the bigger group, it would be rational to choose the 
policy of  saving the greater number. However, by the same logic we ought to choose 
a policy that confers a minimal benefit on an extremely large number of  people, say 
treatment of  a mild headache for 1 billion people, at the cost of  a significant harm 
to a single individual, say certain death.  Expected benefit reasoning from behind a 
veil of  ignorance recommends policies that the contractualist egalitarian or 
advocate of  pairwise comparison has good reason to reject. Until a more successful 
derivation of  the significance of  numbers from individualist premises is offered, the 
second strategy ought to be rejected.76 
 If  strategies one and two are unavailable, the contractualist egalitarian will 
have to fall back on a pluralist solution. Nagel himself  indicates sympathy for this 
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74 See Otsuka (2006a, p.114 ff). 
75 This is a solution that Taurek (1979, p.313) himself  alludes to.
76  Rahul Kumar (2001) argues that we ought to save the greater number because equally strong 
claims cancel each other out. Iawo Hirose (2001) argues that one can save the greater number 
without aggregation by relying on the idea of anonymous Pareto optimality. For a response to these 
proposals, see Otsuka (2006a).
strategy: “But if  the choice is between preventing severe hardship for some who are 
very poor and deprived, and preventing less severe but still substantial hardship for 
those who are better off  but still struggling for subsistence, then it is very difficult 
for me to believe that the numbers do not count (…). It might be suggested that this 
is a case where equality is outweighed by utility” (Nagel 1979b, p.125). Nagel 
believes that the concerns of  “individualized impartiality,” “unanimity” and 
“separateness of  persons” which underpin his individualist conception of  equality 
should be balanced against aggregative concerns of  benefiting the greater number. 
4.  Conclusion
I have argued that two prominent prioritarian commitments fall victim to serious 
objections. Derek Parfit's priority view fails to account for a shift in judgement that 
occurs when moving from a single- to a multi-person case and violates the 
separateness of  persons requirement. Thomas Nagel's contractualist commitment to 
universal acceptability, pairwise comparison and strict priority faces the numbers 
objection and cannot explain how the number of  people affected by a distribution 
matters. I have considered various ways in which proponents of  the respective view 
could try to respond to these objections and argued that all of  them fail. Appeal to a 
pluralist solution appears to be the only option. To explain the shift in judgement, 
advocates of  Parfit's priority view would have to appeal to some version of  equality. 
To account for the significance of  numbers, the contractualist will have to appeal to 
non-individualist considerations. I discuss further implications of  both objections 
and the prospects of  pluralism in the next chapter.
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 CHAPTER 3  
Two arguments for the principle of equality
1.  Preliminary remarks  
The previous two chapters have established the background against which I shall 
now present two arguments in support of  the principle of  equality. My first 
argument concerns pure versions of  the distributive views in question and 
comprises two steps. The first step diagnoses a trilemma and the second step argues 
for a particular way of  solving it. As I have shown, none of  the distributive 
principles that appeared initially promising satisfies all three conditions which 
many people think a sound distributive view should satisfy. The principle of  
equality violates the condition of  person-affectingness, the priority view fails to take 
seriously the separateness of  persons and the contractualist commitment to pairwise 
comparison cannot explain how the numbers count. I refer to this observation as 
the trilemma of  pure distributive ethics. As long as no pure principle satisfies all 
three conditions, we have reason to believe that the three conditions cannot jointly 
be satisfied. If  we want to hold on to any of  the pure distributive principles, one of  
the three conditions will have to yield. I argue that if  having to choose between the 
three conditions, one ought to give up the commitment to person-affectingness. If  
this choice is justified, the levelling down objection appears less powerful than the 
other two objections, which leaves telic egalitarianism with a comparative 
advantage over its rivals.
 My second argument supports the claim that the principle of  equality is part 
of  any plausible pluralist distributive view. Advocates of  each distributive view may 
try  to avoid the intuitive force of  the objections raised against them by becoming 
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pluralist, that is, by endorsing more than one distributive principle. Advocates of  
the principle of  equality may argue that because they also believe in the principle of 
utility, they are not committed to the view that levelling down is all things 
considered required. Advocates of  the priority view may appeal to the principle of  
equality or the contractualist framework to account for the shift in judgement that 
occurs when moving from an intrapersonal to an interpersonal case. However, as I 
shall argue, the contractualist position does not lend itself  to a pluralist solution. 
Any attempt at avoiding the numbers objection by combining the method of  
pairwise comparison with a less strictly individualist principle will give rise to two 
serious objections. Any pluralist distributive view covering our considered 
convictions across a wide range of  distributive cases will thus have to comprise the 
principle of  equality. The principle of  equality is, all things considered, part of  the 
truth about distributive ethics.77
 
2. A first argument for the principle of equality 
2.1 The trilemma 
Three distributive views have emerged as the most plausible alternatives to pure 
utilitarianism. The principle of  equality, the priority view and a contractualist 
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77 One may of course object that my list of distributive views is not exhaustive. However, I share this 
predicament with Rawls, who in section 21 of A Theory of Justice justifies his choice of candidate 
principles which the parties of the original position get to choose from: "I shall simply take as given 
a short list of traditional conceptions of justice. (...)" (Rawls, 1999, p.106). I believe that my list of 
principles covers the most promising traditional views. Some distributive views, such as 
sufficientarianism, are excluded because they fall victim to independent objections, c.f. Casal (2007). 
If, however, one is convinced that other principles ought to be on the list as well, my argument still 
warrants a weaker conclusion: Telic egalitarianism is superior to the two rival views discussed, i.e., 
Parfit's priority view and Nagel's contractualist commitment to strict priority. 
commitment to strict priority all appear superior to pure utilitarianism, for they 
succeed in explaining why in cases of  distributive conflict, we (sometimes) ought to 
benefit the worse-off, even if  doing so would fail to maximise overall well-being:78
 Principle of  equality: "It is in itself  bad if  some people are worse off  
     than others" (Parfit 1997, p.204).
 Priority view:   "Benefiting people matters more the worse off  
     these people are" (Parfit 1997p.213). 
 Strict priority:  One distribution is better than another, if  and 
     only if  it is better for the respectively worst-off  
     individual.
Many people believe that there are (at least) three conditions or requirements which 
a sound distributive view should satisfy. Firstly, in establishing a betterness relation 
between different distributions, a sound distributive view would have to satisfy the 
condition of  person-affectingness:
 Person-affectingness: "One distribution cannot be better (worse) than 
     another, unless it is better (worse) for somebody" 
     (Temkin 1993b, p.263). 
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78  Bertil Tungodden (2003, p.32) believes that the question of "how much priority to assign to the 
worse off" is "the most fundamental concern in distributive reasoning."
Secondly, a sound distributive view would have to reflect the fact that different 
individuals have different lives to lead and take seriously the separateness of  
persons requirement:
 
 Separateness of  persons: A distributive principle will have to recognise the 
     normative significance of  boundaries between 
     different individuals.
Thirdly, a distributive principle should be sensitive to the number of  people affected 
by each distribution and thus be number sensitive:
 Number sensitivity:   The number of  people standing to gain or lose 
     under each option matters for what distribution 
     we ought to choose.
As I have argued in chapter 1, the principle of  equality violates the condition of  
person-affectingness. The levelling down objection derives its force from the 
observation that telic egalitarians will have to regard an equal distribution that is 
not better for anybody as in (at least) one respect better than an unequal distribution 
which is better for some. As explained in chapter 2, the priority view fails to take 
seriously the separateness of  persons. Due to the non-comparative nature of  their 
commitment, advocates of  the priority view fail to distinguish between inter- and 
intrapersonal cases of  conflict and apply the same priority-weighted principle in 
each case. As I have also argued in chapter 2, a commitment to the method of  
pairwise comparison and the principle of  strict priority fails number sensitivity. 
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Evaluating distributions solely from the point of  view of  the worst-off  individual, 
one cannot accommodate the fact that the number of  people affected matters for 
what distribution one ought to choose. 
 These observations present us with a trilemma. On the level of  pure 
principle, none of  the initially promising candidates fulfils all three of  the 
requirements that a sound principle should satisfy. As the various objections show, 
each principle fails at least one condition. There is a strong and a weak conclusion 
that could be drawn from this observation. The strong conclusion entertains the 
suspicion that the three conditions cannot jointly be satisfied. The weaker 
conclusion asserts that none of  the three familiar principles satisfies all three 
conditions. The weaker conclusion is all I need for my present argument. One way 
of  thinking about the trilemma takes the priority view and the separateness of  
persons requirement as a starting point. The priority view satisfies two of  the three 
conditions but fails to take seriously the separateness of  persons. The principle of  
equality and a contractualist commitment to strict priority present two different 
ways of  satisfying the separateness of  persons requirement. Unfortunately, each of  
these ways embarrasses one of  the other two conditions. Taking the separateness of 
persons seriously by arguing that there is something wrong with some being worse 
off  than others will violate the condition of  person-affectingness. Taking the 
separateness of  persons seriously by maintaining that a distribution will have to be 
justifiable to each will run up against the condition of  number sensitivity.
 There are (at least) four different ways of  responding to the trilemma. Firstly, 
one could abandon the search for principles. This I believe is the wrong response. 
Secondly, one could formulate a principle that solves the trilemma and satisfies all 
three conditions. If  I knew of  such a principle, I would opt for that response. 
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Unfortunately, I do not. Thirdly, one could try to avoid the trilemma by adopting a 
pluralist stance and endorsing a conjunction of  principles, which jointly avoid the 
trilemma. I shall discuss this strategy in section 3 when presenting my second 
argument for the principle of  equality. However, I also believe that the trilemma 
raises a genuine question on the level of  pure principles. The three objections 
discussed in chapters 1 and 2 are objections against pure versions of  the respective 
principle. In making up one's mind about the strengths and weaknesses of  pure 
principles (which objection is most powerful?), one should set the option of  
pluralism aside for one moment.79 Finally, one could argue that in light of  the 
trilemma at hand, one of  the conditions will have to yield. This is the response I 
choose. There are again different ways of  making an argument for giving up one 
particular condition. On the one hand, one could argue that giving up any of  the 
other two conditions would be more costly. Alternatively, one could provide an 
independent reason for giving up one condition, i.e., a reason which is independent 
of  the comparative strengths of  the other conditions. I shall focus on the latter 
option and only return to the former in my conclusion below. Throughout the 
remainder of  this section, I shall argue that there are good reasons for giving up the 
condition of  person-affectingness.
2.2 How to interpret the "slogan"?
The motivation behind principles of  person-affectingness can be captured in many 
different ways and I shall take Temkin's seminal formulation of  the "slogan" as my 
starting point: "One distribution cannot be better (worse) than another, unless it is 
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79 Parfit (2002, p.103) believes in a pure version of the priority view: "The priority view, in contrast, 
can be held as a complete moral view. (...) It can be regarded as the only principle we need."
better (worse) for somebody" (Temkin 1993b, p.263). The "slogan" captures the 
deep intuition that our moral concern needs to somehow be connected to what 
happens to individuals, it seems to underpin a great number of  arguments in moral 
and political theory, and Temkin believes that it serves as a modern equivalent to 
Ockham's razor. Temkin presents a number of  arguments against the "slogan" and I 
shall presently focus on those two, which I believe raise the most interesting 
questions in their own right and have hitherto received least treatment.80 My 
approach is simple. I briefly present each of  the two arguments, sketch what I 
believe is the most powerful response to them,81 and then argue that because these 
responses fail, the original arguments stand. Advocates of  the "slogan" cannot meet 
the dual challenge of  rescuing (a variant of) the "slogan" from various objections, 
and maintaining it as a principle informing the levelling down objection to the 
principle of  equality. To solve the trilemma of  distributive ethics in favour of  the 
principle of  equality, only one of  the arguments discussed would have to succeed. I 
believe that both of  them do.  
2.2.1 The "no coherent interpretation" objection to the "slogan"
Larry Temkin argues that in spite of  its intuitive appeal, the "slogan" lacks a 
coherent interpretation. This objection rests on two observations. Temkin firstly 
observes that the "slogan" establishes a tight link between theories of  self-interest 
and theories about the goodness of  outcomes. The "slogan" implies that "one's 
theory about outcomes must be a direct function of  (perhaps, in a sense, 
supervenient on) one's theory of  self-interest" (Temkin 1993b, p.263). His second 
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80 I ignore some strands of argument, which have either been extensively dealt with in the literature, 
or have received treatment elsewhere in my thesis. 
81 Again, I focus on those objections that Temkin himself  has not yet responded to.
observation maintains that there is no theory of  self-interest that would both serve 
as a plausible account of  what is good for individuals and succeed in maintaining 
that the goodness of  outcomes is a direct function of  what is good for individuals. 
The reasoning in support of  this observation proceeds by elimination. None of  the 
familiar theories of  self-interest succeed in supporting the "slogan".82 Mental State 
Theories (MST) assert that "only conscious states have intrinsic value or 
disvalue" (Temkin 1993b, p.258). Subjective Desire Fulfilment Theories (SDFT) 
assume that "something will be good or bad for someone insofar, and only insofar, 
as it promotes or contravenes the fulfilment of  her desires" (Temkin 1993b, p.264). 
Objective List Theories establish that some things "are intrinsically good or bad (...) 
for people independent of  the quality of  their conscious states or the fulfilment of  
their desires" (Temkin 1993b, p.272). All these theories fail in at least one of  three 
ways, while failure in one way would be sufficient to reject them as a convincing 
interpretation of  the "slogan". The following table offers a brief  summary of  
Temkin's reasoning:83
fails about self-interest... fails about outcomes... fails supervenience...
MST because conscious states 
are not all that matters to 
how well someone's life 
goes.
because not everything which 
is good about outcomes can 
be traced to somebody's 
enjoying some conscious state.
SDFT because contravening 
somebody's desires does 
not always harm them.
because the goodness of  an 
outcome does not solely 
depend on whether somebody 
has a desire for that outcome.
because as about self-
interest, SDFT should 
focus only on self-
regarding desires, but as 
about outcomes should 
include other-regarding 
desires.
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82 For a list of  these theories, see Appendix I in Parfit (1984).
83 This table summarizes the main points of  Temkin's original reasoning in Temkin (1993a, 1993b).
fails about self-interest... fails about outcomes... fails supervenience...
OLT because objective values 
should not be understood 
in terms of  the effects that 
their realization has on 
individuals.
because once we allow 
that outcomes can be 
intrinsically good or bad, 
we cannot be certain that 
all of  them are good or 
bad for individuals. 
To vindicate an interpretation of  the "slogan", its advocates could now pursue one 
of  two response options. Undermining the second of  Temkin's observations, they 
would have to single out one theory of  self-interest and refute all objections raised, 
thus entirely clearing the respective row of  the table.84 Undermining Temkin's first 
observation, advocates of  the "slogan" could turn against the claim that the 
goodness of  outcomes must be a direct function of  self-interest and argue that the 
supervenience requirement, properly understood, would avoid the "no coherent 
interpretation objection" without thereby rendering the "slogan" ineffective as a 
consideration against the principle of  equality.
2.2.2  The necessary condition response
I consider those advocates of  the "slogan" who try to undermine Temkin's 
argument by turning against its first observation.85 They seek to clarify what is at 
stake in affirming or denying the "slogan" and argue that one can maintain the 
"slogan" and still insist that there are elements in one's account of  the goodness of  
outcomes that do not play a role in one's theory of  self-interest. This response is 
facilitated by the insight that the "slogan" only formulates a necessary condition of  
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84  Different authors defend different theories of self-interest. Nils Holtug (2003) argues that the 
difficulties faces by (SDFT) can be overcome, Dennis McKerlie (1995) and Marc Ramsay (2005)
argue that (OLT) is most promising.
85  I believe that this response is more promising. Turning against the second premise of Temkin's 
argument at best leads to a stand-off  between advocates of  the "slogan" and its opponents. 
goodness or betterness. That somebody be made better (or worse) off  by a 
particular distribution is merely a necessary condition for there being (at least) one 
respect in which that distribution is better (or worse). Other independent reasons, 
that is, considerations independent of  what is good for individuals, will have to be 
invoked to establish which of  two distributions (both of  which are better (or worse) 
for somebody) is in fact better (or worse).86 Because non-person affecting value 
considerations will have to matter for the goodness of  outcomes, a theory of  self-
interest does not have to contain all the building blocks for a satisfactory theory of  
the goodness of  outcomes. And as long as one insists that these non-person 
affecting considerations cannot render one outcome better than another unless it is 
also better for somebody, the requirement of  the "slogan" is satisfied. The "slogan" 
thus leaves room for non-person-affecting value considerations.87 Advocates of  a 
particular theory of  self-interest, say (SDFT), may thus respond to Temkin by 
pointing out his apparent mistake about what is to count as a coherent 
interpretation of  the "slogan". The fact that desire-fulfilment explains what is good 
for individuals, for example, does not imply that a particular pattern of  desire-
fulfilment is good only if  individuals have a preference for that pattern. The 
"slogan" captures the idea that considerations having to do with the "quality of  
human life" provide "the raw material of  value" (Ramsay 2005, p.103). However, 
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86  Ramsay introduces this thought in opposition to what Temkin calls the requirement of 
improvement. According to improvement, "the extent to which a change improves a situation will be 
a direct function of the extent to which individuals in that situation are benefitted by that 
change" (Temkin, 2000, p.152). 
87  A related person-affecting principle that would not leave room for such considerations is 
introduced by Persson (2001, p.28): "(PAC*): If one outcome is, in some way, better (worse) than 
another, its betterness (worseness) for some (collective) is greater than the betterness (worseness) of 
the other is for any (collective)." 
non-person-affecting value considerations may have a bearing on how changes in 
the quality of  human life are to count morally: "Again, the essential idea is that, 
while losses to the quality of  a person's life are necessary conditions for negative 
moral changes, other moral ideals may bear upon the situation in a way that either 
enhances or diminishes (perhaps even eliminates) this negative change" (Ramsay 
2005, p.103). Temkin's "no coherent interpretation" objection then appears 
misguided. It is not true that for the "slogan" to be coherent, one would have to be 
able to accommodate every change in the value or goodness of  an outcome in terms 
of  one's theory of  self-interest. A belief  in person-affectingness seems compatible 
with a commitment to an account of  value which does not solely or even primarily 
understand the goodness of  outcomes as a direct function of  individual self-interest.
2.2.3  Why a necessary condition is not good enough
Critics may turn against the "no coherent interpretation" objection by pointing out 
that because the "slogan" merely formulates a necessary condition of  goodness, a 
theory of  self-interest need not exhaust one's account of  value or goodness. 
Impersonal value considerations are compatible with the "slogan", as long a moral 
change operates on a change in somebody's well-being.88 However, I believe that 
because this response suffers from three serious flaws, it fails as a response to 
Temkin's objection.
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88  Note that the "merely a necessary condition" line of reasoning I am discussing is different from 
another one, which Bertil Tungodden (2003) raises in response to Temkin. Tungodden believes that 
the Pareto principle can support the levelling down objection, while this principle only needs to 
assert that all things considered value judgements will have to be person-affecting. The claim that I 
am presently discussing, however, asserts that the "slogan" stipulates a necessary condition for 
something to be in one respect good.
 First: If  one believes in the significance of  impersonal value, why does one 
insist that an outcome can be better or worse than another only if  it is better or 
worse for somebody?89 If  one believes that non-person-affecting considerations 
matter for the goodness or badness of  an outcome, why do impersonal values alone  
never make an outcome better or worse? I believe that there is no coherent answer 
to these questions. There are two candidate responses but each of  them fails to 
convince. A first reason for embracing any condition of  person-affectingness may 
be found in a deep and general welfarist commitment, captured for example by the 
idea "that the moral value of  an outcome is entirely determined by what is good or 
bad for individuals in it" (Persson 2001, p.29). How could anything other than the 
well-being of  individuals be of  moral significance? Unfortunately, this thought, 
even if  it were independently plausible,90 is not to be had by advocates of  the 
revised version of  the "slogan": They respond to the 'no coherent interpretation' 
objection by arguing that the moral value of  an outcome is in part determined by 
considerations that are independent of  what is good or bad for individuals. The 
same change of  well-being may be of  varying moral significance, depending for 
example on whom it accrues to, e.g., whether it accrues to the more or the less 
deserving, the more or the less well-off  etc.91 But if  it is not general scepticism 
about impersonal value that motivates the "slogan", what other principled reason 
could be invoked in its support? 
 Another idea could support the claim that even though there are impersonal 
values, their realisation alone can never make an outcome better: Values are 
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89 Temkin (2003a) raises a similar question in the related Tungodden debate.
90 It should not come as a surprise that I do not find this claim plausible.
91  Note that that a denial of this idea would deliver simple utilitarianism and be incompatible with 
the priority view and any other distributive value containing an impersonal component.
compounds containing both an impersonal and a personal component, such that 
the personal component serves as a necessary or enabling condition of  impersonal 
value. Invoking G.E. Moore's (1993 (1903), p.79) notion of  organic wholes, Andrew 
Mason (2001) argues that intrinsic impersonal values may be valuable only in 
certain contexts or as a component of  certain wholes, for example when their 
realisation would benefit somebody. However, there are three considerations that 
speak against motivating the necessary condition understanding of  the "slogan" in 
this way. Firstly, the ideas of  wholes and context, and how it is that contexts enable 
values, stand in need of  further elaboration.92 I am sceptical about the prospects of  
meeting it. Secondly, the idea of  conditional values does not strike me as 
particularly convincing. There are at least some intrinsic values, for example values 
associated with the status of  individuals, that matter unconditionally and 
irrespective of  context. It might be that in a specific context these values are 
outweighed by competing considerations; however, this is not to say that these 
values would require a specific context as an enabling condition. Thirdly, consider 
what the argument of  those seeking to motivate the "slogan" in this way would have 
to achieve. Not only would they have to show that every impersonal value is 
conditional or contextual in nature, but they would have to establish that the 
relevant condition is that of  benefiting somebody. Finally, one ought to keep in 
mind that searching for a rationale in support of  their position, those who endorse 
the "slogan" as merely stipulating a necessary condition of  goodness are walking a 
fine line. On the one hand, they will have to maintain that preferring a distribution 
{3,3,3} to a distribution {2, 9, 9} is compatible with the spirit that animates the 
"slogan." On the other hand, they will have to explain why impersonal 
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92 As Mason (2001, p.251) himself  points out.
considerations can neither make an all things considered difference, nor even render 
one distribution in one respect better. If  considerations independent of  individual 
well-being are morally significant, why can their significance never be sufficient as a 
reason to prefer one distribution over another? Why should impersonal value be 
accompanied by changes in well-being to be morally efficacious at all?
 Second: The belief  that impersonal value can create a reason to prefer one 
situation to another, only if  accompanied by a change in well-being, will give rise to 
additional problems. There are for example cases where it seems clear that an 
impersonal value should give one a reason to prefer one situation to another, even 
though levels of  well-being are exactly the same in each case. Imagine that one of  
two individuals who fare equally well at time T1, e.g.,{7,7}, will unavoidably and as 
a matter of  fact be worse off  at time T2, e.g.,{3,7}. There are, however, two possible 
causal paths leading to the {3,7} situation at T2. On the first causal path C1, the 
worse-off  individual would become worse off  as the result of  her own responsible 
agency, for example because she loses a risky gamble that she voluntarily entered 
having had the opportunity for a risk-free alternative. On the second causal path C2, 
the worse-off  individual performs no such act and becomes worse off  as a matter of 
bad brute luck. I believe that a world in which T2 comes about as a consequence of  
C1 is better than a world in which T2 comes about as a consequence of  C2. Put 
differently, there is a reason to hope that C1 rather than C2 actually obtains. 
However, advocates of  the "slogan" cannot accommodate such reason. There is 
nobody for whom {3,7} coming about as a result of  C1 is better than {3,7} coming 
about as a result of  C2. Arguing that impersonal values can only matter if  
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accompanied by changes in well-being, one will have to remain insensitive to how 
values may be realised in the history of  outcomes.93
 Third: Note that if  successful, the idea of  impersonal value underpinning the 
re-interpretation of  the "slogan" would facilitate a person-affecting version of  
egalitarianism. If  one responds to Temkin's "no coherent interpretation" objection 
by assuming that there are impersonal values which render one distribution better 
or worse if  accompanied by a change in well-being, then equality may well be one 
of  these values. As mentioned, Andrew Mason (2001) argues that equality is 
intrinsically valuable if  and only if  its realisation leaves people better off. Ingmar 
Persson (2001) argues that inequality makes an outcome worse, if  it is at least worse 
for somebody. This observation is not strictly speaking an objection to the necessary 
condition response to Temkin's "no coherent interpretation" argument. However, it 
points out that such a response may leave the "slogan" with limited polemical force. 
It would, for example, no longer vindicate non-comparative views such as the 
priority view, for other comparative principles, such as a version of  conditional 
egalitarianism, would also satisfy its requirements. In responding to Temkin, non-
egalitarian advocates of  the "slogan" would supply the egalitarian with the 
conceptual resources necessary to avoid the levelling down objection. 
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93  In the language of Lippert-Rasmussen (2007, p.103), you will have to be insensitive to the 
"genesis" of  a distribution. John Broome (2004, p.30) employs the notion "history".
2.3 The "slogan" and non-identity
2.3.1 The non-identity argument against the "slogan"
Larry Temkin believes that the "slogan" also falls victim to the non-identity 
problem.94 Imagine that a group of  presently existing people (P) faces the choice 
between two policies. Choosing the first policy, call this policy depletion, the 
presently existing people would decide to use existing resources immediately and 
have their children (CNow) now. Choosing the second policy, call this policy 
conservation, the presently existing people would decide to save resources now and 
postpone having children (CLater) until later. As represented in figure 1 below, the 
presently existing people would be better off  if  they opted for depletion; however, 
the generation of  their children would be better off  under the conservation policy: 
The non-identity problem arises from the fact that there are three plausible 
judgements about the scenario at hand which support a denial of  the "slogan": 
 
 (1) Depletion is worse than conservation. 
                                                
   P         P CNow   P          CLater  
Present          Depletion  Conservation
         Fig.1
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94 For the original formulation of the non-identity problem, see Parfit (1984, p.351 ff). For Temkin's 
presentation of  the problem, see Temkin (1993a, p.255 ff).
 (2) The children born earlier under the policy of  depletion (CNow) are 
  different individuals than the children born later under conservation 
  (CLater).
 (3) One does not harm a person by failing to conceive her.95
Most people would agree that (1) is true. We ought to choose conservation instead 
of  depletion. A variant of  claim (2) is convincingly defended by Parfit and should 
be uncontroversial.96 Claim (3) might be more controversial, however, it seems to 
capture some deep convictions about the nature of  morality, for example that 
"morality has to do with how we treat whatever people there are" (Narveson 1973, 
p.73). But if  one believes in (1), (2) and (3), then the "slogan" must be false. If  the 
"slogan" were true, one could not argue that depletion is worse than conservation. 
If  one believes that a situation can only be worse if  it is worse for somebody, while 
there is nobody for whom depletion is worse (it is neither worse for CNow because 
under conservation they would not exist, nor for CLater because non-existence does 
not harm), one cannot claim that depletion is worse than conservation. In cases 
where the choice of  a situation affects the identity of  the people in it, the "slogan" 
excludes what clearly appears to be the right judgement. If  one wants to hold on to 
the claim that one ought to choose conservation over depletion, which presumably 
is the claim endorsed with a higher degree of  confidence, one ought to give up the 
"slogan". 
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95  More elaborately, Larry Temkin (1993a, p.255) claims: "One cannot harm or act against the 
interests of someone who will never exist, and more particularly, one does not harm someone by 
failing to conceive her." 
96 See Parfit (1984, p.352).
2.3.2 The benefit of existence and a revised version of the "slogan"
In an attempt to rescue the "slogan," one may argue that claim (3) ought to be 
rejected.97 The claim that causing somebody to exist may confer a benefit on that 
person may after all be defensible,98 and the idea that living a life worth living is 
better than not existing could plausibly be expressed by the following claim:99
 (3') "Coming into existence can be better or worse for a person than never 
  existing" and "existence can be better or worse for a person than 
  nonexistence" (Holtug 2001, p.364).
Unfortunately, substituting (3') for (3) does not quite succeed in rendering the claim 
that depletion is worse than conservation compatible with the "slogan". The 
"slogan" claims that one situation cannot be worse than another, unless there is 
somebody for whom it is worse. But even though CLater would be better off  under 
conservation, one cannot say that opting for depletion is worse for them. Slightly 
reformulating the "slogan" helps to solve this problem:
 (S') "An outcome, O1, cannot be in any respect better (worse) than 
  another outcome, O2 , if  there is no one for whom, were O1 to obtain, 
  O1 would be better (worse) than O2 and no one for whom, were O2 to 
  obtain, O2 would be in any respect worse (better) than O1" 
  (Holtug 2007a, p.142).
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97  The response to the non-identity objection presently sketched follows the arguments of Nils 
Holtug (1998, 2003).
98 Parfit (1984, p.487) argues that the claim that existence may confer a benefit is at least defensible. 
99 For an argument in defense of  this claim, see Holtug (2001).
A combination of  (2), (3') and (S') is compatible with (1). Depletion is worse than 
conservation because there is somebody for whom conservation would be better 
than depletion, viz. it is better for CLater to exist than not to exist. Note that (S') 
meets the dual challenge spelled out above: It avoids a particular objection against 
person-affectingness, in this case the non-identity objection, and still supports the 
levelling down objection to the principle of  equality. 
2.3.3 The repugnant conclusion rides again
The proposed response to the non-identity objection rests on two claims, (S') and 
(3'). One can thus respond to it by trying to undermine each individually, or by 
turning against the combination of  (S') and (3'). My argument is of  the latter sort.100 
Relying on a strategy employed by Parfit, I argue that solving the non-identity 
problem by endorsing (S') and (3') comes at the cost of  inviting a version of  the 
repugnant conclusion. More precisely, combining (S') and (3') with either the 
priority view or the principle of  strict priority requires that we prefer a distribution 
in which a greater number of  individuals exist at a level barely worth living to a 
situation in which a smaller number of  people enjoy significantly better lives. 
Consider a scenario, where A to Z stand for different distributions, each column 
stands for 1000 people, and the height of  each column represents the respective 
quality of  life:
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100 Larry Temkin (2003b, p. 21ff.) offers an alternative response to Holtug's argument and claims that 
the proposed revised version of the "slogan" is at odds with the reasoning that originally motivates 
the "slogan." He believes that (S') is less attractive than (S). 
If  one believes in (3') and accept that existence can be better than nonexistence, one 
will think that the additional 1000 people who exist in B but not in A are better off  
in B. Likewise, you will think that the additional 1000 people who exist in C but not 
in B are better off  in C, and so on. If  one embraces (S'), one will also believe that 
there may be a respect in which A is worse than B, a respect in which B is worse 
than C, and so forth. Derek Parfit argues that a standard maximizing version of  
utilitarianism, which he calls the "impersonal total principle" (Parfit 1984, p.387), 
falls victim to the repugnant conclusion objection because it would tell us to choose 
Z. Provided that the number of  people in Z is large enough, the impersonal total 
principle tells us that a situation is better than any alternative, "even though its 
members have lives that are barely worth living" (Parfit 1984, p.388). 
 I believe that the priority view falls victim to a very similar objection.101 If  it 
is true that coming into existence confers a benefit and that those who exist are 
better off  than those who do not exist, then the prioritarian belief  that benefiting 
people matters more the worse off  these people are, gives one a strong reason to 
prefer B to A, C to B etc. The priority view, it appears, falls victim to a variant of  
the repugnant conclusion:
                                              ......  
               
A    B   C      D        (...)       Z
                  Fig.2
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101 Ingmar Persson (2001, p.34, fn 14) formulates an objection very similar to the one I develop here.
Repugnant Conclusion': In combination with (3') and (S'), the priority view 
    implies that for "any population with a high quality of  
    life, there must be a much larger imaginable population 
    whose existence, if  other things are equal, would be 
    better, even though its members only have lives barely 
    worth living" (Parfit 1984, p.388).
Advocates of  the priority view may respond that their preferred principle only gives 
them a pro tanto reason to prefer B to A, while the absolute size of  the loss to the 
people in A is sufficiently large to prefer A to B all things considered. However, I 
believe that such a response will be unsuccessful. Prioritarians will have to believe 
that the greater the number of  the badly-off  people potentially to be benefitted, the 
greater the reason to benefit the badly-off. There will thus be a version of  the 
scenario sketched above, where the number of  additional people in each subsequent 
scenario is sufficient to deliver a decisive reason in its favour. 
 Advocates of  strict priority face a similar predicament. The exact nature of  
this predicament depends on how exactly one conceives of  their commitment. 
However, the options appear equally unattractive. Firstly, choosing between 
situation A and situation B, the strict prioritarian seems committed to the view that 
B is better than A. The complaint that those who would only exist in B would have 
against choosing A is stronger than the complaint those better off  in A than in B 
would have against choosing B.102 Secondly, the strict prioritarian may respond that 
it is not true that B is better than A because the position of  the worst-off  individual 
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102 Provided, of course, that speaking of complaints when questions of (non-)existence are at stake 
makes sense in the first place. 
remains the same whatever we choose. If  we believe in (3'), then the worst-off  are 
those who do not exist and these are infinitely many. This response, however, gives 
rise to an equally problematic conclusion, namely that one ought to be indifferent 
between the distributions A to Z. The strict prioritarian faces the choice between 
two variants of  the repugnant conclusion:
Repugnant conclusion'':  In combination with (3') and (S'), the strict priority view 
    implies that for "any population with a high quality of  
    life, there must be a much larger imaginable population 
    whose existence, if  other things are equal, would be 
    better, even though its members only have lives barely 
    worth living" (Parfit 1984, p.388).
Repugnant conclusion''': In combination with (3') and (S'), the strict priority view 
    implies that for any population with a high quality of  
    life, there must be a much larger imaginable population 
    whose existence, if  other things are equal, would not be 
    worse, even though its members only have lives barely 
    worth living.
Avoiding the non-identity objection to the "slogan" by embracing a modified 
version of  person-affectingness in combination with the claim that coming into 
existence can confer a benefit comes at significant costs. In part, these costs are due 
to the present argumentative context. It may be open to some philosophers to 
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respond to the non-identity objection by embracing (S') and (3').103 However, this 
rebuttal of  the objection is not to be had if  you are an advocate of  either the priority 
view or the principle of  strict priority. Because the point of  my present argument is 
to develop considerations that may speak for or against these principles vis-a-vis the 
principle of  equality, the repugnant conclusion is in fact significant. If  advocates of  
either principle of  priority can only respond to an objection (the non-identity 
objection) to a principle (the "slogan") which vindicates an objection (the levelling 
down objection) to a rival principle (the principle of  equality) by inviting a new 
objection (the repugnant conclusion) to their own principle, then nothing is won.
2.4 To solve the trilemma is to vindicate the principle of equality
If  my arguments are correct, the "no coherent interpretation" objection and the 
non-identity objection defeat the "slogan". Two further considerations may move 
those not yet convinced. Firstly, the trilemma gives us a reason to give up one of  the 
three: The condition of  person-affectingness, the separateness of  persons 
requirement, or sensitivity to numbers. Secondly, there are no apparent reasons that 
speak in favor of  giving up any of  the latter two conditions. The distinction between 
different individuals is of  undeniable significance and the number of  people 
affected clearly matters for which outcome one ought to choose. Jointly, these two 
considerations should tip the balance in cases where there is a stand-off  between 
advocates of  the "slogan" and its opponents, i.e., where we neither have conclusive 
reasons for or against it. We ought to solve the trilemma of  pure distributive ethics 
by giving up on the condition of  person-affectingness. Doing so vindicates the 
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103  For a defense of the claim that egalitarians could embrace (S') and (3') without encountering 
these problems, see Persson (2001, p.34 ff.).  
principle of  equality against its two main rivals. The levelling down objection to 
equality is less powerful than the separateness of  persons objection to the priority 
view or the numbers objection to strict priority. This observation concludes my first 
argument in support of  the principle of  equality. 
3. A second argument for the principle of equality
3.1 Pluralist responses
The considered convictions invoked to determine which option to pursue in 
particular cases have operated on the level of  all things considered judgements and 
targeted pure versions of  the respective distributive view.104 Note that advocates of  
the respective view can avoid these particular objections by becoming pluralist. 
Instead of  abandoning her view, the pluralist may simply supplement her original 
distributive commitment. The advocate of  the principle of  equality who points out 
that she also believes in the principle of  utility can explain why the pill ought to be 
given to her better-off  child: Considerations of  utility outweigh considerations of  
equality. And a pluralist version of  the priority view could appeal to the intrinsic 
significance of  equality, or the significance of  achieving a unanimously acceptable 
distribution, to account for the shift that occurs when moving from the one-person 
case to the two-person case. 
 My second argument for the principle of  equality supports the claim that, 
insofar as the three distributive principles presently considered are concerned, any 
plausible pluralist position will have to rely on the principle of  equality. The 
argument rests on two observations. First: The pluralist response strategy fails to 
solve the numbers problem which the contractualist commitment to strict priority 
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104 These are cases (1) to (3) discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of  my thesis. 
falls victim to. The contractualist framework does not lend itself  to pluralistically 
trading off  different principles and values against one another. Second: To account 
for our considered convictions across a wide range of  cases, one will have to invoke 
a combination of  either the principle of  utility and the principle of  equality, or the 
principle of  equality and the priority view. Either way, the principle of  equality is 
part of  the truth about how burdens and benefits ought to be distributed among 
individuals.
3.2 Nagel's contractualist pluralism
Nagel recognizes that the numbers objection presents the method of  pairwise 
comparison and the principle of  strict priority with a serious problem. On the one 
hand, he fears that a theory insensitive to numbers would "not provide the 
foundation for a correct egalitarian theory" (Nagel 1979b, p.125). On the other 
hand, he understands that a contractualist theory cannot be sensitive to numbers, 
for "if  egalitarian urgency is itself  sensitive to numbers (...), it does not seem that 
any form of  unanimity criterion could explain the foundation of  the view" (Nagel 
1979b, p.125). If  a sound distributive theory will have to accommodate our 
judgement that the number of  people affected matters for the outcome to be chosen, 
while sensitivity to numbers cannot be part of  the egalitarian or prioritarian 
concern, the only available option appears to endorse a pluralist theory. Nagel 
believes that his contractualist commitment can deliver the right intuitive 
judgements in cases involving numbers when combined with other values and 
considerations. He says, for example: “But if  the choice is between preventing 
severe hardship for some who are very poor and deprived, and preventing less 
severe but still substantial hardship for those who are better off  but still struggling 
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for subsistence, then it is very difficult for me to believe that the numbers do not 
count (…). It might be suggested that this is a case where equality is outweighed by 
utility” (Nagel 1979b, p.125). The concern of  satisfying the separateness of  persons 
requirement through a notion of  individualized impartiality and acceptability of  
distributions to each which underpin Nagel's individualist conception of  equality 
should (at least sometimes) be balanced against aggregative concerns of  benefiting 
the greater number. 
 Giving “independent weight to aggregative considerations that are sensitive 
to the numbers of  people” (Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009, p.185 fn 22) would allow 
Nagel to escape the numbers objection in all of  its three dimensions. Where the fact 
that one's child suffers from a mild hay fever would require a move to the city on 
the method of  pairwise comparison, aggregative considerations allow pursuing the 
course of  action that would create significant benefits for the other nine children. 
Similar considerations render the option of  heading south to rescue 50 individuals 
permissible in the rescue case. The requirements of  individual acceptability, which 
would demand that everybody be given a one in two chance of  being rescued, are 
outweighed by considerations of  utility. And finally, aggregative considerations 
would allow breaking the choice-defeating cycle of  Otsuka's pill allocation case. 
Assuming that a greater number of  weaker claims can outweigh a smaller number 
of  stronger claims, one could opt for the distribution in which three individuals 
have the use of  both arms restored.
 However, I believe that this pluralist response strategy is not open to 
contractualists like Nagel. Contractualism does not lend itself  to pluralistically 
trading off  individualist and non-individualist principles against one another. Two 
arguments support this claim. Firstly, allowing that individualist principles be 
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balanced against non-individualist principles presents the contractualist with a 
coherency problem. Secondly, the pluralist solution invites a new set of  problematic 
cases, which the contractualist is ill equipped to deal with. 
3.3. Two arguments against contractualist pluralism
3.3.1 The coherency objection
My first objection to Nagel's attempt at pluralistically combining the individualist 
method of  pairwise comparison with other non-individualist considerations raises a 
concern about coherency: I believe that the reasons in support of  pairwise 
comparison cannot coherently be balanced against aggregative concerns. The 
intuitive idea behind the objection is this: If  there is a good reason to prefer 
pairwise comparison to an aggregative method of  combining individual claims, 
such as utilitarianism, then this reason rules out appeal to aggregative concerns 
altogether. Formulating the objection proceeds in three simple steps. The first step 
briefly explains Nagel's reasoning in support of  pairwise comparison, drawing on 
the idea of  acceptability from each point of  view. The second step explains how the 
requirement of  acceptability to each is both binary, i.e., it is either satisfied or not 
satisfied, and will have to be satisfied all things considered to be satisfied at all. The 
third step shows how the nature of  the reasons in support of  pairwise comparison 
rule out a pluralistic appeal to aggregation as incoherent. 
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 First step: The significance of  pairwise comparison, according to Nagel, 
should be understood in terms of  two very fundamental observations.105 Firstly: An 
impersonal or impartial point of  view, from the perspective of  which everybody 
matters equally, is an irreducible element of  our moral reasoning. This standpoint 
serves as the “source of  other regarding moral reasons” (Nagel 1979b, p.126) and its 
suppression would be a “denial of  our full humanity" (Nagel 1991, p.20). Secondly: 
Because persons are distinct and separate, our impartial concern ought to be 
fragmented and individualized: “It includes a separate concern for each person, and 
it is realised by looking at the world from each person’s point of  view separately 
and individually” (Nagel 1979b, p.127). Jointly these two observations deliver the 
method of  individual pairwise comparison. Not to demand that an allocation of  
burdens and benefits be acceptable from each individual point of  view would be to 
deny an ineliminable element of  our moral reasoning and a failure to take seriously 
the individualized nature of  the impartial concern. The requirement of  
acceptability to each, which arises from the nature of  moral reasoning as putting 
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105 Nagel develops the reasoning underpinning the method of pairwise comparison at various places. 
The philosophically most ambitious grounding is offered in the final pages of The Possibility of 
Altruism, where Nagel argues that the criterion of acceptability to each and the method of pairwise 
comparison are implied by the nature of altruistic reasons. If there are to be altruistic reasons, then 
pairwise comparison etc. will have to be true.
oneself  into the shoes of  others, requires that we solve distributive conflicts by 
pairwise comparison.106
 Second step: Any pluralist view will distinguish between two levels. On the 
one hand, there is the level of  pro tanto reasons or precepts. On the other hand, 
there is the level of  all things considered judgements. Some moral reasons can be 
exhausted on the level of  precepts. The requirement that a benefit to the worse-off  
should matter more may be satisfied even if  all things considered one decides not to 
benefit the worse-off. The requirement of  acceptability to each, however, is not of  
that kind. It does not make sense to say that a distribution which is not acceptable 
from each individual's point of  view may still respect the requirement that 
distributions be acceptable to each. The requirements that underpin pairwise 
comparison, it seems, will have to be satisfied all things considered to be satisfied at 
all. The fact that acceptability is a binary property may be part of  the reason why 
this is so. Either a distribution is acceptable from each point of  view (or most 
acceptable to those it is least acceptable to), or it is not. The requirement of  
acceptability to each seems akin to Jewish rules for preparing food: One cannot 
argue that one ought to eat kosher, take some kosher ingredients, then add some 
non-kosher ingredients, and recommend the result as a kosher dish. Just like certain 
dietary laws, the requirement of  universal acceptability can only be satisfied all 
things considered, and it either is satisfied or it is not.
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106 One may think that the problems discussed in this section would be more troubling for Scanlon's 
more ambitious version of contractualism. However, if one takes Nagel's deep grounding of the 
unanimity criterion seriously, it is not obviously clear that Nagel's commitment to individualist 
principles is somehow less strict or fundamental. For an explanation of the costs a contractualist 
would incur by abandoning the acceptability to each condition, see Otsuka's (2006) discussion of 
Scanlon. 
 Third step: The numbers objection presents contractualist egalitarians with a 
case where the method of  pairwise comparison requires that we choose the option 
which benefits the worst-off, where in fact we should choose an alternative option 
that would benefit a greater number of  people. If  my arguments in chapter 2 are 
correct, the contractualist egalitarian cannot generate a concern for numbers from 
within his individualist approach and will have to pluralistically appeal to 
aggregative concerns, such as the principle of  utility. This appeal, however, presents 
pluralist contractualist egalitarians with the following problem: Allowing for 
aggregative considerations all things considered undermines the original case for 
pairwise comparison. Given that the requirement of  universal acceptability can 
only be satisfied all things considered, the contractualist egalitarian will have to 
choose between either supporting the method of  pairwise comparison by invoking 
the notion of  universal acceptability, or opting for the distribution that would 
benefit the greater number. Trying to achieve both, Nagel would have to answer the 
question of  whether or not his pluralist principle incorporating an aggregative 
component satisfies the acceptability to each requirement. To this question, he does 
not have a good answer: If  he maintained that a principle which because it 
aggregates individual claims would prefer outcomes that benefit the greater number, 
would still be acceptable from the point of  view of  each, considerations of  universal 
acceptability would fail to support pairwise comparison. But if  he admitted that his 
pluralist method fails the requirement of  universal acceptability, the contractualist 
egalitarian could not coherently invoke that requirement against the utilitarian 
aggregator, for he would be in the same boat in violating it. One cannot coherently 
(a) argue that the criterion of  individual acceptability requires that conflicts between 
reasons to benefit people be settled by the method of  pairwise comparison, (b) refer 
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to this claim in establishing pairwise comparison against the rival method of  
aggregation, and (c) embrace aggregation to justify benefiting the greater number.
3.3.2 The problematic cases objection
My second worry about the pluralist solution concerns a further set of  problematic 
cases that the pluralist solution fails to adequately deal with. Making room for 
aggregative concerns leaves a distributive view vulnerable to the objection that it 
may recommend the dreaded conclusion, namely that one ought to save a great 
number of  people from a minor harm, instead of  saving a single individual from 
one very significant harm. I shall firstly motivate my objection by reference to a 
familiar case. Secondly, I will argue that various attempts to avoid the objection, as 
for example advocated by Parfit (2003) and Kamm (2007, p.297 ff.), fail.
 If  one believes that aggregative concerns can outweigh the demands of  
pairwise comparison and acceptability to each, the spectres of  the cases that 
originally motivated a contractualist and individualist approach begin to haunt 
again. Scanlon and Taurek discuss cases where one thinks that a minor bad for a 
great number of  people does not outweigh a significant bad for a single individual, 
regardless of  the number of  people suffering the minor bad. It seems that any view 
sensitive to aggregative number concerns will have trouble in accommodating our 
judgement in these cases. Consider Scanlon's (1998, p.235) famous example of  the 
transmitter room:107
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107   John Taurek (1977) discusses structurally similar cases, where the minor harms at stake are 
individual headaches.
Case (7):  Suppose the World Cup final in football is going on and 
   technician Jones suffers an accident in the television 
   transmitter room. We could interrupt the transmission to 
   remove the equipment that has fallen on Jones’ arm. Doing so 
   would spare Jones from severe pain but frustrate the 
   preferences of  millions of  people watching the match. What 
   shall one do?
I believe that regardless of  the number of  people watching, one should interrupt the 
transmission and rescue Jones.108 It seems, however, that for anybody who allows 
for benefits and burdens to be added across different people, even if  only 
pluralistically on the level of  all things considered verdicts, there will have to be a 
point at which the number of  individuals suffering a minor bad becomes sufficiently 
large to outweigh the claim of  the single individual. Nagel’s number sensitive 
pluralism may fail to accommodate our judgement that even if  five billion people 
are watching, we ought to rescue Jones. 
 In response to this objection, Nagel could appeal to what Parfit calls the 
close-enough view.109 For burdens and benefits to be weighed against each other in 
an aggregative calculus, they have to be close-enough to one another. For example: 
“Suppose that, for two benefits to be close-enough, the lesser benefit must be at 
least a tenth as great” (Parfit 2003, p.384). Arguing that the benefit of  watching the 
football match is less than a tenth as great as being spared severe pain, the 
119
108 Some may argue that this depends on who is playing. I am not convinced. 
109 The passages where Nagel discusses the option of pluralism suggest that it is something like the 
close-enough view that he has in mind.  
conclusion, according to which it is permissible not to rescue Jones, could be 
avoided. Unfortunately, applying the close-enough view is not always as 
straightforward as that. Assume that firstly, the harm of  an individual death is close 
enough to that of  suffering from quadriplegia, such that one person's death is not as 
bad as ten people suffering from quadriplegia; that secondly suffering from 
paraplegia is close enough to quadriplegia, such that one person suffering from 
quadriplegia is not as bad as ten people suffering from paraplegia; and that thirdly, 
one endorses a simple common sense version of  aggregation. Against the 
background of  these assumptions, consider another case:110 
Case (8): Suppose one is faced with three options. One could (a) save 
  one person from death, (b) save 10 people from quadriplegia, or (c) 
  save 100 from paraplegia. What should one do?
Case (8) presents advocates of  the close-enough view with two apparently 
unattractive options. On the one hand, they could argue that because of  the 
numbers involved, and because of  the fact that (a) is close enough to (b), and (b) is 
close enough to (c), one should opt for the latter and save 100 people from 
paraplegia. However, choosing (c) may not only be counterintuitive in its own right, 
but the reasoning underpinning this choice would give rise to what Kamm calls the 
downward spiral, delivering the non-consequentialist to the dreaded conclusion: If  
for fate (a) there is some close enough and less bad fate (b) such that we should save 
the greater number from (b), while the same is true of  (c), (d), (e) and so on, we 
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110 Derek Parfit discusses a structurally similar case dealing with the question of  whose lives to 
extend and involving an individual called Black, c.f. Parfit (2003, p.384). 
cannot avoid "the dreaded conclusion that enormous numbers of  people, each of  
whom has only a headache, should be saved from their headaches rather than save 
one person (to a long life) who faces death" (Kamm 2007, p.485). On the other 
hand, advocates of  the close-enough view could avoid the downward spiral and 
argue that even though (b) is better than (a), and (c) is better than (b), it is not true 
that (c) is better than (a). Unfortunately, this way of  avoiding the downward spiral 
violates two conditions which many people think should not be violated, i.e., the 
conditions of  transitivity and the independence of  irrelevant alternatives.
 Kamm pursues the latter option and argues that in cases like the one at 
hand, "qualitative considerations constrain the quantitative ones" (Kamm 2007, p.
298). There are qualitative features to a case of  distributive conflict, which "have a 
veto over the quantitative dimension" (Kamm 2007, p.485) and explain why even 
though (b) should be preferred to (a), and (c) should be preferred to (b), one still 
should not prefer (c) to (a). Choosing between (a), (b), and (c), the relevant 
"qualitative dimension" is that of  respect. Kamm argues that it is disrespectful to a 
person to "attend to paraplegics who will lose much less than he, rather than save 
his life, but not disrespectful to him to save many who would suffer the much worse 
condition of  quadriplegia" (Kamm 2007, p.298). The context of  available options 
matters for whether or not one option is to be preferred to another. If  the question is 
merely that of  either rescuing ten people from quadriplegia, or 100 from paraplegia, 
the latter is to be preferred to the former. If, however, one could also rescue one 
person from death, rescuing the paraplegics would be disrespectful to the one 
person and one ought to save the quadriplegics. When somebody one could save 
from death is present, "one may go so far as save the quadriplegics but no 
further" (Kamm 2007, p.298). Is Kamm's way of  avoiding the downward spiral and 
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the dreaded conclusion successful? There are two reasons why I believe it is not.
 Before turning to the costs involved in giving up on requirements such as 
transitivity and the independence of  irrelevant alternatives (in short: IIA), I shall 
discuss some of  the difficulties involved in granting qualitative considerations a veto 
over quantitative ones. Kamm believes that while it may be permissible to let person 
(a) suffer a great harm, e.g., to let that person die, in order to save more people (b) 
from a slightly lesser harm, e.g., cure 10 quadriplegics, person (a) has a respect-
grounded veto against rescuing an even greater number of  people further down the 
spiral, say people (k), from a significantly lesser harm. A first question that arises is 
this: Where exactly should the veto apply? Roughly identifying the range of  the veto 
may be relatively easy. But should the veto apply between (k) and (l), between (l) 
and (m), or between (m) an (n)? And if  it applies, say between (l) and (m), why 
exactly is rescuing (m) disrespectful of  (a) but saving (l) is not? As the differences 
between each step on the downward spiral become smaller and smaller, as in many 
cases they will do, coming up with convincing answers to these questions becomes 
increasingly difficult. But let us assume that these questions can be answered and 
advocates of  qualitative vetoes succeed in coming up with an independently 
plausible and principled reason why the veto should apply between (l) and (m). I 
believe that Kamm would still be vulnerable to a serious objection: Putting the veto 
anywhere on the downward spiral will give rise to a new and equally serious respect 
complaint. If  (a)'s veto applies between (l) and (m), we ought to rescue (l), even 
though we could have rescued a significantly greater number of  people (m) who still 
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suffer from a very serious harm.111 These (m) people, it seems, would have a 
respect-grounded complaint against choosing (l) over (m): "In rescuing a much 
smaller number of  people from a harm that is only slightly less bad than ours, you 
fail to adequately acknowledge the presence of  additional people who could be 
spared serious harms." When preventing 100 people from losing two legs, the 1000 
people losing one leg could complain that they are treated disrespectfully. In fact, 
900 people could mount a complaint on grounds invoked by Kamm in a different 
argumentative context, namely that because their presence does not make a 
difference, they are denied equal significance.112 It is not clear then, to say the least, 
why the respect complaint that (a) has against rescuing 1000 (m) people, should be 
granted the status of  a veto and override the respect complaint that 1000 (m) people 
have against saving 100 (l) people. Kamm's first problem then is this: Even if  it is 
plausible to assume that qualitative considerations constrain quantitative ones, it is 
not clear that they do so in the way she imagines. 
 A second reason that speaks against Kamm's approach arises from the fact 
that it violates the requirements of  transitivity and (IIA). I shall focus on the 
independence of  irrelevant alternatives.113 There are (at least) two types of  
considerations that speak against violating this condition: A rationality 
consideration and a normative consideration. Considerations of  rationality are 
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111 Assuming that the steps on the downward spiral are small steps, and given that the veto applies 
between two such steps, it is implausible to assume that one would move from a significant harm to 
an insignificant harm. 
112  Kamm (1993, p.101 and 114-119) relies on this argument when turning against Taurek's coin 
tossing solution to the original numbers problem.
113 The question of transitivity has extensively been discussed in the literature, e.g. by Larry Temkin 
(1987, 1996), and my arguments here support my earlier response to Hsieh et al. 
these: Some claim that it is irrational to violate the independence of  irrelevant 
alternatives condition.114 If  one prefers option (c) to option (b), that order of  
preference should not, as a matter of  rationality, be inverted simply because some 
independent alternative (a) becomes (un)available. Kamm challenges this position 
and maintains that there may be a good reason for altering the ranking of  (b) and 
(c) when (a) becomes available. For example, one may choose (b) rather than (c) 
when (a) becomes available, because choosing (c) would be disrespectful to those 
who are harmed by not choosing (a), whereas choosing (b) would not have that 
effect. However, I believe that the scope of  Kamm's argument is limited. Firstly, the 
reasons which work as required are intricate and only apply under exceptional 
circumstances: The act of  choosing one option (c) in light of  a particular alternative 
(a) has a qualitative property, which renders the choice of  (c) impermissible, even 
though choosing (c) would be required if  alternative (a) was unavailable. 
Importantly, the choice of  a very similar option (b) does not have that qualitative 
property. It is not at all clear that all problematic instances of  the downward spiral 
exhibit this feature. One may, for example, imagine a case where possession of  the 
relevant qualitative property, e.g., being disrespectful to those in (a), does not 
distinguish (c) from (b) because they both possess it, while such possession is not 
sufficient for impermissibility. One could plausibly think that one should let one 
person die and rescue 10 from some other condition, even though doing so would 
be disrespectful to the dying person. While there sometimes may be a good reason 
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114 Frances Kamm attributes this claim to Sidney Morgenbesser, who uses examples of the following 
kind: Imagine that the waiter in a restaurant asks what you would like for desert and offers chocolate 
fudge or fruit salad. You choose fruit salad. A minute later the waiter returns and says that he forgot 
to mention that there also is ice cream. It would be irrational to respond that in this case you will 
have chocolate fudge.  
to avoid a downward spiral by violating the independence of  irrelevant alternatives 
condition, it is not clear that there always is. And if  there is not, violating the 
condition seems to remain irrational.115 Secondly, Kamm's respect response 
presupposes that what is at stake is the performance of  an action. The qualitative 
property of  being "disrespectful" is a property of  an individual's action. 
Consequently, Kamm's response will not apply in cases where we are to rank 
distributions that have emerged naturally, that is, without the involvement of  
human agency. Would it be better if  things turn out such that one person dies but 
ten are saved from quadriplegia? When merely ranking distributions, or dealing 
with natural distributions, Kamm's respect-grounded veto cannot apply. Altering 
one's ranking of  distributions simply because a new dominated alternative becomes 
(un)available still appears irrational. 
 Violating the independence of  irrelevant alternatives requirement also gives 
rise to a normative concern: Cases where people exploit the fact that the (un)
availability of  an independent alternative may matter in the instance of  whom to 
rescue raise difficult questions.116 As long as we do not know how to answer these 
questions, we should maintain (IIA).  Imagine that you are a flying doctor in the 
Australian Outback. While you are at ranch C, three things happen. Firstly, it turns 
out that through drinking polluted water, the 100 people living on ranch C have 
contracted a disease, which, if  untreated, will cause them to suffer from paraplegia. 
Secondly, you receive a call that on the neighbouring ranch B, 10 people have been 
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115 Maybe one should think of (IIA) as a pro tanto or defeasible rationality requirement. Kamm's 
argument does not show that it sometimes may not be irrational to violate (IIA). The conclusion of 
Kamm's argument, viz. that it sometimes may not be irrational to violate the condition, does not 
undermine the assumption that absent such reason it is.
116 Kamm briefly mentions such a possibility but does not discuss its normative implications. 
bitten by a venomous snake and if  untreated they will all become quadriplegics. 
Thirdly, you find out that on far away ranch A, somebody has suffered a stroke and 
unless treated will die within the next 30 minutes. Because of  time constraints, you 
could only do one of  three things. You could stay at ranch C and treat the 100 
people there, you could walk over to ranch B and treat 10 people there, or you could 
fly out to ranch A in order to treat the person with the stroke. You have read your 
Kamm and figure that because saving 100 people from paraplegia would be 
disrespectful to the person with the stroke, you ought to walk over to ranch B and 
rescue 10 people from quadriplegia. Unfortunately, the people on ranch C have also 
read their Kamm, they know that you have too, so they figure that you will leave 
them to become paraplegics and they come up with a simple way of  rescuing 
themselves: While you are still thinking through your various options, they begin to 
temporarily disable the runway that you would have to use for landing and take-off  
with your plane. The runway belongs to the people on ranch C and they disable it 
by driving their sheep on the runway, which also are their rightful property. With 
the runway being unusable after a couple of  minutes, the option of  rescuing the 
single individual on ranch A has become unavailable, it would not be disrespectful 
anymore to save 100 people from paraplegia and you now think that instead of  
walking over to ranch B, you are required to stay at ranch C. But are you really? It 
seems that there is something wrong with engineering one's own rescue by 
eliminating a reason that would have been decisive for rescuing someone else. 
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear how to account for this intuition. The people on 
C have not harmed the person living at ranch A, for that person would not have 
been rescued anyways. It would also be weird to say that the people on C had a 
duty not to disable their runway. They may have such a duty if  the runway was 
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needed for the doctor to discharge a rescue duty, however, it was not. Could we 
then say that the people on ranch C have wronged the people on ranch B? The 
following principle would render C's action wrong: Do not act with the intention of 
altering somebody else's reasons such that what is required of  that person after your 
act would benefit you at the cost of  somebody else. Unfortunately, one cannot rely 
on this principle, as it would condemn any effort at consciously improving your 
performance in a respect relevant to the allocation of  a scarce good, such as your 
effort to give up alcohol and cigarettes in order to move up on the NHS list of  
priority for donated organ reception. Violating the independence of  irrelevant 
alternatives requirement then gives rise to a simple a problem: If  we relax the 
requirement as suggested by Kamm, there may be cases where people exploit the 
fact that the (un)availability of  an independent alternative may matter for whom to 
rescue. It seems that such exploitation is wrong; however, there is no good way of  
explaining why it is. Unless somebody either offers a good reason for abandoning 
the wrongness intuition, or comes up with a good way of  accounting for it, one 
ought to maintain the independence of  irrelevant alternatives requirement.
 To sum up: A pluralist position combining individualist principles with 
aggregative concerns will encounter problematic cases such as Scanlon's transmitter 
room. Appealing to Parfit's close-enough view in order to avoid this problem, one 
will either encounter what Kamm calls the downward spiral, or one will have to 
give up on the requirements of  transitivity and the independence of  irrelevant 
alternatives. Focusing on the latter, I have shown that Kamm's response to the 
downward spiral suffers from significant shortcomings. As long as there is no better 
way of  dealing with the problematic cases, one ought to stay away from pluralist 
contractualism.
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3.4 Why the principle of equality is part of the truth
If  the contractualist commitment to strict priority cannot be combined with non-
individualist principles, how shall one explain one's considered convictions in cases 
(1) to (3) that originally gave rise to the various objections? It seems that the 
principle of  equality will inevitably play a role in covering the fixed points of  our 
normative reasoning in these cases. All the important all things considered 
judgments can be entertained by a view comprising the principle of  equality, and 
some of  them can only be entertained if  the principle of  equality is part of  the 
picture. Combining the principle of  equality with the principle of  utility addresses 
the challenge that originally befell each principle: We move to the city in case (2) 
because considerations of  equality outweigh considerations of  utility. In case (1) the 
opposite is true and we give the pill to the child suffering from the mild headache. 
Addressing the separateness of  persons objection, the priority view may be 
combined with the principle of  equality, delivering the view according to which the 
intrinsic badness of  equality explains the shift in judgement that takes place when 
moving from case (2) to case (2*). 
  There remains an open question: Shall one cover one's considered 
convictions by combining the principle of  equality and the principle of  utility, or by 
running together the principle of  equality and the principle of  priority? The case-
based judgements are indeterminate in this respect, and eventually, one's answer 
will depend on whether one finds the priority view independently plausible. I shall 
presently remain agnostic on this question but observe that either way, i.e., 
regardless of  whether one is a utilitarian or a prioritarian, one cannot avoid 
invoking the principle of  equality to arrive at the correct list of  all things considered 
judgements. This concludes my second argument for the principle of  equality. 
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4. Conclusion
I have presented two arguments in support of  the principle of  equality. The first 
argument concerned pure distributive principles and came in three steps. I have 
argued that (a) there is a trilemma of  pure distributive ethics (b) that ought to be 
resolved by giving up on the condition of  person-affectingness, (c) which leaves the 
principle of  equality with a comparative advantage over its rivals. The second 
argument concerned all things considered judgements about particular distributive 
scenarios and ran together two claims. I have argued that because (d) a 
contractualist commitment to strict priority does not lend itself  to pluralist trade-
offs, (e) any pluralist distributive principle doing justice to our considered 
convictions across a wide range of  cases will have to invoke the principle of  
equality. Considerations (a) to (e), I believe, strongly support the principle of  
equality.
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 CHAPTER 4
Framing, reciprocity and the grounds of egalitarian justice 
This chapter has been published in Res Publica: A Journal of  Moral, Legal and 
Social Philosophy, 2010, Vol.16 (4), 281-98 and is here excluded for copyright 
reasons.
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 CHAPTER 5
Equality and the significance of coercion 117
1. Preliminary remarks
Some political philosophers believe that equality emerges as a moral concern where 
and because people coerce each other. I shall argue that they are wrong. The idea of 
coercion as a trigger of  equality is neither as plausible nor as powerful as it may 
initially appear. Those who rely on the idea that coercion is among the conditions 
that give rise to equality as a moral demand face a threefold challenge. They will 
have to succeed in jointly (a) offering a convincing account of  the wrongness of  
coercion, (b) rendering cogent the idea that the demand of  equality arises in 
response to the moral problem of  coercion, and (c) identifying some types of  
interaction as relevantly coercive. This challenge, I believe, cannot be met. More 
precisely, I argue that two main accounts of  coercion fail to meet it.
  Section 2 explains why the idea of  coercion as a trigger of  equality appears 
both initially powerful and plausible. Section 3 outlines the difficulties that arise 
when trying to account for coercion and explain its wrongness. Section 4 discusses 
an account of  coercion which explains its wrongness primarily in terms of  the 
effects it has on the options of  the victim. Advocates of  this account believe that 
coercion is wrong because it leaves the victims of  coercion worse off  than they 
otherwise would have been. I argue that no familiar version of  such a baseline 
account succeeds in meeting the threefold challenge (a) to (c). Section 5 proceeds 
likewise with a different account of  coercion, which explains its wrongness in terms 
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117 An earlier version of this paper has been presented at a workshop of the "SFB 700: Governance 
in Regimes of limited Statehood" at the Free University Berlin. I am grateful to the audience for very 
helpful comments, especially to Bernd Ladwig and Cord Schmelzle. 
of  the coercer's intentions. Advocates of  this account believe that coercion is wrong 
because to coerce somebody is to treat that person merely as a means. I argue that 
such a non-baseline account fails to convincingly explain the wrongness of  coercion 
and does not succeed in rendering plausible the claim that a concern for equality 
arises in response to it. Section 6 concludes my argument.
2. The idea of coercion as a trigger of equality
A line of  reasoning comprising three steps renders the idea of  coercion as a trigger 
of  equality initially plausible and powerful. I believe that this line of  reasoning 
underpins the position of  different philosophers who believe in the idea of  coercion 
as trigger of  equality, including Blake (2001), Nagel (2005), Julius (2006) and 
Rawls.118 The first two steps render the claim that coercion gives rise to egalitarian 
distributive justice plausible by arguing that principles of  distributive equality justify 
what would otherwise be wrongful instances of  coercion. The third one explains 
how the idea is powerful and significant, for example because it provides liberal 
egalitarians with an explanation for why obligations of  justice within states are 
different from those that apply across them. 
 First: One is inclined to believe that coercion requires a special kind of  
justification. If  one individual coerces another one, or if  several individuals 
mutually coerce each other, they will have to justify their acts or schemes of  
coercion so as not to wrong each other. As argued by Michael Blake, "coercive acts 
and practices are prima facie prohibited" and "stand in need of  justification" (Blake 
2001, p.272). Coercion is pro tanto wrong and imposes a justificatory burden, 
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118 Michael Blake argues that (especially the later) Rawls should be seen as offering the difference 
principle to justify coercive state power, c.f. Blake (2001, p.285 ff.).
which gives rise to particularly strong demands on what individuals owe to each 
other. Unless justified, coercion is wrong.
 Second: Even though unjustified coercion is wrong, coercion can be all 
things considered morally justified. As noted by Blake, "a question arises about the 
appropriate forms of  justification, by which an otherwise impermissible invasion of 
autonomy might be legitimated" (Blake 2001, p.273). Consent by the victim is a 
familiar candidate for rendering the exercise of  coercion legitimate. However, as 
argued by all proponents of  the idea that coercion triggers equality, principles of  
egalitarian distributive justice may also justify coercion and thus render it all things 
considered legitimate. Relying on the idea that coercion would be justified if  all 
those affected could consent to the distribution of  burdens and benefits it mandates, 
and assuming that a distribution is acceptable if  it is most acceptable to those it is 
least acceptable to, delivers principles of  egalitarian distributive justice, such as the 
difference principle: "The real purpose of  the difference principle is to justify 
coercion to all those coerced, including the least advantaged" (Blake 2001, p.283). 
There are minor variations between different accounts of  how exactly coercion 
gives rise to equality, and disagreement on precisely what egalitarian principle is 
triggered. The central idea, however, is the same. The idea of  coercion as a trigger 
of  equality appears plausible because we are inclined to believe that coercion 
requires a special kind of  justification, which may be provided through a particular 
distribution of  burdens and benefits between those who coerce each other. 
Distributive equality rights the wrong of  coercion.  
 Third: This idea is powerful because it provides a solution to two puzzles 
that trouble liberal egalitarians of  a Rawlsian vintage. The first puzzle concerns an 
explanation for why the basic structure of  society, rather than say decisions of  
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individuals within that structure, is the primary subject of  distributive justice.119 If  
the basic structure of  society, maybe understood as a society's legal system, because 
of  its particular coerciveness raises a special moral problem, to which egalitarian 
distributive justice provides the answer, the objection that focusing on the basic 
structure as the primary site of  justice is arbitrary would miss its target. The second 
puzzle concerns the question why principles of  distributive justice that apply 
domestically are different from those that apply internationally. If  other regarding 
reasons take on a distributive and egalitarian form only among individuals who 
coerce each other (in particular ways), while the relevant coercion only takes place 
within particular institutions, for example within states, there is a strong reason to 
believe that the scope of  egalitarian justice is limited to those who participate in the 
relevant coercive scheme, for example to co-citizens of  a state. The idea that 
coercion triggers equality can be employed to "defend principles of  sufficiency 
abroad and principles of  equality at home" (Blake 2001, p.258).  
  Controversy surrounding the idea of  coercion as a trigger of  equality has 
focused on the third step, asking which type of  institution or interaction qualifies as 
relevantly coercive.120 This chapter raises a more fundamental question: Is it 
plausible to believe that egalitarian distributive justice arises in response to the 
moral wrong of  coercion? I shall argue that it is not. Michael Blake admits that he 
will "refrain from offering a complete theory of  coercion" (Blake 2001, p.272). And 
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119 For the "basic structure objection", see Cohen (2000, chapters 8 and 9). 
120 Arguing that coercion can come as a matter of degree, and that there is coercion beyond the state, 
Cohen and Sabel (2006) have, for example, argued that the scope of equality should not be limited to 
the nation state. For a similar objection, see Armstrong (2009). A second debate about relevantly 
coercive institutions concerns the question whether state borders are coercive. Arash Abizadeh 
(2008, 2009) argues that border regimes are coercive, David Miller (2009) argues that they are not. 
indeed, he has a good reason for doing so. Once one attempts to offer a theory of  
coercion, the difficulty of  jointly offering a convincing account of  the wrongness of  
coercion, rendering cogent the idea that the demand of  equality arises in response 
to the moral problem of  coercion and identifying some types of  interaction as 
relevantly coercive, become apparent. 
3.  What is coercion? And what is wrong with it?
Specific claims about the conditions that an act or agent would have to satisfy to 
count as coercive will be controversial.121 Disagreement on answers to at least two 
questions is feeding such controversy.122 What is coercion and how does it differ 
from other acts that aim at altering other people's behaviour?123 What, if  anything, 
is wrong with coercion? A simple observation complicates things: It seems 
impossible to answer one of  the two questions without presupposing an answer to 
the other.124 To account for the wrongness of  coercion, one will have to know what 
coercion is, which in turn will depend on whether one classifies certain acts as 
coercive. But depending on what one thinks is wrong with coercion, one will pick 
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121 Contemporary debate on the necessary and sufficient conditions of coercion has been triggered 
by Robert Nozick (1969). For a summary of  contributions to this debate, see Scott Anderson (2009).
122 William Edmundson identifies another complication and notices that the notion of coercion is 
invoked and serves different pragmatic purposes in various different contexts, c.f. Edmundson (2007 
p. 74 ff). I shall ignore this complication and focus on what Edmundson calls the "justification-
demanding context."
123  A.J. Julius calls this type of acts "action-directing action," see Julius (2009a). Other forms of 
action-directing action include: Advice, deception, warning, intimidation, provocation, offers etc. 
124 Raz puts a similar point in a slightly different way. He says: "One's list of sufficient conditions (of 
coercion) as well as one's view of how evil the threatened consequence must be to count as a 
coercive threat depends on one's view of  the evaluative significance of  coercion." (Raz 1986, p.149)
out different phenomena as coercive and arrive at one rather than another 
understanding of  coercion. In making up one's mind about coercion and its 
wrongness one will have to move carefully between judgements about the meaning 
of  coercion and judgements about why one thinks that particular acts are wrong. 
One of  the challenges that those who believe in coercion as a trigger of  equality will 
have to meet is that of  developing an account of  coercion which captures what we 
mean by coercion, convincingly explain why it is wrong, and adequately distinguish 
between coercive and non-coercive types of  interaction. 
 What then is coercion? Firstly, coercion is a particular way of  getting people 
to do things.125 Say that an individual's action Φ is a way of  getting people to do 
things just in case it is performed because its performance will give another 
individual a reason to do some other action ψ. There are cases where it is clear that 
people get others to do things through coercion: The mugger who takes out his gun 
and shouts "Your life or your money!" is coercing his victim. There are five further 
observations that render the notion of  coercion more precise without uniquely 
characterising it.126 While not all ways of  getting people to do things satisfy the 
following conditions, standard cases of  coercion do. Secondly then, coercion gets 
people to do things through effectively altering their options. The mugger who 
threatens his victim removes the option of  staying alive and keeping the money 
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125  This is another expression borrowed from Julius (2009a). The list of different ways of getting 
people to do things is co-extensive with the list of  action-directing action.
126 My observations will fail to uniquely characterize coercion for two reasons. Firstly, they do not 
uniquely characterize coercion because they might hold true of other types of action-directing 
action. Secondly, it is not clear that they are true of all phenomena of coercion. However, the fact 
that they are true of standard cases of coercion, such as "Your life or your money!", renders them 
initially plausible. 
from the victim's option set and replaces it with the options of  either staying alive or 
keeping the money.127 The alteration is effective because the victim now does what 
she otherwise would not have done, i.e., she hands over the money.128 Thirdly, 
coercion gets people to do things by making a proposal and leaving the victim a 
choice. The mugger's proposal consists in offering two alternative options. If  the 
victim hands over the money she will live, if  she does not she will be shot. The 
mugger's threat gives the victim a reason to hand over the money but leaves her free 
to choose between these options.129 Fourthly, the coercer not only communicates 
the fact that the options have changed but he is responsible for changing them. It is 
the mugger's action which makes it the case that the victim's options have 
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127  Note that this formulation leaves open the question of whether the coercer alters the victim's 
objective or subjective options. Would the mugger relevantly alter the option set if instead of holding 
a real gun he would merely point a toy gun at the victim's head? 
128 Non-effective alterations of options probably should not count as coercive. If you render that of 
my two options worse, which I would not have chosen anyway, you do not coerce me into opting for 
the independently superior option. Harry Frankfurt admits that our "linguistic intuitions (...) are 
somewhat equivocal" but maintains that "it is incorrect to regard a man as being coerced to do 
something unless he does it because of  the coercive force exerted against him." (Frankfurt 1988, p.5). 
129 Note that this is compatible with saying that the option of not handing over the money does not 
constitute a reasonable alternative. 
changed.130 Fifthly, the fact of  coercion does not lead to the creation or recognition 
of  an independent reason that speaks in favour of  ψ-ing. Pulling out the gun does 
not give the victim a threat-independent reason to hand the money to the mugger. 
Finally, the fact that Φ is an act of  coercion morally speaks against doing it.131 
Coercion is pro tanto wrong.132 Unless he can offer some sound justification for his 
action, the mugger is committing a wrong. Typically, if  we think that a coercer's 
action Φ coerces his victim into doing ψ, such as in the case of  the mugger coercing 
his victim into handing over the money, the following is also the case. Call these the 
marks of  coercion:
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130 The notion of "making it the case that options have changed" is ambiguous. One might say that 
the action which the coercer threatens to undertake will objectively make it that the case that the 
options have changed. Alternatively, the coercer could be said to change the victim's subjective 
options merely by making a threat. Some considerations speak in favor of the objective reading: If 
one employed the subjective reading, other action-directing action such as advice or warning would 
also satisfy the criterion of coercion. Other considerations, however, favor the subjective reading: If 
the objective reading were true, the coercer could coerce the victim by removing an objective option 
that was never in the victim's subjective set in the first place. A combination of both approaches 
seems to initially solve these problems. One might think that an act counts as coercive if and only if 
it alters both subjective and objective options. On this understanding, however, a new problem arises: 
It seems that an effective bluff, say when a mugger points a toy gun at you, should count as coercive. 
On the combined approach it could not. 
131 I say "morally speaks against doing it" because the fact that an act is coercive might give you a 
prudential reason to perform it, coercion might for example be quicker, less costly and more effective 
than relevant alternatives. 
132 The notion of "pro tanto wrong" might sound odd and I use for lack of a better term. Say that an 
act Φ is pro tanto wrong if  it is wrong but could be justified all things considered. 
 (1) The coercer does Φ because he believes that his Φ-ing will give the 
  victim a reason to ψ.
 (2) Φ-ing alters the victim's options, such that if  the coercer had not done 
  Φ, the victim would not have done ψ.133
 (3) The coercer leaves the victim a choice between ψ-ing and not 
  ψ-ing.134
 (4) The coercer is responsible for the fact that Φ-ing alters the victim's 
  option set and the victim is aware of  this.135
 (5) The coercer's Φ-ing does not give the victim a reason to ψ that is 
  independent from (the effects of) Φ-ing.
 (6) The fact that Φ satisfies conditions (1) to (5) morally speaks against 
  doing it.
 What then is wrong with coercion? The short answer is that coercion invades 
autonomy. Most contemporary accounts of  the wrongness of  coercion can be 
understood as drawing, either implicitly or explicitly, on the importance of  being 
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133 This is to say that the victim does ψ because of the coercer's Φ-ing. For the reasoning behind the 
inclusion of  this condition, see for example Frankfurt (1988).
134 There are of course cases of coercion, call these cases of non-communicative coercion, where the 
victim does not have a choice, for example where direct force is applied to the victim. For the present 
purposes, however, cases of communicative coercion, such as present in threats, appear to be more 
important. Firstly, the threat of applying sanctions appears to be sufficient for coercion. Secondly, 
relevant cases of institutional coercion appear to be primarily and more pervasively communicative. 
Thirdly, communicative coercion appears to be the most promising candidate for rendering plausible 
the idea that coercion triggers equality.   
135 The victim needs to "be aware of this" to exclude cases where the victim misunderstands a threat 
as a warning. 
the author of  one's own life.136 I suggest following Joseph Raz in his understanding 
of  the value of  autonomy as characterized by three conditions. An individual is 
autonomous if  she possesses "appropriate mental abilities, an adequate range of  
options and independence" (Raz 1986, p.372). Different accounts of  the wrongness 
of  coercion can then be understood as relying on different elements of  autonomy so 
construed. I shall consider two principle alternatives. 
 The first one focuses on what coercion does to the victim's set of  options. 
One could maintain that coercion is wrong because it diminishes autonomy by 
changing an individual's options for the worse. The consequences of  coercion 
negatively affect the victim by narrowing the set of  available options or replacing 
valuable options with less valuable ones. This account of  the wrongness of  coercion 
focuses on condition (2). The mugger diminishes his victim's autonomy and thereby 
wrongs her through rendering a better option, namely that of  keeping the money 
and staying alive, unavailable. Call this the victim's options account of  the 
wrongness of  coercion. Intuitively, the account seems plausible because it offers an 
easy way of  distinguishing between coercion and other ways of  getting people to do 
things, for example through making an offer. Conceptually, an act of  coercion 
seems to contract an option set, whereas an offers expands it. Unlike coercing 
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136 Blake, for example, explicitly accounts for the wrongness of coercion by reference to the "liberal 
principle of  autonomy" (Blake, 2001, p.272).
somebody, making an offer is usually morally unproblematic, because often an offer 
improves rather than worsens the recipient's options.137 
 Secondly, one could focus on Raz's independence component of  autonomy 
and argue that the source of  the wrong is not the impact that the coercer's Φ-ing has 
on the victim's options, but rather in the attitude that the coercer takes towards the 
victim's agency. The focus here is on conditions (1) and (5). By Φ-ing with the 
intention that the victim ψ, and without it being the case that Φ-ing gives the victim 
a reason to ψ that is independent from (the effects of) Φ-ing, the coercer is treating 
his victim merely as a means.138 The mugger is committing a wrong because he 
treats the victim's agency as a means to his monetary gain. Call this the coercer's 
intention account of  the wrongness of  coercion.139 Intuitively, this account appears 
promising because it succeeds in distinguishing between coercion and some other 
ways of  getting people to do things. Coercion is morally problematic in a way that 
even misguided but honest and well-meaning advice is not, because unlike the 
former, the latter aims at giving the recipient a reason to ψ (or not to ψ) that would 
exist independently of  the particular action in question. 
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137 Note that there are two types of non-standard cases. First: Sometimes expanding an option set 
can be morally problematic, for example when consciously offering a glass of vodka to a dry 
alcoholic. Second: Sometimes contraction might make an option set better, for example because 
having fewer options makes choice easier. For the view that there can be coercive offers, see 
Zimmerman (1981). 
138 This is a simplified version of  the position developed by A.J. Julius (2009a).
139 I use "intention" in a broad sense, meaning reasons for action. 
4.  The victim's options account of coercion
The claim that coercion is wrong because it restricts the victim's options and 
renders her option set less valuable than it otherwise would have been appears 
initially plausible.140 The mugger leaves his victim worse off  than she would have 
been without the mugging. However, the notion of  "otherwise" requires 
interpretation. My first argument against the victim's options account shows that 
those attempting such interpretation face tough choices. The question that gives rise 
to a dilemma is about the baseline to which the victim's options should be 
compared. My second argument establishes that assuming a natural baseline, 
advocates of  the victim's option account will have a hard time identifying important 
institutions as relevantly coercive. The third argument illustrates that the moral 
baseline account faces a different objection. It seems that there can be no 
convincing answer to the question of  whether or not equality is one of  the 
considerations determining the moral baseline. I believe that these arguments are 
sufficient to establish that, in advocating coercion as a trigger of  equality, one 
should not rely on a victim's option account of  coercion.
4.1 The options account and the dilemma of baselines
One might think that in deciding whether an action Φ is coercive, the victim's 
option set after having been Φ-ed is to be assessed against the set of  options she 
would have enjoyed in a normal course of  events.141 Had things gone as expected 
and unfolded naturally without the intervention of  the mugger, the victim would 
not have had to choose between staying alive and keeping her money. Nozick notes 
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140 My arguments focus on Nozick (1969).
141  Note that there is a difference between the statistically normal course of events and the 
counterfactual course of  events in a particular instance. Nozick fails to note this ambiguity.
that if  the consequences of  Φ make the victim worse off  than she "would have been 
in the normal and expected course of  events, it is a (coercive) threat; if  it makes the 
consequences better, it is an offer" (Nozick 1969, p.447). However, there are two 
types of  cases where reliance on such a natural baseline delivers the wrong results. 
Consider firstly a case where the natural baseline account would identify an act as 
coercive and thus wrong, which in fact is not wrong. Assume that the mugger's 
victim has no legitimate claim to the money she is carrying, maybe because she 
previously stole it from the person now about to mug her.142 In this case the 
mugger's coercive re-appropriation does not seem to constitute a wrong, or at least 
it should not count as a wrong if  your sole concern is with people's options.143 It 
would be odd to say that it is wrong to take away an option from somebody if  she 
should not have had this option in the first place.144 Consider secondly a case where 
the baseline is itself  coercive and the coercer's action does in fact improve the 
victim's options. Would one not say that a slave-owner who gives his slave the 
option of  doing the chores instead of  ploughing the fields, which is the more 
143
142  Edmundson mentions cases that are structurally similar, which he calls "tables turned on the 
gunman" and where the victim of the mugger responds by announcing that she is prepared to defend 
herself with force if the gunman does not refrain from his attack. He argues that in these cases 
coercion is not even pro tanto wrong, c.f. Edmundson (2007, p.82). 
143 It seems that given the choice between either re-transferring the money in a non-coercive way or 
allowing the mugger to mug the thief, one ought to choose the former. One might think that this 
preference is best explained by the wrongness of coercion. Note that if you hold a pure baseline 
view and believe that the wrongness of coercion consists solely in its effects on the victim's option 
set, then this judgement is not to be had. 
144 Unless, of course, you believe that there is something wrong with the action of removal as such. 
This, however, is not the suggestion of how to conceive the wrongness of coercion that I am 
considering here. 
onerous task the slave normally has to perform, is thereby coercing her into doing 
the chores? If  the natural baseline account were true, we could not entertain this 
judgement because altering them actually improves the options of  the slave.  
 In these cases a moral baseline seems more appropriate.145 Reference to a 
moral baseline delivers a slightly different version of  condition (2).  If  we think that 
a coercer's action Φ coerces his victim into doing ψ, then the following is also often 
true:
(2')  Φ-ing alters the victim's options, such that if  the coercer had not done 
  Φ, the  victim would not have done ψ, where the victim was both 
  morally entitled to the conditions under which she would not have 
  opted to ψ, and these conditions were morally sound.
It is often the case that we do not have to choose between the moral and the natural 
baseline because the two coincide. The mugger leaves his innocent victim worse off  
than she would have been if  things had unfolded naturally and worse off  than she 
would have been under morally sound conditions. But what should we do in cases 
where the two baselines diverge?
 Sometimes reliance on the natural baseline fails and we ought to choose the 
moral one, such as in the case of  the non-entitled victim and the generous slave-
owner. However, there are also cases where the moral baseline delivers the wrong 
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145  Alan Wertheimer advocates a moral baseline view in his "two-prong" theory of coercion. He 
believes that a coercer can be said to coerce his victim to ψ if and only if (a) he makes a proposal 
that creates a choice situation such that the victim has no reasonable alternative but to ψ (the choice 
prong) and (b) it is wrong for the coercer to make such a proposal (the proposal prong). c.f.: Alan 
Wertheimer (1987, p.172). 
result and identifies an act as non-coercive which should in fact count as coercion. 
Consider the case of  a drug dealer and an addict.146 Suppose that a drug dealer has 
been selling drugs to an addict for a couple of  years at a certain price but one day 
introduces the additional condition that he will not supply any more drugs unless 
the addict signs up to work for the dealer and starts peddling drugs at a local 
school. According to the moral baseline account the addict is not coerced into 
peddling the drugs because he is not morally entitled to the baseline in comparison 
to which he is now worse off, namely that of  just buying drugs at the usual price. 
However, it seems that the addict is coerced into peddling drugs.147 
 Drawing on another proposal of  Nozick's, one might offer the following  
solution: In cases where natural and moral baseline come apart, the victim's 
preference is crucial for whether a given act Φ counts as coercive. Nozick suggests: 
"It may be that when the normal and morally expected courses of  events diverge, 
the one of  these to be used in deciding whether a conditional announcement of  an 
action constitutes a (coercive) threat or a (non-coercive) offer is the course of  events 
the recipient of  the action prefers" (Nozick 1969, p.451). The addict would prefer 
the natural baseline of  buying drugs without having to peddle himself  and thus the 
dealer's action counts as coercive. 
 Unfortunately, there are two objections to be raised against Nozick's 
proposal. Firstly, his solution fails our judgement in a case familiar from above. In 
the case where the mugger's victim is not entitled to the money in the first place, 
natural and moral baseline come apart. Relying on Nozick's proposal, we would 
have to count the mugger's act of  re-appropriating his money as wrongfully 
145
146 I am again employing a variation of  an example used by Nozick (1969, p.450).
147 This judgement is shared by Nozick (1969, p.447).
coercive; after all, the victim would choose the natural baseline of  holding on to the 
money as the preferred course of  events. Secondly, the proposal fails to explain why 
the victim's preference matters only when moral and natural baseline come apart. If 
they are relevant to determining whether an act counts as wrongfully coercive here, 
why should they not be of  wider relevance and matter in other cases as well?  
 Advocates of  the claim that coercion is wrong because it renders the victim's 
options less valuable then seem to face a dilemma. If  they claim that coercion is 
wrong because it renders the victim's options less valuable than they would have 
been in a normal course of  events, they will be unable to deal with cases where the 
victim is not morally entitled to the options she would enjoy under normal 
circumstances, such as in the case of  the victim who previously stole the money. 
They would suffer from a similar predicament in cases where the natural baseline is 
itself  coercive, such as in the case of  the slave-owner. If, on the other hand, they 
claim that coercion is wrong because it renders the victim's options less valuable 
than they would have been assessed against a morally sound baseline, they fail to 
adequately deal with cases where somebody's options seem to be coercively 
restricted even though there is no moral baseline compared to which the victim is 
worse off, such as in the case of  the dealer and the addict. 
4.2 The natural baseline account and state coercion
Even if  advocates of  the victim's options account managed to handle the tough 
choices presented above, they would still fail to deliver on the idea that coercion, or 
more precisely a particular type of  (state) coercion, triggers equality. The natural 
baseline approach falls victim to a simple problem: It is often the case that coercion, 
and this especially true of  the type of  coercion relevant for solving the two 
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Rawlsian puzzles discussed above, does not leave the victims worse off  than they 
otherwise would have been. Advocates of  a natural baseline account of  the 
wrongness of  coercion assert that some act is wrongfully coercive if  it leaves the 
victim worse off  compared to some counterfactual baseline. Assume that they are 
right and consider those instances of  coercion that proponents of  the claim that 
coercion triggers equality often refer to, such as coercive rules or acts commissioned 
and enforced by state institutions or a society's basic structure. Are such acts or 
rules wrongfully coercive on a natural baseline interpretation of  the victim's option 
account? A simple thought explains why they are not: The existence of  coercive 
state institutions does not leave the victims of  coercion worse off  than they 
otherwise would have been. Even if  each particular citizen would be better off  not 
having to make a particular tax payment, he would arguably be worse off  in a 
world without coercive taxation. And the same seems to be true of  the institution of 
criminal and civil law.148 It might then be more difficult than initially expected to 
endorse a natural baseline account and hold that state coercion is pro tanto wrong. 
At least one of  the following three claims will have to yield: 
 (1) Coercion is pro tanto wrong because it renders the victim's options 
  less valuable than they otherwise would have been.
 (2) State coercion is pro tanto wrong.
 (3) State coercion does not render its citizens' options less valuable than 
  they otherwise would have been. 
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148 Michael Blake, who discusses taxation, criminal law and civil law as central instances of state 
coercion says: "Without some sort of state coercion, the very ability to autonomously pursue our 
projects and plans seems impossible; settled rules of expectation seem necessary for the settled 
expectations without which autonomy is denied" (Blake 2001, p.280).
Advocates of  a natural baseline account have good reasons for holding on to each 
of  these claims. If  they denied claim (1) they would give up on the natural baseline 
interpretation of  the victim's option account. If  they denied claim (2) they would 
lose a key premise needed for their overall argument that state coercion triggers 
equality. And denying claim (3) would give rise to the following problem: If  it is not 
true that citizens' option sets are more valuable with states than without them, and 
state coercion is pro tanto wrong, then why have states? To deny that living in a 
state typically renders an individual's option set more valuable is to seriously 
threaten the prospects for successfully arguing that states are all things considered 
justified. What else than its impact on an individual's ability to set and pursue her 
own ends could justify the existence of  a state?
 There is a response to this argument and it is worth going to some length to 
pre-empt it. Advocates of  the natural baseline account could try to escape the 
trilemma by pointing out an ambiguity: There is an important difference between 
two ways of  understanding a natural baseline. One could firstly believe that the 
relevant counterfactual baseline is one where action Φ is universally absent, i.e., 
where nobody is subject to action Φ:149
 
 (1')  Some act Φ1 counts as wrongfully coercive because it renders the 
  victim's options less valuable compared to a counterfactual baseline 
  without Φuniversal.
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149 This ambiguity is briefly mentioned and discussed by Nozick, albeit under a different heading. He 
raises the question of whether one should focus on a baseline where a token of action is absent, or 
on a baseline where a type of  action is absent. 
Alternatively, one could believe that the relevant counterfactual baseline is one 
where only the particular act in question is not performed:
 (1'')  Some act Φ1 counts as wrongfully coercive because it renders the 
  victim's options less valuable compared to a counterfactual baseline 
  without Φ1.
Now reconsider the question of  whether the fact that you have to pay taxes is 
wrongfully coercive.150 Employing baseline (1'') the answer will have to be yes: The 
fact that you are paying taxes restricts your options and leaves you worse off  than 
you would have been if  tax exempt. It is only if  you believe in baseline (1') that the 
answer might well be no: If  nobody was paying any taxes you would be worse off  
than you are under the current tax regime. However, advocates of  the natural 
baseline account might claim that because they rely on baseline (1''), the above-
mentioned trilemma does not arise. It is perfectly consistent to claim that (1'') a 
particular act is wrongfully coercive because it renders the victim's options less 
valuable than they would have been without that particular act, hold that (2') any 
particular act of  state coercion is wrongfully coercive, and admit that (3') universal 
state coercion leaves citizens better off  than they would have been if  there was no 
state coercion at all. 
 This way of  avoiding the trilemma raises a question: What baseline should 
we be concerned with when trying to figure out whether a particular act is 
wrongfully coercive? Should the counterfactual situation where the act in question 
is universally absent count as the relevant natural baseline? Or should we be 
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150 Taking civil law or criminal law as an example would deliver the same results.
concerned with a state of  affairs where only one victim is exempt from the 
potentially coercive treatment? Is there a good reason to believe that the relevant 
natural baseline is (1'') and not (1')? A simple consideration leads me to believe that 
there is no such reason.151 There are important cases where reliance on (1'') invites a 
powerful objection by those in favour of  a moral baseline. 
   It is often the case that the baseline picked out by the non-universal 
counterfactual (1'') is morally objectionable. Imagine a case where a particular set of 
rules is coercively imposed on a large number of  people, say a tax regime backed 
with sanctions. It seems that in order to determine whether that regime leaves a 
particular individual worse off, one should not compare the status quo, where 
everyone including her is subject to that rule, to the baseline where everyone else is 
subject to the rule but she is exempt. Why should a baseline that is unfair be 
relevant for assessing the moral status of  a situation? This line of  thought turns into 
a powerful argument at the hand of  somebody who advocates a moral baseline. 
Relying on interpretation (1''), natural baseline accounts are particularly vulnerable 
to the charge of  determining the pro tanto wrongness of  an act by comparing its 
effects to a morally arbitrary alternative. It is a mistake to think that what matters 
about coercion is how it affects the victim relative to an alternative situation that the 
victim is not actually entitled to. It seems that advocates of  the natural baseline 
account will have to choose between either claiming that state coercion is 
wrongfully coercive or gaining the upper hand against moral baseline accounts. 
 The natural baseline account presents advocates of  the claim that coercion 
triggers equality with a problem: Important forms of  coercion, such as state 
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151 The idea that the state is in fact coercive cannot be relied upon here, for this is exactly the view in 
question.
coercion, do not leave individuals worse off  than they otherwise would have been. 
One might try to come to terms with this problem by arguing that a natural baseline 
is best understood as a non-universalised counterfactual baseline. Unfortunately, 
this move seems ad hoc and weighty considerations speak against it. I conclude that 
the natural baseline interpretation of  the victim's option account of  the wrongness 
of  coercion does not support the third step in the line of  reasoning underpinning 
the idea that coercion triggers equality and fails to identify central institutions as 
relevantly coercive. 
4.3 Does equality matter for the baseline? A dilemma for the moral account
Those who advocate a moral baseline account of  the wrongness of  coercion assert 
that an act is wrongfully coercive if  it leaves the victim worse off  compared to a 
baseline that she is entitled to and which is generally morally sound. Moral baseline 
accounts are attractive in two respects. They firstly succeed in explaining the 
wrongness of  coercive offers, such as in the case of  the benign slave owner 
discussed above. They secondly capture our conviction that not all types of  coercion 
are morally wrong, such as in cases where the only way of  restoring rightful 
holdings is through coercion. However, I believe that moral baseline accounts fail to 
render plausible the claim that coercion triggers equality, or put differently, the 
claim that the wrongness of  coercion gives rise to a particular moral problem, 
which equality then answers. My first argument in support of  this claim concerns 
the question of  whether equality should be among the concerns that matter in 
fixing the baseline.
 Those who in claiming that coercion triggers equality rely on a moral 
baseline account of  coercion, will have to explain which moral considerations 
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matter in determining their preferred moral baseline. For example: Does equality 
matter in determining the relevant moral baseline? I believe that answering this 
question raises two serious problems. Firstly, exclusion of  equality would require an 
argument, which as far as I can see, is not even attempted. The following remains 
an open question: Why should we believe that egalitarian concerns do not matter in 
determining the moral baseline while other concerns do? The answer that unlike 
other moral concerns, equality is only triggered through coercion is, for obvious 
reasons, not to be had. 
 Secondly, answering the question of  whether equality matters gives rise to a 
dilemma, for the answer can neither be "yes" nor "no". It is easy to see why the 
answer cannot be "yes". If  equality mattered in determining the moral baseline, 
while the wrongness of  coercion is understood to consist in deviating from this 
baseline, the wrongness of  coercion could hardly be the trigger of  equality. 
Egalitarian concerns cannot be triggered by coercion if  they already matter in 
accounting for coercion. If  the answer to the question posed is "yes", then 
egalitarian concerns matter from the beginning and coercion lies downstream from 
equality. This renders the first problem particularly salient: Equality will have to be 
excluded from the moral concerns fixing the moral baseline but there is no 
argument in support of  this option. If  on the other hand the answer is "no", an 
independently important challenge arises: Can coercion serve as the trigger that 
turns non-egalitarian obligations into egalitarian ones? Does the fact that 
individuals coerce each other introduce equality as a concern between them? 
 Whether advocates of  a moral baseline account succeed in answering this 
question will depend on their pre-coercive moral standards. Two considerations 
support my claim that one should not think that coercion turns non-egalitarian 
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concerns into egalitarian ones. Consider firstly a picture that appears initially 
plausible: Assume that absent coercion you think of  moral concerns as 
sufficientarian in nature. Between individuals who do not coerce each other, it does 
not matter that individuals have equally valuable options, but it matters that their 
options are good enough.152 Now imagine a case where two individuals that do not 
coerce each other, Harry and Jerry, both enjoy options that are good enough but 
one enjoys twice as many as the other. Say that Harry is at level 20, Jerry is at level 
10 and the level of  sufficiency is at 7.153 Because your moral concern is 
sufficientarian there is nothing wrong with this situation. Now imagine that Jerry 
decides to coerce Harry and thereby lowers the value of  his option set to 19, 
increasing his own to 11. If  one believes that coercion triggers equality, then this act 
has further implications. Unlike in the pre-coercive situation, the distribution of  
options no longer justifies the appropriate moral requirements. Instead of  relying on 
a sufficiency standard, compliance with an egalitarian standard is now required. 
Harry will have to transfer more options to Jerry, up to the point where the value of 
both option sets is 15. This is an odd result: By coercing Harry to give up one of  his 
rightfully held options, Jerry can trigger a moral standard, which in turn requires 
that Harry give up even more of  his options. The coercion view requires that the 
coercer be benefitted and not the victim. These considerations cast a strong doubt 
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152 This pre-coercive sufficiency reasoning is, I believe, the picture endorsed by many of those who 
endorse the view that coercion triggers equality. Michael Blake, for example says: "The strategy I 
employ seeks to endorse the idea that we can defend principles of sufficiency abroad and principles 
of  distributive equality at home" (Blake 2001, p.258). 
153 These number are just a rough indicator for the value of different options. You may plug in your 
preferred currency or metric.  
on the idea that coercion turns sufficientarian standards into egalitarian 
standards.154 
 Consider next an alternative picture of  pre-coercive moral standards. 
Assume you believe that the moral baseline employed in accounting for the 
wrongness of  coercion is one of  historical entitlements, which are determined by 
considerations of  self-ownership, justice in acquisition and justice in transfer.155 
Assume that on the relevant moral baseline the option holdings of  two individuals, 
Bob and Jack, are just by the standards of  historical entitlements. Now imagine that 
Jack decides to coerce Bob and thereby diminishes the value of  his option set. 
Would it be plausible to think that coercion causes egalitarian concerns to take over 
from the historical entitlement reasoning? Again, the answer, it seems, will have to 
be no. If  protection of  autonomy from coercive interference is part of  the reason for 
adopting an historical entitlement account, which is how I think one should 
plausibly conceive of  such accounts, then coercive interference with autonomy 
should not give you a reason to give up on the historical entitlement reasoning and 
embrace an egalitarian account instead.
154
154 One may of course worry that the type of coercion between Harry and Jerry is not the type of 
coercion that would be sufficient to trigger equality. However, one may simply revise the type of 
coercion used in the example, add whatever else one thinks is part of a sufficient condition and ask 
whether it would in this case be plausible to assume that duties of sufficiency turn into obligations of 
justice when the worse off (North Korea?) begin to coerce the better off (South Korea?). It would 
generally be odd if one could trigger moral obligations that benefit oneself by beginning to 
(relevantly) coerce somebody else. 
155 Note that the historical entitlement view I here have in mind is a version of right-libertarianism as 
defended by Robert Nozick and not a version of left-libertarianism as defended by Hillel Steiner, 
Peter Vallentyne or Mike Otsuka. For the former, see Nozick (1974). For the latter, see Michael 
Otsuka (2003).
 The dilemma faced by the advocate of  the moral baseline view then is this: If  
one believes that equality is among the concerns fixing the baseline, coercion 
cannot be the trigger of  equality because egalitarian concerns would arise prior to 
and independently of  coercion. If  one believes that equality is not among the 
concerns determining the baseline, coercion cannot be the trigger of  equality, 
because it is implausible to think that coercion turns non-egalitarian moral 
standards into egalitarian ones. In any case, coercion fails as a trigger of  equality.
5. The coercer's intention account 
The coercer's intention account seems to avoid some of  the difficulties that befall 
the victim's options account. Explaining the wrongness of  coercion in terms of  the 
coercer's intention does not presuppose that one chooses a baseline and compares 
the value of  different option sets.156 The ability to clearly distinguish between 
coercive threats and non-coercive warnings also counts in favour of  the coercer's 
intention account. The mugger does not merely warn his victim of  a consequence 
that would independently ensue, but it is the mugger's intention to alter the victim's 
behaviour by announcing consequences he intends to bring about. On the coercer's 
intention account, coercion is considered wrong because it violates autonomy by 
failing to respect an individual's independence.157 The account seems to capture the 
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156 Advocates of the intention account, such as A.J. Julius, believe that coercion is wrong because 
the coercer's intentions violate an important requirement on how to treat other people. Their 
explanation of the wrongness of coercion in terms of the coercer's intentions should be understood 
as offering necessary and sufficient condition for the wrongness of coercion. An act which satisfies 
the descriptive criteria of coercion is wrong, if and only if the coercer's reasons for action contravene 
the relevant requirement. 
157 Maintaining Raz's terminology, the intention account can be said to focus on the independence 
constituent of  autonomy. 
special significance we attach to having one's own ends replaced with those of  
another person, of  finding one's will subjected to somebody else's and of  being 
steered into some particular course of  action. The wrongness of  coercion might 
then be understood in the following way.158 The coercer's action Φ gives his victim a 
reason to ψ, where the coercer does not intend that his victim comes to ψ as a result 
of  her recognition of  an independently good reason that speaks in favour of  ψ-
ing.159 There are two ways in which the victim might fail to act on the basis of  
recognising an independently good reason. The failure might firstly consist in the 
fact that there is no good independent reason. In the mugger's case there is no good 
independent reason for the victim to hand over the money. The failure might 
secondly consist in the fact that the coercer does not aim at the recipient's 
recognition of  the independent reason. In some cases of  paternalism, the 
paternalist does not intend that the recipient recognise the independent reason to ψ, 
for example that ψ-ing would promote her own well-being. In these cases, the 
coercer's intention seems to violate a simple requirement: Do not act in ways that 
gives others a reason to ψ, unless you thereby also intend to make it more likely 
that good independent reasons to ψ are acted upon. A.J. Julius (2009a, p.1) offers a 
formally more accurate version of  this thought:
 "You should not (do y, believe that your y-ing will lead me to x and 
 that this fact is a reason to y, and fail by your y-ing to help make it the 
 case that, for some reason R, that hold independently of  your y-ing, I 
 (do x as a result of  my belief  that I should x in virtue of  R.))" 
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158 The present section focuses on an account that has recently been offered by Julius (2009a).
159 Note that this account puts a particular emphasis on conditions (1) and (5) from the account of 
coercion offered in section 3 above. 
This requirement seems to capture a significant aspect of  what we think is wrong 
with coercion.160 However, I believe that the coercer's intention account fails to 
succeed both in explaining the wrongness of  coercion and in rendering convincing 
the claim that coercion triggers equality. Three arguments support this verdict. The 
first argument shows that the coercer's intention account is mistaken because it 
overproduces judgements of  wrongness. It identifies clearly permissible ways of  
getting people to do things as morally wrong. The second argument shows that the 
account underproduces judgements of  wrongness and is unable to adequately deal 
with cases where people are coerced into recognising independently good reasons 
for action. The third argument relies on cases where acts have coercive but non-
intended effects, to undermine the idea that equality arises as a moral demand in 
response to the moral problem of  coercion.161 
5.1. How the intention account overproduces judgements of wrongness
On the coercer's intention account, an act of  coercion is wrong because the coercer 
is giving his victim a reason to perform a particular act, without intending to 
thereby make it more likely that the victim acts out of  recognition of  an 
independently good reason. The coercer's threat or proposal serves as the victim's 
sole reason for doing what she is coerced to do. But if  that is the feature which 
renders acts of  coercion wrong, then other ways of  getting people to do things are 
similarly wrong. In many cases this is unproblematic. Deceiving and blackmailing 
are examples of  acts that are rightfully condemned by Julius's principle. However, 
and this is where the problem arises, there are acts which the principle wrongfully 
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160  Julius (2009a) argues that his account fits in with our judgements about a large number of 
particular cases.
161 For a fuller argument to this effect, see my previous chapter 4. 
condemns. Some action-directing actions are morally unproblematic, for example 
making somebody an offer, but ruled out by the principle. If  I offer my flatmate to 
cook her dinner if  she agrees to do my dishes, she might not have a sufficient 
independent reason to do so. In fact, my offer might be the only reason she has to 
do my dishes. I am directing her action without making it more likely that she acts 
out of  recognition of  an independently good reason. But should we say that I am 
wronging my flatmate by making the offer? I believe not. The offer does not 
contract her option set; she is free to reject it and it does not prevent her from 
pursuing a more valuable option. The coercer's intention account then seems to 
overproduce judgements of  wrongness. It fails to distinguish between acts of  
coercion and offers. An account of  the wrongness of  coercion, which finds the 
same kind of  wrongness in both offers and coercion, is unconvincing and ought to 
be rejected.
 Julius anticipates this objection and responds by introducing the notion of  a 
joint-requirement.162 Two individuals are subject to a joint-requirement if  they 
jointly ought to perform a particular pair of  acts, while it is impossible to 
understand their reasons for action as a conjunction of  individual requirements. An 
example clarifies the notion of  a joint requirement. Assume that two individuals A 
and B are on one side of  a river and have a good reason to cross it, say because their 
homes are on the other side. There is a rowing boat with two oars that could be 
used to cross. If  A rows left and B rows right they both will cross the river safely. If  
one rows without the other, then the boat will spin without moving forward and the 
current will wash the boat into a cataract. It seems that even though neither A nor B 
has an individual reason to row, they are subject to the joint requirement {A rows 
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162 See for example Julius (2009a, p.6) and Julius (2009b). 
left, B rows right}. Joint-requirements then render offers morally innocent, because 
offers help to meet joint-requirements. Put differently, joint-requirements provide 
the independent reason required by Julius's principle. Reconsider the example that 
motivated the original objection. Assume that I am better off  cooking, say I enjoy 
cooking and do not like washing up, and my housemate is better off  doing the 
dishes because she likes the food I cook and does not mind washing up, then my 
offer helps us to do what we jointly ought to do.  
 Does appeal to joint-requirements successfully pre-empt the offer-objection? 
Two considerations illustrate why it does not. First: Even though there might be 
some joint requirements, and even though some offers might plausibly be 
understood as helping to meet joint-requirements, there are many offers that do not. 
It is implausible to believe that all morally innocent offers facilitate joint-
requirements. Consider the simple case of  asymmetric offers. There are cases where 
those who issue an offer stand to benefit while those receiving the offer are 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting it. If  I offer you a seat at my table 
during lunch, you may have no good independent reason to sit down at this 
particular table and you may even be indifferent between sitting with me and sitting 
alone. My offer gives you a reason to sit down, it is action-directing, but it clearly 
fails to track a joint-requirement. Second: Arguing that offers are morally innocent 
if  they facilitate joint-requirements leaves coercion and offers implausibly on par 
with each other. If  joint-requirements can be invoked in justification of  offers, then 
they can be invoked in justification of  coercion. If  coercion is wrong because it 
violates Julius's principle, while joint-requirements can provide the independent 
reason required by that principle, then coercion is justified if  it ensures that we 
together do what we are jointly required to do. However, there seems to be an 
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important difference between a situation in which person A coerces B into rowing 
right and a situation in which person A offers to row left if  B agrees to row right. 
Once more the coercer's intention account fails to make a morally relevant 
distinction between coercion and offers. 
5.2 How the intention account underproduces judgements of wrongness
The coercer's intention account also underproduces judgments of  wrongness. There 
are cases where the coercer's action is coercive even though the coercer's intentions 
satisfy Julius's principle. It is sometimes pro tanto wrong to give somebody a reason 
to act, even if  that act makes it more likely that the other person acts out of  
recognition of  an independently good reason. Consider the following case:163 A 
tightrope walker is about to cross a deep chasm. Assume that it is actually very 
dangerous to cross the chasm and that there is a good independent reason not to do 
so. The tightrope walker suffers from acrophobia and her psychological set-up is 
such that she can only bring herself  about to walk as long as she does not look 
down. As long as she does not look down, she is determined to cross and she will 
walk just as safely as any other tightrope walker would. As soon as she looks down, 
however, she will recognise the danger, lose confidence and decide not to walk. 
Because she is aware of  her psychological setup, the tightrope walker tries to avoid 
looking down. Now imagine that somebody concerned about the tightrope walker's 
safety appears on the scene, points a gun at the tightrope walker's head and 
threatens: "Look down the chasm or I will shoot you!" As a result of  this threat, the 
tightrope walker looks down the chasm, recognizes the danger, her acrophobia 
kicks in, she loses confidence and overturns her original decision to walk. I believe 
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163 I owe this case to a discussion with Mike Otsuka. 
that that there are two things to be said about this situation: Firstly, even though the 
threat might be all things considered justified, it is still pro tanto wrong to coerce 
the tightrope walker into looking down the chasm. The gun-pointing person could 
appropriately regret her threat and think: "I wish I could have convinced her not to 
walk instead of  having had to point my gun at her. Or even better, she should have 
looked down and recognised the danger without my interference." Secondly, if  one 
believes that violation of  Julius's principle is what makes coercion wrong, then the 
judgement that the gun-pointing is pro tanto wrong is not to be had. The gun-
pointing gets the tightrope walker to act out of  recognition of  a good independent 
reason not to cross the chasm. The argument then is this: If  one believes that the 
gun-pointer's threat is coercive and pro tanto wrong, one ought to reject the 
coercer's intention account. 
5.3 The intention account's failure as a trigger of equality
Putting the coercer's reasons for action centre-stage invites another objection. There 
is a further set of  cases where the coercer's intention account underproduces 
judgements of  wrongness. These are again cases where the coercer seems to 
wrongfully coerce his victim without it being the case that Julius's principle is 
violated. The coercer might for example give somebody a reason to ψ that does not 
track a good independent reason, without intending to do so. Put differently, the 
account fails in cases where threats have coercive but non-intended effects. Consider 
a simple example. Thousands of  people are marching down Fleet Street in London 
protesting against the G20 Summit. Most of  the protesters are marching peacefully 
but a small minority is smashing windows and throwing bricks. The police appear 
on the scene and officer Johnson threatens to use his water canon unless the 
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protesters vacate the city. In making this threat, however, he only intends to coerce 
the violent protesters into leaving. Johnson would prefer that the peaceful protesters 
remain on the street, maybe because he believes that they have a right to do so, 
maybe because he is afraid of  bad press. But given that it is practically impossible to 
only threaten the violent protesters, Johnson accepts that the peaceful protesters will 
also face the options of  either having to leave or being water cannoned. He does not 
act with the intention of  giving the peaceful protesters a reason to leave, but merely 
foresees that his intended action will have that consequence. If  the coercer's 
intention account of  the wrongness of  coercion were correct, we would have to 
accept that only the violent protesters are wrongfully coerced into leaving. This, I 
believe, is absurd. Both groups share the same predicament and face the same 
option set. A position committed to the view that the violent protesters are wronged 
while the peaceful demonstrators are not must be mistaken.  
 Note that this observation also undermines the coercer's intention account's 
prospects for rendering plausible the claim that egalitarian distributive justice arises 
in response to the wrongness of  coercion. Imagine a society with three groups of  
people in it.164 The emergent capitalists own some newly built factories. The 
talented farmers live off  their own land and possess certain skills, such that the 
emergent capitalists would like them to work in their factory. The untalented 
farmers also live off  their land but they possess no marketable factory skills. 
Because they can survive from what they earn from labouring their land and trading 
with each other, no farmer goes to work in the capitalists' factories. Thinking about 
how to get the talented farmers to work in their factories, the emergent capitalists 
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164  This example is a simplification and variation on Karl Marx's account of the original 
accumulation of  capital, see Marx (2008, chapter 24). 
coercively impose a high tax on trading farm products, making it impossible for the 
farmers to live off  their land and its produces. It seems that if  the coercive 
imposition of  a tax is sufficient to give rise to some obligations of  distributive 
justice between the capitalists and the farmers, obligations would arise between 
capitalists and both talented and untalented farmers. The talented and the 
untalented farmers are equally affected by the imposition of  the tax, i.e., they both 
end up unable to carry on with their traditional lifestyle etc. Advocates of  the 
coercer's intention account, however, will have to maintain that obligations arise 
merely between the emergent capitalists and the talented farmers. After all, the tax 
is only intended to get the talented farmers to work in the factory and the 
predicament of  the untalented farmers is not even intended. This observation, I 
believe, casts serious doubt on the idea that the wrongness of  coercion, understood 
in terms of  the intentions of  the coercer, creates the moral problem to which 
equality provides the solution. If  demands of  equality arise as a result of  taxation, 
they arise likewise between all three groups. Consequently, coercive intentions 
cannot be the triggers equality. 
6.  Conclusion
I have argued that those political philosophers who believe that equality emerges as 
a moral concern where and because people coerce each other are mistaken. If  my 
arguments are correct, the idea of  coercion as a trigger of  equality is neither as 
plausible nor as powerful as it may initially appear. Neither the victim's options 
account nor the coercer's intentions account succeed in jointly (a) offering a 
convincing account of  the wrongness of  coercion, (b) rendering cogent the idea that 
the demand of  equality arises in response to the moral problem of  coercion, and (c) 
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identifying some institutions, such as those of  a society's basic structure, as 
relevantly coercive. As long as no alternative account of  coercion succeeds in these 
respects, one ought to remain sceptical about the claim that coercion triggers 
equality.
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CHAPTER 6
Basic equality, range properties and common humanity 165
1. Preliminary remarks
The idea that human beings are fundamentally one another’s equals is 
uncontroversial. However, that a claim is universally accepted does not mean 
that it raises no further questions. Some ideas win support because they are 
vague, and affirming a proposition is different from offering reasons in its 
support. What exactly does it mean to say that people are fundamentally one 
another’s equals? In virtue of  what feature or property do human beings 
possess equal moral status? The first aim of  this chapter is to outline the 
difficulties involved in answering these questions. The question is primarily of  
importance to egalitarians but also presents a genuine problem for other moral 
theories. The second aim of  my chapter is to reconcile the idea of  basic 
equality with a particular egalitarian commitment. Ian Carter (2009) has 
argued that rendering the idea of  basic equality coherent rules out a 
substantive luck egalitarian commitment. I shall argue that the idea of  basic 
equality is compatible with the substantive egalitarian claim that nobody 
should be worse or better off  than anybody else through no fault or choice of  
his or her own. Finally, my third aim is to offer a sketch and brief  defense of  a 
particular and hitherto neglected conception of  basic equality which, building 
on the ideas of  common humanity and family resemblance, answers most of  
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165 An earlier version of this chapter has been presented at the conference “The Diversity of Human 
Rights: Human Rights and Democracy in the Age of Globalization" at the InterUniversity Centre 
Dubrovnik, 5. - 12. September 2009. I am grateful to the audience for very helpful comments. 
the difficulties associated with the question of  basic equality and supports a 
luck egalitarian commitment. 
 My argument proceeds in seven steps. Section 2 offers an analysis of  
the structure of  egalitarian theory and argues that the idea of  basic equality is 
pertinent to three types of  important egalitarian argument. Section 3 identifies 
three questions that those who believe in the idea of  basic equality will have to 
come to terms with. Section 4 presents a general strategy for responding to 
these questions and introduces the idea of  a range property. Section 5 argues 
that the idea of  a range property raises still further questions that are difficult 
to answer. Section 6 introduces Carter's recent solution to the problems raised 
by the idea of  a range property. Unfortunately, this solution challenges a 
particular type of  distributive egalitarian commitment, namely distributive 
principles, which are sensitive to considerations of  responsibility and aim at 
the compensation of  internal endowment deficits. Section 7 explains how 
advocates of  such principles should respond to Carter's challenge. Section 8 
outlines the account of  basic equality as common humanity.
2.  The structure of egalitarian argument
This section illustrates how the claim that human beings are fundamentally 
one another’s equals figures as a premise in egalitarian argument. My 
illustration has three parts. The first part advances a claim about the structure 
of  egalitarian theory and identifies three different types of  egalitarian 
argument. Establishing an egalitarian principle is to take a stance on (at least) 
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the metric, scope and grounds of  equality.166 The second part examines what 
role the characteristics of  those entitled to equal shares play in these 
arguments. I believe that they figure as premises in all three types of  
argument. The third part argues that anybody who thinks that there is some 
egalitarian principle that applies to everybody has to rely on the idea of  basic 
equality.
 Egalitarians believe that some persons {P1, P2, Pn} are entitled to equal 
amounts of  some good Gn or treatment Tn. Substituting different goods or 
types of  treatments for these placeholders gives rise to various specific 
egalitarian claims. Consider two examples: Every person is entitled to be 
treated with equal respect. Or: Individuals who participate in a joint 
productive effort are entitled to an equal share of  the fruits of  their 
cooperative endeavour. Advocating any such specific egalitarian claim, the 
egalitarian will have to take a stance on three different questions. The first 
question that arises is this: What good Gn or treatment Tn  are the members of  
{P1, P2, Pn} entitled to? This question is at the heart of  the metric debate 
prominent in the current egalitarian literature.167 Note that candidate metrics 
need not be confined to economic distributive justice and material goods, 
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166 There are of course further relevant questions, such as "What is the site of distributive justice?". 
However, I believe that answering the questions of scope, metric and grounds is necessary and 
sufficient for rendering an egalitarian principle determinate. One may object to this threefold 
distinction and insist that a grounds argument is always a grounds argument in support of a 
principle with a particular metric, applying to a specific scope. However, I believe the three 
arguments are still logically independent and ought to be treated separately. As my discussion of 
chapters 4 and 5 has illustrated, one may agree about the scope and metric of an egalitarian 
principle, and still disagree on the relevant grounds.  
167 See for example: Sen (1978), Cohen (1989) and Dworkin (2000).
since entitlements to equal moral authority, liberty, political power or simply 
concern might be the quintessence of  one’s preferred egalitarian principle. The 
second question that arises is this: Who are the members of  {P1, P2, Pn} 
entitled to equal amounts of  Gn or treatment Tn? This second question 
concerns the scope of  egalitarian entitlements. Egalitarians need to determine 
the range of  people subject to egalitarian principles. A third question that 
arises is the following: Why are the members of  {P1, P2, Pn} entitled to equal 
amounts of  good Gn or treatment Tn? An answer to this question identifies 
those features of  {P1, P2, Pn} or the relationship in which they stand to each 
other that give rise to egalitarian entitlements. Call this a question about the 
grounds of  equality. Arguing for a specific egalitarian principle is to give 
reasons in support of  answers to questions of  metric, scope and grounds. 
Correspondingly, there are (at least) three different types of  egalitarian 
argument: Arguments supporting claims about the metric of  equality, 
arguments supporting claims about the scope of  equality, and arguments 
supporting claims about the grounds of  equality. Keeping these arguments 
conceptually distinct is important. A specific egalitarian principle might be 
rejected for being mistaken about scope, metric or grounds. 
 The characteristics of  the members of  {P1, P2, Pn} seem relevant to all 
three types of  egalitarian argument. Consider the question of  scope first. 
Arguments about the scope of  equality will have to rely on a relevant 
difference between those who are entitled to equal amounts of  Gn and those 
who are not. If  P1 is to be treated differently from P2, or to receive a different 
share of  Gn, there must be a relevant difference between them. Call this the 
supervenience constraint on scope arguments. The supervenience constraint 
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does not presuppose that there is any characteristic the members of  {P1, P2, 
Pn} have in common. But it requires that there is a relevant difference between 
members and non-members.168 
 Consider next the question of  grounds. Giving a conclusive answer to 
the question why {P1, P2, Pn} are entitled to equal amounts of  Gn is a 
cornerstone of  any egalitarian argument, and some contemporary egalitarians 
are indeed sceptical about the prospects of  providing it.169 Attempts that look 
promising are of  this general argumentative form:170
 (P1) Relevantly similar cases ought to be treated equally.
 (P2) The entitlements of  {P1, P2, Pn} to Gn have to be a fitting 
  response to the features and characteristics of  {P1, P2, Pn}. 
 (P3) The features relevant to the distribution of  Gn are possessed by 
  all members {P1, P2, Pn} equally.
 (P4) There are no differences between the members of  {P1, P2, Pn} 
  relevant to the distribution of  Gn.
 (.:) The members of  {P1, P2, Pn} are entitled to equal shares of  Gn.
The first two premises of  this argument are uncontroversial: (P1) formulates a 
weak generic principle of  justice, (P2) states a relationship of  propriety that is 
presupposed by most normative arguments seeking to establish distributive 
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168 For a discussion of  the supervenience constraint, see for example Waldron (2008, p.23 ff).
169 A.J. Julius  (2006, p.176) argues that nothing short of a full theory of justice would actually be 
sufficient to answer this question.
170 More specific variants of this argument are employed by Thomas Christiano (2007, p.45 ff.) and 
Ingmar Persson (2007, p.83). 
principles. The last two premises are more interesting. For the argument to be 
sound, or more precisely for (P3) to be true, there have to be characteristics 
that all members of  {P1, P2, Pn} share equally. Also, these characteristics have 
to be relevant to the distribution of  Gn. After all, they are the features that give 
rise to egalitarian entitlements. Ground arguments build on the assumption of 
relevant sameness.
 Consider finally the question of  metric. It is often the case that 
arguments for a particular metric proceed by appeal to intuitions in specific 
cases.171 However, there has to be some systematic relationship between the 
good Gn and those features of  {P1, P2, Pn} that give rise to the entitlement in 
the first place. Take an example: If  we believe that egalitarian distributive 
justice is more adequately captured in terms of  entitlements to equal 
opportunity for welfare, rather than entitlements to welfare, this belief  tracks 
some relevant features of  {P1, P2, Pn}, such as the significance of  and their 
ability to exercise responsible choice. Call this the tracking relation: The 
metric of  egalitarian entitlements tracks significant features of  the entitlement 
bearers. There are then (at least) three different ways in which the 
characteristics of  those entitled to equal shares figure as premises in 
egalitarian argument. The characteristics of  {P1, P2, Pn} enter scope 
arguments through the supervenience constraint, they underpin the 
assumption of  relevant sameness in ground arguments, and figure in the 
tracking relation of  scope arguments.
170
171 A good example is the debate between those supporting a resource metric and those supporting a 
welfare metric, c.f. Cohen (1989).
 I suspect that any approach in normative ethics contains at least one 
principle of  the following form: “There is a good Gn or treatment Tn such that 
every person is entitled to equal shares of  it.” Everybody seems to endorse at 
least one egalitarian principle with universal scope. Utilitarians believe that 
everybody is entitled to have their interest taken into account equally. 
Contractualists believe that everybody is owed equal justification in deciding 
on the principles that are to govern their conduct. Almost everybody believes 
that there is an equal right not to be killed. And some egalitarians believe that 
everybody is entitled to equal access to advantage. Proponents of  all these 
views need to explain to whom their principle applies, why they think it 
applies and what the equal entitlement is an entitlement to. Doing so involves 
making claims about the characteristics of  {P1, P2, Pn}. Where {P1, P2, Pn} 
has universal scope and comprises everybody, these claims have to be about 
characteristics universally shared. This is where the idea of  basic equality 
comes in. To satisfy the supervenience constraint, to make good on the 
relevant sameness assumption, and for the metric tracking relation to hold, the 
members of  {P1, P2, Pn} have to be one another’s equals. Defending an 
egalitarian principle with universal scope requires an interpretation and 
defence of  the claim that human beings are fundamentally one another’s 
equals.
3. Variation, scope and significance: Three questions for basic equality
An account of  basic equality comprises a descriptive and a normative 
component. The descriptive component identifies some property or feature 
that renders human beings fundamentally equal. The normative component 
171
explains the choice of  property and accounts for its significance. Even though  
there are different ways to conceive of  the relationship between the two 
components, each of  them is required for a complete account of  basic equality 
and a successful account of  basic equality will have to convince in both 
respects.172 In virtue of  what features are human beings fundamentally one 
another's equals? What is the property that all human beings possess equally?  
And why does possession of  this property matter? There are (at least) three 
challenges that a good answer to these questions must meet.173 Firstly, the 
properties figuring in an account of  basic equality must avoid variation 
without turning into properties it is incredible to claim are possessed by each. 
Secondly, the features rendering human beings equal must be such that all 
human beings and only human beings possess them. Thirdly, the property in 
question must indeed be of  great significance. The present section briefly 
explains each of  these challenges.
 Bernard Williams (1979) argues that anyone taking the question of  
basic equality seriously faces a dilemma. Searching for a feature possessed by 
all human beings equally we come to find that those properties that initially 
look like promising candidates are in fact possessed unequally by different 
individuals, while those properties that are possessed equally fail to convince. 
To illustrate Williams's point, consider Anderson's (2009, p.320) interpretation 
of  the notion of  basic equality:
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172  See for example Waldron's (2008, p.30) discussion of John McDowell and the claim that 
descriptive properties remain "shapeless" unless viewed from some normative point of  view.
173 Richard Arneson (1999) speaks of what he calls the "Singer Problem". However, I believe it is 
more helpful to treat the components of  this problem independently.
 "Everyone equally has the power to develop and exercise moral 
 responsibility, to cooperate with others according to principles of  
 justice, to shape and fulfil a conception of  their good." 
 
There is a straightforward empirical reading of  this statement such that the 
underlying idea appears promising and plausible. Certain powers, for example 
one's ability to reflect and act upon the demands created by the interests of  
other people, seem clearly relevant to one's moral standing. However, on any 
plausible empirical reading, Anderson's remark is false. It is not the case that 
persons possess the properties underpinning moral powers equally. People 
differ in their practical intelligence and degree of  empathy, some might be 
more vulnerable than others to acrasia, and not everybody can reciprocate in 
accordance with justice. In combination with the first two premises of  the 
general argument, the principle of  generic justice and the relationship of  
propriety, this insight would actually deliver inegalitarian principles. The first 
horn of  Williams's dilemma is this: Relevant empirical candidate properties 
are possessed unequally. Seeking to avoid this predicament, one could instead 
apply a different reading to the notion of  equal powers. Williams offers the 
alternative of  a Kantian solution, according to which individuals possess 
certain moral powers independently of  any contingent and empirical ability. 
On this reading, the properties in virtue of  which human beings are 
fundamentally one another's equals are, ex hypothesis, possessed equally. 
However, this Kantian or transcendental solution has a serious drawback. The 
idea of  basic equality itself  is much less controversial than the idea of  non-
empirical moral powers. One might in fact worry that many contemporary 
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egalitarians would altogether like to avoid the commitments presupposed by 
the Kantian solution. This is the second horn of  Williams's dilemma: The 
understanding on which plausible candidate properties are possessed equally 
by all individuals fail to convince. To meet the challenge posed by Williams's 
dilemma, egalitarians would need to identify a property or a set of  properties 
that avoids both horns. Egalitarians are looking for properties that avoid 
variation and turn out believable. 
 Successfully spelling out the idea of  basic equality requires that we 
accommodate our considered convictions about scope. I believe that the 
property we are looking for should cover every human being and only human 
beings.174 There are two ways of  making a scope mistake in this context. The 
scope of  the property could firstly fail to subsume human beings under the 
status of  moral equality that ought to be included. This mistake is most likely 
to occur when the candidate property focuses on an ability coming along with 
agency or personhood. Those at the margins of  life like infants and cognitively 
impaired people must not be excluded from the realm of  equality.175 If  our 
considered convictions tell us that somebody is entitled to equal moral 
concern, while our preferred feature specifying its scope fails to include them, 
we ought to revise the specifying feature. The second mistake is the inverse of  
the first. Instead of  excluding individuals that ought to be included, one could 
make the mistake of  including those that ought to be excluded. This mistake 
is most likely to occur where the candidate property focuses on vulnerabilities 
or capacities for benefit and suffering. Peter Vallentyne (2007) points out that 
174
174 The challenge is that of defending this claim and avoid the charge of "speciecism". I shall discuss 
the challenge of  speciecism in greater detail below when defending my common humanity account.
175 For "margins of  life" see for example McMahan (1997).
just like men, mice possess capacity for well-being. To interpret the idea of  
basic equality as equal capacity for well-being would give rise to two 
problems. Firstly, inclusion of  non-human beings does not sit well with our 
conviction that human beings are fundamentally one another’s equals. We 
think that they are each other’s equals but certainly not the equals of  mice. 
Secondly, we ought to avoid overcrowding the purview of  our egalitarian 
concern because otherwise our preferred egalitarian principle might become 
implausible. If  we believe that the idea of  basic equality supports some 
egalitarian principle governing the distribution of  burdens and benefits, while 
mice share the property relevant for the status of  basic equality, redistribution 
from men to mice might be what the egalitarian principle requires. A 
convincing account of  basic equality should render all human beings and only 
human beings one another's equals. 
 Richard Arneson (1999) points out that the property underpinning the 
idea of  basic equality will have to carry a lot of  weight. We are looking for a 
property sufficiently significant to support one of  our central moral 
convictions. Note that in the general argument formulated above, the features 
of  {P1, P2, Pn} have to play two roles that my discussion so far has neglected. 
On the one hand they have to give rise to the entitlements mentioned in the 
second premise and the conclusion. On the other hand they have to be 
established as relevant against and override the competing inegalitarian 
considerations mentioned in the fourth premise. Not any property or 
characteristic that all human beings possess equally would be successful in 
these respects. Considerations of  significance introduce the third challenge 
that the advocate of  basic equality would have to come to terms with.  
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4. Locke, Rawls and the idea of a range property
The first horn of  Williams's dilemma brings out the importance of  avoiding 
the type of  variation that would contradict the idea of  basic equality originally 
set out to vindicate. How can human beings be one another's equal in virtue of 
a feature that they possess unequally? The idea of  a range property attempts to 
reconcile basic equality with variation by degree in the properties 
underpinning it. A range property is characterised by two features. Firstly, a 
range property is a property that individuals either possess or do not possess. 
It is binary. Secondly, individuals posses a range property in virtue of  
possessing some other property which admits of  degrees. A range property 
establishes a relationship between a binary property and a scalar property. It 
specifies a range on a scale such that the range property is possessed by 
anyone coming within that range.176 Consider an intuitive example. Being a 
mature student is a range property possessed by any student who passes the 
threshold of  21 on the scalar property of  age. Jeremy Waldron defines a range 
property like this:
 
 "R is a range property with respect to S if  R is binary and there is a 
 scalar  property S, such that R applies to individual items in virtue of  
 their being within a certain range on the scale connoted by 
 S" (Waldron 2008, p.33).
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176 Note that some range properties have both a lower threshold and an upper threshold and some 
only have a lower threshold.
Relying on range properties offers a promising way of  addressing the problem 
of  variation. Variation in certain properties does not threaten the idea of  basic 
equality, as long as the property ranging over this variation is possessed 
equally by all relevant individuals. There are two positions that rely on range 
properties to explain the idea of  basic equality that are worth looking at.  
 John Locke's argument takes off  from the assumption of  "equality of  
men by nature" (Locke 1990, p.101). Locke argues that "there is nothing more 
evident than that creatures of  the same species and rank, promiscuously born 
to all and the same advantages of  nature, and the use of  same faculties, should 
also be equal one amongst another without subordination or 
subjection" (Locke 1990, p.101). Trying to explain why human beings are by 
nature one another's equals, Locke relies on the idea of  relevant similarity. 
Human beings relevantly resemble each other in their possession of  "corporeal 
rationality," a property which in turn is explained by the fact that all men are 
created in the image of  God. Unfortunately, people possess the property of  
"corporeal rationality" unequally. The problem of  variation arises. Locke 
addresses this problem by relying on a range property. There is a level of  
rationality sufficient to place individuals within the realm of  basic equality. 
The threshold that Locke has in mind consists of  individuals having "Light 
enough to lead them to the Knowledge of  their Maker, and the sight of  their 
own Duties" (Locke 1971, p.45). Employing the definition offered above, the 
picture that unfolds is this: Capacity for abstraction sufficient for reasoning to 
the existence of  God is a range property that applies to all individuals within a 
certain range on the scale of  "corporeal rationality." Individuals are 
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fundamentally one another's equals in the sense that and because they can 
recognise the existence of  God. 
 John Rawls (1999, p.441) understands the idea of  basic equality as 
concerning "the features of  human beings in virtue of  which they are to be 
treated in accordance with the principles of  justice." His question is this: "On 
what grounds then do we distinguish between mankind and other living things 
and regard the constraints of  justice as holding only in our relations to human 
persons?" (1999, p.441). Rawls's answer builds on the notion of  moral 
personhood: "Moral persons are distinguished by two features: first they are 
capable of  having a conception of  their good (...) and second they are capable 
of  having a sense of  justice" (Rawls 1999, p.442). To avoid the problem of  
variation, and clearly people differ in the degree to which they possess these 
two capacities, Rawls refers to the idea of  a range property. Moral personhood 
is a binary property ranging over the two scalar properties of  moral capacity. 
Anyone who passes a minimal threshold of  moral capacity counts as a 
person. The threshold is specified by reference to the requirements of  justice 
as fairness, "equal justice is owed to those who have the capacity to take part 
in and act in accordance with the public understanding of  the initial 
situation" (1999, p.442), i.e., the original position. Individuals are 
fundamentally one another's equals in the sense that and because they can 
understand and act upon principles of  justice: "Those who can give justice are 
owed justice" (1999p. 446).
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5. The idea of a range property: Five questions and three problems
Advocates of  a range property R will have to answer five questions: (1) Why 
choose scalar property S? (2) Why allocate entitlements on the basis of  R 
rather than S? (3) Why set the particular threshold envisaged by R? (4) Why 
ignore variation above the threshold? (5) Why make a fundamental distinction 
between somebody just below the threshold and somebody just above the 
threshold? There are three problems that befall any attempt of  providing 
sound arguments in support of  answers to these five questions. Note that I am 
not offering a knock-down argument against the idea of  a range property. I 
simply offer some considerations which may or may not be decisive.177 
 There are several scalar properties that one might choose from when 
trying to establish the idea of  basic equality. Considerations of  significance, 
scope and believability are relevant criteria informing this choice. Opting for 
scalar property S1 rather than scalar property S2 we justify our choice by 
explaining the significance and importance of  S1. Maybe we say that S1 
matters more than S2 because S1 is more germane to what we believe is 
important about human beings, to what we value in persons or similar. Any 
such argument establishing the significance of  a particular scalar property 
delivers an answer to question (1). Answers to question (2) require a different 
type of  argument. Instead of  providing an argument supporting our 
preference for focusing on S1 rather than on S2, we need an argument in 
support of  our preference for focusing on R rather than on S1. Given that we 
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177  I suspect that it may be easier to justify the choice of a range property on the level of social 
regulation. It may, for example, be more feasible or efficient to focus on some range property rather 
than the underlying scalar property. This sort of justification, however, is not what I am looking for 
in the present context.   
believe in S1 as capturing a fundamentally significant feature of  human 
beings, we need a good explanation for why we focus on some different 
property R as the basis of  equality.  Why should the equal possession of  some 
range property R serve as the proper basis for determining entitlements to Gn 
rather than the unequal possession of  the underlying scalar property S? 
Answering this question is less straightforward than it might initially appear. 
The challenge is that of  explaining why possession of  the scalar property 
matters but the fact that different people possess it in varying degrees does not. 
Arguments in support of  answers to questions (1) and (2) have to strike an 
intricate balance. They would have to deliver the conclusion that one's 
preferred scalar property is more important than alternative scalar properties 
but less significant than one's preferred range property. Locke fails to strike 
this balance. The power to reason seems more significant than the power to 
reason to the existence of  God. Does Rawls have a good reason for allocating 
entitlements to contractualist justification and liberties on the basis of  a 
minimal threshold conception of  moral personhood rather than on the two 
moral capacities?
 Even if  the difficulty involved in simultaneously answering question (1) 
and (2) can be overcome, there remains the question of  why the threshold 
posited by one's preferred range property is precisely where it is. There are 
multiple ways of  drawing the line on the underlying scalar property, and 
Richard Arneson (1999) worries that any such line would be vulnerable to the 
objection of  arbitrariness. Advocates of  a range property need to give a reason 
explaining the location of  their threshold. In the case of  Rawls this reason is 
given by his conception of  justice. Jeremy Waldron (2008) observes that range 
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properties are driven by an interest or purpose, for example by the purpose of  
coherently supplementing the idea of  justice as fairness. Ultimately, the 
plausibility of  an argument in support of  an answer to question (3) depends 
on the plausibility of  one's theory of  justice. However, there are three 
independent constraints on the reason for holding a specific threshold. Firstly, 
the reasoning offered in support of  a threshold must avoid circularity. One 
cannot argue for a threshold on the ground that it is the threshold relevant for 
a particular principle and also maintain that the principle is supported by the 
idea of  basic equality. If  the idea of  basic equality is going to do any genuine 
work in grounding a principle of  justice, then Rawls's account that "those who 
can give justice are owed justice" turns out to be disappointingly circular.178 
Secondly, the interest driving the threshold must not be at odds with the 
interest of  identifying what renders human beings fundamentally one 
another's equals. If  the purpose of  fixing a threshold is that of  determining the 
range of  people subject to principles of  justice regulating the basic institutions 
of  society, we might end up identifying a property different from the one 
rendering all human beings fundamentally one another's equals. Thirdly, the 
actual threshold ought to do justice to our pre-theoretical convictions about 
scope and avoid both types of  scope mistake mentioned above. I believe that 
neither of  the historically familiar accounts of  range properties succeeds in 
meeting these three constraints. 
 Can a threshold support the fundamental significance we associate 
with the idea of  basic equality? There is a simple line of  reasoning in 
illustration of  the claim that questions (4) and (5) escape a convincing answer. 
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178 Carter (2009, p.32) makes the point about Rawls's circularity forcefully.
Presumably, there are individuals located across the whole range of  a scalar 
property. However, the differences between various locations do not matter 
equally. In fact, there is only one difference that matters, namely that of  being 
above or below the relevant threshold. The difference between somebody just 
below the threshold and somebody barely above it is much more significant 
than the respective differences between, on the one hand somebody barely 
above and somebody significantly above, and on the other hand somebody 
just below and somebody significantly below. The advocate of  a range 
property faces a tough choice. The higher she sets the threshold, the more 
plausible the claim that differences below the threshold matter. The lower she 
sets the threshold, the more plausible the claim that differences above the 
threshold are of  moral significance. A natural way of  avoiding this choice 
would be to set multiple thresholds. Multiple thresholds, however, would fail 
to deliver the binary distinction needed to support the idea of  basic equality. 
6. Respect and the basis of equality: Carter's challenging proposal
Ian Carter (2009) argues that the notion of  respect provides an independent 
justification for the range property of  moral personhood. This is good news 
for egalitarians. If  his argument is sound, then the range property discussed in 
section 4 appears less vulnerable to the challenges of  section 5. But Carter also 
argues that his way of  combining a Rawlsian range property with a Kantian 
notion of  respect is the only way to render the idea of  basic equality coherent. 
For some egalitarians this is bad news. Carter claims that his basis of  equality 
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is incompatible with some key luck egalitarian commitments.179 He believes 
that respect rules out distributive egalitarian principles that are both sensitive 
to considerations of  individual responsibility and aim at compensating for 
internal endowment deficits. I will address the question of  how luck 
egalitarians should respond to Carter's challenge in section 6 below. The 
present section briefly presents his argument.
 Carter's solution to the problem of  basic equality has two parts. Firstly, 
Carter argues that other persons are owed respect simply because they are 
moral agents.180 Properly understood, such respect requires "a refusal to 
evaluate persons' varying capacities" (Carter 2009, p.26). Or put differently, 
respect requires that we treat them as opaque. To treat persons with opacity 
respect is to ignore variation in their agential capacities as irrelevant to their 
moral status. Once people possess the capacities minimally required for moral 
agency, we must ignore the fact that people possess these capacities to 
different degrees. Opacity respect is the attitude we are required to take 
towards persons, the adequate response to their dignity and status as ends in 
themselves.181 Second: Combining the Rawlsian range property of  moral 
personhood and the idea of  opacity respect promises to avoid the difficulties 
spelled out above. The notion of  opacity respect explains the significance of  
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179  Standard accounts of the luck egalitarian position, include among others Arneson (1989), 
Dworkin (2000) and Cohen (1989).  
180 Carter's understanding of respect has two sources. On the one hand he draws on Cupitt (2000). 
On the other hand, his notion resembles the neo-Kantian notion of respect, for example as 
developed by Stephen Darwall (2006).
181 As mentioned above, Carter's arguments are broadly speaking Kantian in spirit. He also refers to 
Thomas Hill (2000) as one of  his sources.
the threshold and accounts for the insignificance of  variation: Once 
individuals are recognised as persons, opacity respect requires that we ignore 
variation in the capacities underpinning moral agency. In Carter's own words:  
"Respecting persons involves viewing them from behind a veil of  ignorance 
that allows us to perceive them only in the form of  silhouettes, where the 
outlines of  the silhouettes reflect the fact of  those persons' capacities falling 
within a certain range" (Carter 2009, p.29). Opacity respect then offers a non-
circular justification of  the binary property of  moral personhood, which in 
turn succeeds in rendering cogent the idea of  basic equality. The dignity of  
persons requires that we treat them with opacity respect, which in turn 
requires evaluative abstinence and the refusal to evaluate variation in agential 
capacities. Opacity respect is the fitting response to the possession of  moral 
personhood and requires that we treat human beings as fundamentally one 
another's equals. 
 Carter's verdict that opacity respect rules out luck egalitarianism relies 
on two claims. First: How one spells out the idea of  basic equality matters for 
the content and metric of  the egalitarian principle justified by it: "The 
foregoing reflections suggest that the outcome of  our search for the basis of  
equality can work as a surprisingly powerful filter, leading us to question the 
internal coherence of  a number of  answers to the question 'Equality of  
what?'" (Carter 2009, p.47). Some egalitarian principles are ruled out by 
Carter's basis of  equality because their application would require that we 
violate opacity respect. Second: Certain luck egalitarian metrics, such as equal 
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opportunity for welfare,182 equal access to advantage,183 or equality of  
autonomy184 are incompatible with opacity respect. There are two luck 
egalitarian commitments that appear objectionable from the point of  view of  
opacity respect and they give rise to three independent problems. Firstly, 
compensating particular individuals for internal endowment deficits, say 
disability or a lack of  marketable talents, is incompatible with opacity 
respect.185 Carter (2009, p.38) says: "This topping-up exercise cannot be 
carried out without looking behind the exteriors individuals present to us as 
moral agents, and is therefore inconsistent with opacity respect." One may 
adopt egalitarian policies that generally benefit those with lesser internal 
endowments, say through an unconditional basic income;186 however, one 
must refrain from compensating a particular individual on the basis of  
assessing her deficient internal endowments. Secondly, sensitivity to 
responsibility is ruled out by opacity respect, "given that judgements of  
responsibility presuppose knowledge about the degrees of  autonomy with 
which particular individuals choose and act" (Carter 2009, p.43). One may 
make responsibility-sensitive judgements that presuppose some normal notion 
of  responsibility or autonomy, that is, the degree of  responsibility implied by 
the range property of  personhood. However, judgements about specific 
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182 See Arneson (1989).
183 See Cohen (1989).
184 See Fleurbaey (2008).
185 It is maybe helpful to here think of Carter as raising on a more fundamental level, an objection to 
luck egalitarianism that has previously been formulated by Jonathan Wolff (1998) and Elisabeth 
Anderson (1999).
186 Carter here refers to van Parjis's (1995) work on an unconditional basic income.
individuals and their capacity to choose responsibly are ruled out. Thirdly, a 
dilemma arises from the first two observations. Carter argues that the luck 
egalitarian will have to choose between on the one hand a commitment to 
compensate for internal endowment deficits, and on the other hand sensitivity 
to responsibility considerations. The choice is between broadly speaking two 
types of  policies. The first type of  egalitarian policy satisfies the requirements 
of  opacity respect and operates to the advantage of  those with low internal 
endowments; however, it will have to be insensitive to considerations of  
responsibility. Opting for Rawls's difference principle or an unconditional 
basic income will, as a matter of  empirical fact, promote the position of  those 
with low internal endowments. However, such a policy leaves no room for 
questions of  responsibility. The second type of  egalitarian policy will choose a 
baseline of  equality and then allow for inequalities that arise from the exercise 
of  responsibility. However, attempting to satisfy the requirement of  opacity 
respect renders this policy unattractive from an egalitarian point of  view. 
Opacity respect rules out setting a baseline that equalises both internal and 
external endowments. And reliance on a normalised notion of  responsibility 
puts those less equipped to behave responsibly, presumably those with lesser 
internal endowments, at an additional disadvantage. As Carter (2009, p.45) 
observes, "this alternative will almost certainly strike most luck egalitarians as 
unacceptably anti-egalitarian."
 Employing some of  the terms developed in section 2, Carter's overall 
line of  reasoning and the challenge to luck egalitarianism delivered by it can 
be understood like this:
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 (P1) To be justified, any principle of  the kind (E) "Every person is 
  entitled to equal amounts of  some good Gn or treatment Tn " 
  must rely on the idea of  basic equality.
 (P2) The only way of  rendering the idea of  basic equality coherent 
  relies on the idea of  a Rawlsian range property and the 
  requirements of  opacity respect.
 (P3) For a principle of  the kind (E) to be justified, the application of  
  (E) must not violate any of  the principles or ideas relied upon in 
  its justification. 
 (P4) Applying the luck egalitarian principles that "Every person is 
  entitled to (Gi) equal access to advantage, (Gii) equal 
  opportunity for welfare, or (Giii) equality of  autonomy" violates 
  the requirements of  opacity respect.
 (.:) Luck egalitarian principles that "Every person is entitled to (Gi) 
  equal access to advantage, (Gii) equal opportunity for welfare, or 
  (Giii) equality of  autonomy" are not justified.
How should the luck egalitarian come to terms with this challenge? 
7. A luck egalitarian response to Carter
Because Carter's argument is valid, luck egalitarians will have to respond to 
his challenge by rejecting (at least) one of  its premises. There are four basic 
options that are worth exploring. Firstly, luck egalitarians could challenge (P2) 
by denying that opacity respect succeeds in providing a basis for equality. 
They could rely on the objections pressed against range properties and ask 
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whether invoking opacity respect succeeds in answering all of  them. Secondly, 
the luck egalitarian could question the reasoning underlying (P3) and insist 
that even if  the application of  a principle violates a requirement involved in 
the justification of  that principle, the justification of  the principle would still 
succeed. The argument would have to establish that an egalitarian principle 
which violates opacity respect in its application might still be justified by 
appealing to the requirements of  opacity respect. Thirdly, proponents of  luck 
egalitarianism could raise doubts about (P4) and argue that applying the luck 
egalitarian principle does not in fact violate opacity respect. They might for 
example maintain that there are hitherto unexplored alternatives undermining 
Carter's claim about the joint impossibility of  opacity respect, sensitivity to 
responsibility and compensation for internal endowment deficits. Finally, and 
this is another way to deny (P2) (which also happens to be the most ambitious 
response), luck egalitarians could provide an alternative understanding of  
basic equality. If  there is another way to account for basic human equality, the 
luck egalitarian does not find herself  in the uncomfortable position of  having 
to choose between giving up her substantive commitment and admitting that 
her view lacks a sound basis. The present section pursues the less ambitious 
luck egalitarian response options and I argue that each of  them is promising. 
Section 8 will take up the final possibility and offer an alternative account of  
basic equality. 
7.1 Against (P2): The failure of opacity respect
Turning against the second step of  Carter's reasoning, luck egalitarians could 
question (P2) by arguing that the notion of  opacity respect does not succeed in 
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rendering the idea of  basic equality coherent. If  combining the Rawlsian 
range property of  moral personhood with the requirements of  opacity respect 
does not offer one way of  rendering the idea of  basic equality coherent, the 
claim that if  offers the only such way must be false. There are (at least) two 
sets of  considerations that speak against the claim that moral personhood and 
opacity respect jointly succeed in accounting for basic equality. First: Thinking 
back to the three questions identified in section 3, one might wonder whether 
the notion of  opacity respect succeeds in getting the scope of  basic equality 
right. Remember that I suggested treating the claim that basic equality should 
comprise all human beings and only human beings as a fixed point of  moral 
reasoning. But if  opacity respect is only owed to those in possession of  certain 
agential capacities, then a notion of  basic equality based on such respect fails 
to include those who lack these capacities. It seems that young children, 
mentally disabled adults, coma patients and those suffering from Alzheimer's 
disease will be excluded from the scope of  basic equality. If  we take our pre-
theoretical scope conviction seriously, we ought to turn against opacity 
respect. Advocates of  Carter's solution might of  course refer to how Rawls 
attempts to solve this problem and rely on the idea of  potentiality: "One 
should observe that moral personality is here defined as a potentiality that is 
ordinarily realised in due course. It is this potentiality that brings the claims of 
justice into play" (Rawls 1999, p.442). Instead of  arguing that opacity respect 
is owed to those actually in possession of  the relevant agential capacities, it is 
owed, one might claim, to those with the potential for such capacities. This 
response, however, raises two further problems. It is firstly far from clear 
whether there is a principled rationale for the claim that opacity respect is 
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owed to those merely possessing the potential for moral personality. So far, it 
has only been argued that actual moral personality possesses the moral 
significance that triggers opacity respect.187 The question why respect is also 
owed to those with potential for moral agency remains currently unanswered. 
I am secondly not convinced that introducing the notion of  potentiality offers 
a full solution to the problem of  scope. There are human beings who do not 
even possess the potential for moral personality, say because their coma is 
irreversible, because of  the severity of  their disability or because they have 
already passed through the stage of  agency. In these cases, the notion of  
potentiality is of  no help and advocates of  Carter's solution might find 
themselves left with Rawls's admission that "those more or less permanently 
deprived of  moral personality may present a difficulty. I cannot examine this 
problem here, but I assume that the account of  equality would not be 
materially affected" (Rawls 1999, p.446). Unfortunately, it is hard to see why 
this particular assumption is warranted. The difficulty, it seems, remains to 
embarrass Rawls's, and hence Carter's account of  basic equality. Second: The 
notion of  opacity respect may succeed in offering a non-circular justification 
of  the range property of  moral personhood; however, some of  the other 
questions from section 5 remain unanswered. For example: Where do we set 
the threshold and are we comfortable introducing a fundamental distinction 
between somebody just below and somebody just above it? Whether or not 
somebody is owed opacity respect and thus comes within the scope of  basic 
equality is of  fundamental importance. At the same time, whether or not 
somebody reaches the relevant threshold on the two scalar properties that 
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187 For a discussion of  these points in the context of  Rawls, see McMahan (1997, p.254 ff.).
underpin moral personhood is a question of  degree. As Jeff  McMahan (1997, 
p.261) puts it, the threshold associated with a range property creates a chasm 
and "each of  us must cross it with a single step." Is there a particular threshold 
that the advocate of  opacity respect can put with confidence? At what day in 
their lives do infants reach the relevant level which merits opacity respect? 
Range properties solve the problem of  variation, however, they encounter a 
new set of  difficult questions associated with the idea of  a threshold. The idea 
of  opacity respect, it seems, is of  no help in answering them. Consider the 
final attempt of  a response on Rawls's and Carter's behalf. Advocates of  a 
range property could respond to the challenge of  where to put the threshold 
by introducing a wide instead of  a narrow threshold. The idea is that one does 
not pass the threshold at one particular point on the underlying scalar 
property, but that there is a threshold band or area on the scalar property, such 
that one passes the threshold if  one comes above its upper bounds and fails to 
pass if  one comes below the lower bounds. Such a wide threshold avoids the 
particular location questions considered above. However, it also raises a set of  
new and equally difficult questions. What status do we grant to those within 
the band? And as the threshold will have upper and lower bounds, does not 
the problem of  where to draw the line resurface? In fact, does it not resurface 
twice, once when determining who is below and who is within, and again 
when determining who is within and who is above? It seems that again, the 
idea of  opacity respect is of  no help in solving the problems that befall the 
idea of  a range property. Step (P2) in Carter's reasoning is not beyond doubt.
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7.2  Against (P3): The distinction between justification and application
Challenging the third step of  Carter's reasoning, luck egalitarians could turn 
against the general claim of  (P3) and deny that in order to be justified, the 
application of  a principle must not violate any of  the principles relied upon in 
its justification. Carter's thought that, if  the idea of  opacity respect plays a role 
in justifying a particular egalitarian principle P then one ought not to violate 
the requirements of  opacity respect when applying principle P, appears 
initially plausible. However, there are many cases where the fact that the 
application of  a principle violates requirements relied upon in its justification 
appears unproblematic. If  this observation is correct, (P3) ought to be 
rejected. 
 Consider a simple example. Imagine a fictional rural country, maybe 
somewhere in Eastern Europe in the late 19th century, called Levinia. Only 
half  the citizens of  Levinia possess any land and it is distributed very 
unequally between them. Some of  the enlightened aristocrats of  Levinia 
propose a land reform that would give everyone who is currently a landowner 
an equal plot of  land and they defend their proposal in the national assembly 
of  kulaks. As it happens, their speech in defence of  the proposed land reform 
comes in two parts. The first part offers a justification of  the reform and the 
second part elaborates on its application. The enlightened aristocrats justify 
their proposal by making an argument in support of  the claims that, firstly, all 
true Levinians have an equal claim to land and, secondly, while owning some 
land is what makes you a true Levinian, how much land you own does not 
matter for whether or not you are a true Levinian. The aristocrats argue that, 
"even minimal landownership confers an important virtue on people, a sense 
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of  responsibility for nature and a conception of  the value of  your homeland, 
which turns them into true Levinians and commands our respect. To 
determine the status of  your fellow men, you must not ask how much land 
they own but only find out whether they possess any." The aristocrats carry 
on: "Although it is true that those with more land behave more responsibly 
towards nature and are even better patriots than those with less land, we ought 
to abstain from taking these differences into account, for this abstinence is the 
attitude owed to true Levinians. We believe that anyone who owns at least 
some land is a true Levinian. In light of  their equality as true Levinians, we 
propose that land be distributed equally between those who possess at least 
some land." In elaborating on the details of  their reform, the enlightened 
aristocrats suggest: "We propose to form a commission that administers the 
redistribution of  land. Those landowners that own more than an equal share 
of  land are required to give up land; those who possess less than an equal 
share of  land will receive additional land. Eventually, our redistributive efforts 
will ensure that the land of  Levinia is distributed equally between the current 
landowners, that is, between all true Levinians." Regardless of  how 
compelling you find the particular case of  the enlightened aristocracy in 
Levinia, it seems perfectly consistent to advocate the policy of  an egalitarian 
land reform relying on the claims: 
 (a)  that those entitled to an equal share of  land bear their 
  entitlements on the basis of  a binary property that they all 
  possess equally, e.g., the range property of  being a true 
  Levinian;
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 (b)  that this binary property ranges over a scalar property, which is 
  again a function of  some empirical property, e.g., the scalar 
  properties of  having a sense of  responsibility for nature and a 
  conception of  the value of  the homeland, which vary with the 
  amount of  land one possesses;
 (c)  that an independent normative requirement explains why we 
  focus on the range property rather than on the underlying scalar 
  property when grounding the entitlement and determining the 
  class of  entitlement bearers, e.g., the requirement of  respect 
  owed to true Levinians explains why we ought to ignore the 
  variation in possession of  land;
 (d)  that the land reform compensates those deficient in the 
  empirical property underpinning the relevant scalar property, 
  e.g., those with less than an egalitarian share of  land. 
I believe that the case of  the land reform in Levinia casts some doubt on (P3). 
Implementing the egalitarian land reform requires that we take into 
consideration how much land each true Levinian possesses. Justifying the 
land reform, however, requires that we ignore how much land each true 
Levinian possesses. If  one does not believe that this fact renders the land 
reform unjustified, one ought to reject (P3). 
7.3 Against (P4): Exploring neglected alternatives
There are two strategies that the luck egalitarian could pursue in turning 
against the final step of  Carter's reasoning. The first strategy employs a simple 
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argument: If  it is true that luck egalitarianism is incompatible with opacity 
respect in the way suggested by Carter, then opacity respect does not offer a 
plausible interpretation of  the attitude owed to persons. Proponents of  the 
second strategy argue that Carter presents the luck egalitarian with wrong 
policy choices. One actually can, maybe in more indirect ways, apply a luck 
egalitarian principle without violating opacity respect. 
 First: Remember that its sensitivity to particular internal endowment 
deficits was one of  the features that rendered luck egalitarianism problematic 
from the point of  view of  opacity respect. Carter claims that while it is 
permissible that a principle be motivated by a concern for those with lesser 
internal endowments, the application of  an egalitarian principle must not 
compensate particular individuals on the basis that their internal endowments 
are deficient, for this "topping-up exercise cannot be carried out without 
looking behind the exteriors individuals present to us as moral agents" (Carter 
2009, p.38). Imagine a case where an egalitarian policy that aims at benefiting 
those with lesser internal endowments while observing the requirements of  
opacity respect, say an unconditional basic income, reaches its redistributive 
limits: Provision of  an unconditional basic income has indeed generally 
tended to benefit those with lesser internal endowments, however, some 
individuals suffer from a specific internal endowment deficiency such that 
they are still very badly off. The basic income leaves a particular individual, 
call him phlegmatic Paul, significantly better off  than he otherwise would 
have been, but he still suffers from a particular predicament: Paul possesses 
the relevant above threshold agential capacities; however, due to some genetic 
defect, it is extremely painful for him to exercise these capacities. As a 
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consequence, he hardly ever makes any decisions and never pursues a 
particular goal with any resoluteness. Phlegmatic Paul is, as a result, not only 
economically worse off  than others but he regrets not being able to exercise 
his agential capacities painlessly. There are expensive painkillers that would 
allow him to reflect and decide painlessly, however, Paul is unable to afford 
them. It seems that the advocate of  opacity respect will have to respond to 
Paul's request for painkillers like this: "Unfortunately, we must not give you 
any painkillers. We understand that it would be good for you to have them 
and that you should be able to decide and act without pain just like anyone 
else. However, to hand out the painkillers would be a failure to treat you with 
respect. What we owe to you as a person is that we ignore your condition." I 
think that Paul has good reason to think that the advocates of  opacity respect 
misunderstand what we owe to persons. If  opacity respect rules out 
compensation for internal endowment deficits in this case, then so much the 
worse for opacity respect. 
 Note that there is a response that the advocate of  opacity respect could 
offer. The advocate of  opacity respect could argue that giving out the 
painkillers is actually unproblematic. The internal endowment of  painlessly 
being able to make and act upon decisions is not among those protected by 
opacity respect. To compensate for such a deficit is not a failure of  respect. 
Unfortunately, this response raises a problem. The more narrowly one 
conceives of  the properties requiring evaluative abstinence, or the patchier the 
veil of  ignorance, the less significant the challenge to the luck egalitarian. If  it 
is permissible to improve on how agents use their capacities by enhancing the 
conditions under which they would do so, the luck egalitarian can take the 
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challenge of  opacity respect easy. It would leave large parts of  their 
substantive commitments unscathed. The advocate of  opacity respect faces a 
tough choice. 
 Second: Luck egalitarians could argue that in denying the possibility of  
an egalitarian principle which is sensitive to questions of  responsibility, aims 
at the compensation of  internal endowment deficits and satisfies the 
requirements of  opacity respect, Carter is presenting the luck egalitarian with 
wrong policy choices. Carter believes that if  luck egalitarians take opacity 
respect seriously, they will have to choose between either adopting a policy 
that benefits those with lesser internal endowments but is insensitive to 
matters of  responsibility, such as an unconditional basic income, or choosing 
a policy that is sensitive to considerations of  responsibility but unacceptably 
inegalitarian, such as a starting gate theory equalising external endowments. 
However, it is not clear whether luck egalitarians do in fact face this dilemma. 
One actually can, maybe in more indirect ways, serve the luck egalitarian aim 
without violating opacity respect. There are two things to be said in support of 
this option. Firstly, luck egalitarians could advocate the application of  a 
hybrid principle, for example a responsibility-sensitive version of  the priority 
view. One could think of  a such a view as combining elements of  what 
Arneson labels "responsibility-catering-prioritarianism"188 and Rawls's 
difference principle: Primary goods ought to be distributed to the benefit of  
the least advantaged individual, unless the least advantaged finds herself  in 
that position as a result of  the exercise of  responsible choice, where the notion 
of  responsible choice presupposes the notion of  agency implied is the 
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threshold conception of  personhood. Because those with lesser internal 
endowments tend to be among the least advantaged, such a principle would 
work to the benefit of  those with low internal endowments. At the same time 
it would succeed in ensuring that distributions remain sensitive to individuals' 
exercise of  responsible choice. Clearly, such a hybrid principle fails to fully 
realise the luck egalitarian commitments. However, it seems to offer an 
approximation that avoids Carter's dilemma. 
 Luck egalitarians could secondly amplify their response by noting that 
their preferred distribution of  burdens and benefits between individuals is to 
be achieved indirectly and not in as simple a fashion as critics sometimes seem 
to suggest. Instead of  directly allocating a particular distributive share to a 
particular individual on the basis of  her relevant characteristics, the luck 
egalitarian could, just like the Rawlsian, be concerned with the "background 
social framework within which the activities of  associations an its individuals 
take place" (Rawls 2001, p.10). There is nothing in the luck egalitarian 
principle that should prevent its advocates from employing the same ideas of  
background justice and a basic structure that Rawlsians rely on when thinking 
about how to realise their conception of  justice.189 But if  one achieves equality 
of  autonomy, or realise responsibility-catering-prioritarianism, by means of  a 
sophisticated institutional design,190 including "the specification of  property 
rights, and permissible economic relations, control of  capital, limits on 
concentration of  wealth, permissible uses of  property" (Freeman 2007, p.135) 
etc., one can avoid the move that, according to Carter, violates opacity 
198
189 For a recent discussion of  background justice, see Ronzoni (2009).
190 This response is suggested by Tan (2008).
respect, namely to compensate particular individuals on the basis of  their 
particular endowment deficiency.
 
8. The common humanity account of basic equality
I believe that a range property account of  basic equality that focuses on the 
capacity for moral and rational agency fails. A more promising account of  
basic equality will build on the idea of  common humanity.191 The idea of  
common humanity runs together two commitments. Firstly, it attributes 
ethical significance to membership in the human species. Secondly, it replaces 
the idea that there is a small number of  properties necessary and sufficient for 
the status of  humanity with that of  similarity or resemblance. People are one 
another's equals because they resemble each other in their possession of  a 
number of  human characteristics. Shakespeare (Shakespeare 1600, Act III, 
Scene I) offers a list of  such common dispositions when, demanding justice 
for himself, Shylock dwells on the commonalities between Christians and 
Jews:
 "Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, 
 organs, dimensions, senses, affections and 
 passions? fed with the same food, hurt  with the 
 same weapons, subject to the same diseases, 
 healed by the same means, warmed and cooled 
 by the same winter and summer, as a Christian 
 is? If  you prick us, do we not bleed? if  you tickle 
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191 Bernard Williams (1973, p.232) highlights the significance of  common humanity.
 us, do we not laugh? if  you poison us, do we not 
 die? and if  you wrong us, shall we not revenge?"
I shall offer seven considerations in support and clarification of  my claim that the 
idea of  common humanity succeeds in rendering coherent the notion of  basic 
equality. These remarks will have to remain somewhat cursory, however, they lend 
plausibility to an alternative which has been neglected by those critics who claim 
that luck egalitarianism lacks an account of  basic equality. The first consideration 
motivates my approach against the alternative of  a Kantian range property and I 
argue that moral and rational agency are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
status of  basic human equality. The second consideration explains how I 
understand the notion of  similarity and I argue that one should conceive of  
common humanity as a kind of  family resemblance. The third consideration spells 
out my idea of  common humanity as family resemblance and develops some of  the 
essentially human characteristics from Shylock's list. Having outlined my account 
of  basic equality, I shall explain how it meets the challenges identified above. The 
fourth consideration explains the ethical significance of  common humanity and 
preempts the objection of  speciecism. The fifth consideration explains how my 
account deals with the challenge of  variation, the sixth one explains how I come to 
terms with the problem of  scope, and finally, I explain how making sense of  basic 
equality in terms of  common humanity as family resemblance avoids Carter's 
challenge and turns out compatible with luck egalitarianism.  
 To determine whether some property P is a promising candidate for 
rendering all human beings fundamentally equal, one may apply a simple intuitive 
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test and ask two questions.192 If  some being lacks property P, are you happy to 
exclude that being from the realm of  fundamental human equality? If  some being 
possesses property P, are you happy to include that being in the realm of  
fundamental human equality simply in virtue of  her possession of  P? I believe that 
any broadly speaking Kantian range property will fail this dual test. Moral and 
rational agency are neither necessary nor sufficient for the status of  basic human 
equality. If  some being resembled ordinary human beings in all respects, say she 
possessed the same needs, displayed affections etc., but just fell below the relevant 
threshold of  agency, she should not be excluded from the realm of  basic equality. 
Jeremy Waldron shares this intuitive scepticism about the significance of  rational 
and moral agency. He is unconvinced that "what matters, ultimately, is our capacity 
to make judgments about what matters" (Waldron 2008, p.40). If  on the other 
hand, some being very different from ordinary human beings, say an alien, angel or 
wild beast, turns out (or up) to possess the psychological capacity underpinning 
agency, we still would not think that she is our equal in the relevant sense. If  it 
turned out that dolphins actually possessed the same psychological capacities as the 
average American, we still would not consider dolphins our equals. Rational and 
moral agency will play some part in a convincing account of  basic equality. 
However, they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions in the way suggested 
by advocates of  Kantian range properties.
 Instead of  trying to identify a set of  necessary and sufficient conditions, one 
ought to approach the idea of  basic equality by relying on the idea of  similarity or 
resemblance. I agree with Robert Nozick (Nozick 1997, p.308), who believes that "it 
may be a mistake to expect that there always can be a succinctly formulated 
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192 Thomas Hurka (1993, p.33) discusses this test but focuses exclusively on the second question. 
distinction [between humans and non-humans] based on a manageably small set of  
properties." My reasoning in support of  this claim is simple. We have reason to 
suspect that there is no manageably small set of  properties that meets the threefold 
challenge of  variation, scope and significance which a successful account of  basic 
equality would have to meet. The most promising candidate properties to address 
the problem of  variation are range properties. However, as I have argued, the 
historically familiar candidates fail in important respects and there are severe 
systematic difficulties associated with the idea of  a range property. As long as these 
difficulties remain unresolved, scepticism about the prospects of  identifying a 
definite set of  properties that would render human beings fundamentally one 
another's equals seems warranted. One then ought to develop the idea of  common 
humanity. As Bernard Williams claims, the proposition "that all men are human" 
serves "as a reminder that those who belong anatomically to the species homo 
sapiens (...) are also alike in certain respects more likely to be forgotten" (Williams 
1973, p.232). I believe that one should understand the notion of  common humanity 
relying on Wittgenstein's idea of  "family resemblance" (Wittgenstein 2001, p.27). 
The different respects in which human beings are like one another are analogous to 
"the various resemblances between members of  a family: build, features, colour of  
eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc." (Wittgenstein 2001, p.27). Three characteristics 
of  "family resemblance" are crucial for my present purposes. First: For a number of  
beings to resemble each other, they do not have to share a fixed set of  properties or 
characteristics. Individuals A, B and C may resemble each other, even though there 
is no (set of) characteristic(s) that all of  them possess. Three siblings may resemble 
each other, even though there is no feature shared by all of  them, e.g., at least one 
of  them has a different colour of  eyes, a different build, etc. Second: To say that two 
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individuals resemble each other in their possession of  one particular feature, they 
do not actually have to possess the exact same feature. Rough proximity in 
temperament or gait is sufficient for resemblance. Third: There is no single property 
the acquisition of  which would on its own be sufficient to establish resemblance. 
Two otherwise entirely different individuals do not enter a relationship of  family 
resemblance simply in virtue of  say dying their hair in the same color. Why shall 
the idea of  family resemblance help to make sense of  basic equality? Two thoughts 
explain why it is plausible to conceive of  common humanity in terms of  family 
resemblance. One may firstly argue that the idea is true to or captures how we 
perceive of  other human beings. Observing the various and diverse forms of  human 
existence, "the result of  this examination is: we see a complicated network of  
similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of  detail" (Wittgenstein 2001, p.27). One may secondly argue 
that the notion of  family resemblance turns out successful in solving the problems 
associated with the challenge of  basic equality. The fact that the notion of  family 
resemblance supports our independent judgements, for example about scope, speaks 
in its favor. I shall argue that it succeeds in addressing these important challenges 
below. 
 What then are the respects in which human beings are alike, what are the 
various resemblances between human beings? Taking my inspiration from Shylock, 
I shall focus on two broad respects of  resemblance. These respects are neither 
mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, however, there are two good reasons for focusing 
on them. The two respects of  resemblance are of  independent moral significance 
and they offer a systematic approach to those characteristics constitutive of  more 
complex relationships of  resemblance. A first respect of  resemblance concerns 
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certain human psychological capacities. These capacities should be understood 
broadly. Human beings do not only resemble each other in their capacity for 
rationality, but also in their capacity for empathy, their ability to feel affection and 
in their exhibition of  particular reactive attitudes. As observed by Shylock, humans 
laugh if  tickled and take revenge (or forgive) if  wronged. A second respect of  
resemblance concerns particular human vulnerabilities. Human beings feel pain, 
they have interests grounded in sentience, they have similar needs and so on. 
Ultimately, the specific nature of  these vulnerabilities is grounded in the physical 
setup of  human beings, their anatomy, genes, etc. As Shylock points out, humans 
"are fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same 
diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and 
summer". These various human dispositions, roughly categorized as psychological 
capacities and vulnerabilities, constitute the "complicated network of  similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing" that make up human family resemblance. Human 
beings do of  course resemble each other in respects that combine various of  the 
basic similarities. Being able to see the world through the eyes of  others may, for 
example, be a complex constituent or intermediate respects of  human family 
resemblance.
 One may object that my account of  basic equality grounded in common 
humanity as family resemblance is speciecist.193 Arguing that human beings enjoy 
some special moral status simply in virtue of  their humanity, one may object, 
arbitrarily favors one species in a way comparable to racism or sexism. I believe that 
one ought to distinguish between different ways of  objecting to a position as 
speciecist. Once one becomes clear about what is at stake in each version of  the 
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193 For an original formulation of  the objection of  speciecism, see Peter Singer (1993).
objection, it turns out that all of  them can be answered. I shall defend my account 
of  common humanity as family resemblance against the three most powerful 
speciecist objections. First: Advocates of  a speciecism objection may take issue with 
giving priority to humans over non-humans in cases of  conflict. If  the exact same 
interest of  a human being and a non-human being is at stake, one must not simply 
give priority to the human being. To this objection, however, there is a convincing 
twofold answer. It firstly seems that a requirement to give priority to a human being 
is well grounded. If  a runaway trolley is heading towards a newborn infant and one 
could rescue the infant by diverting the trolley onto a sidetrack where it would kill a 
chimpanzee, one is required to divert the trolley. One secondly ought to note that 
giving priority to human beings does not exclude other creatures from also being 
the subject of  our moral concern. Non-human beings still matter morally. Second: 
Those pressing the objection may argue that speciecists fail to articulate a criterion 
for status that could be empirically assessed.194 Encountering a new group of  
beings, speciecists will fail to offer a test for determining whether these beings count 
as our equals. But even though this objection may apply to some versions of  
speciecism, it does not apply to my account of  common humanity. The notion of  
family resemblance offers a way for determining whether a being not hitherto 
encountered enjoys the status of  common humanity. One will have to find out 
whether it resembles us in the relevant respects, whether its name could be 
substituted in Shylock's monologue. Third: Those opposed to speciecism may argue 
that species membership as such is of  no moral significance. Here my response is 
threefold. I firstly believe that speciecism enjoys a firm grounding in common sense 
morality. As observed by Williams, "whether a creature is a human being or not 
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194 This is version of  the objection discussed by Matthew Liao (2010).
makes a large difference, a lot of  the time, to the ways in which we treat that 
creature or at least think that we should treat it" (Williams 2006, p.138). The fact 
that they are in line with common sense morality, counts in favor of  speciecist 
commitments. The advocate of  common humanity may secondly point out that the 
properties constitutive of  the relationship of  family resemblance are of  independent 
normative significance. A consequentialist tradition in ethics has emphasized the 
significance of  vulnerability and sentience and a non-consequentialist tradition has 
explained the ethical importance of  psychological capacities. The fact that on my 
account none of  these properties is individually necessary and sufficient does not 
undermine the claim that common humanity supervenes on independently 
significant properties, dispositions and commonalities. Finally, one may attempt to 
offer an independent justification for the significance of  common humanity. I 
follow Bernard Williams and argue that what people like Peter Singer call 
speciecism, should be understood as a benign form of  partiality, more aptly called 
humanism.195 I shall briefly explain the model of  special relationships which 
usually give rise to concerns of  partiality and argue that common humanity fits this 
bill. 
 There are relationships, for example between friends or members of  a family, 
which we think are especially valuable and which give rise to special moral 
considerations. It may be controversial which relationships count as special in this 
sense, but it seems that there are at least some clear cases. Three aspects are 
characteristic of  the type of  relationship that I have in mind.196 Firstly, the relevant 
type of  relationship creates special moral considerations which arise in virtue of  
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195 Bernard Williams (1986, 2006) hints at this reformulation.
196 See also Scheffler (2001).
being a member in that relationship. Special relationships are for example thought 
to give rise to positive duties. Many people who believe that we ordinarily only have 
weak reasons, if  any, to benefit other people, believe that such reasons become 
stronger, or emerge, in the context of  special relationships. Others think that 
membership in a group creates the duty to give members of  the group different 
kinds of  priority. Finding yourself  in a situation where you can only rescue one of  
two drowning children, while one of  them is your son and the other is a stranger, it 
is permissible, or maybe even required, that you save your son. Secondly, it is the 
nature of  the relationship as such that matters and not any particular interaction 
within it. Joint membership in a group may suffice to account for the relevant 
relationship and the special responsibilities apply to all members regardless of  their 
actual interaction.197 Thirdly, the reason that there are special responsibilities which 
apply between members of, say a particular group, stem from the value of  their 
relationship. In my attempt to justify significance of  common humanity, I shall 
follow Samuel Scheffler and explore the suggestion that "one's relationships to other 
people give rise to special responsibilities to those people when they are 
relationships that one has reason to value" (Scheffler 2001, p.101). 
 I believe that we ought to think of  the relationship between those who 
resemble each other as human beings on the model of  special relationships. There is 
a particular relationship in which all such beings stand to each other. The value of   
this relationship offers an independent justification for the allegedly arbitrary weight 
placed on membership in the human species. But why should we think of  the 
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197 One may for example think that I have a special responsibilities to my son, even though I never 
met him before and only just now came to learn of his existence. The conception of special 
responsibilities is what Scheffler calls "non-reductionist," see Scheffler (2001, p.99).
relationship of  human family resemblance in analogy to that between friends or 
members of  a family? Clearly, the values realised in a family or friendship are very 
different from those potentially realised in the special relationship of  humanity. 
However, I think one should agree with Bernard Williams and assume that there 
are genuinely human values which render the analogy plausible: "Human values are 
not just values that we have, but values that express our humanity, and to study 
them is to study what we value inasmuch as we we are what we are, that is to say, 
human beings" (2006, p.138). One ought make sense of  humanism (as opposed to 
speciecism) in the following way: Human family resemblance places individuals in 
a special relationship with each other. The special duties and responsibilities that 
arise within this relationship help to realise important values. Just as there is value 
in assuming special responsibilities and duties towards friends, there is value in 
exhibiting similar attitudes towards beings who resemble us in having our kind of  
"hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections and passions." To give their claims 
priority over others allows us to "live in a world that will be our world, one in which 
we have a social, cultural, and personal life" (Williams 1986, p.111). 
 A further idea helps to make sense of  common humanity as a special 
relationship. Trying to distinguish between special relationships that give rise to 
partiality and those that do not, Niko Kolodny (2010, forthcoming) has recently 
introduced the idea of  "resonance." His thought is that the reasons which a special 
relationship gives rise to, for example reasons of  partiality, need to resonate or be in 
line with the reasons that the individual elements which make up the relationship, 
such as individual encounters which make up a friendship, give rise to. In the 
present context, this idea is helpful in two respects. It firstly allows us to preempt 
the worry that if  you admit of  humanism as a form of  partiality, you open the door 
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to racism or sexism. The relationship between whites does not give rise to reasons 
of  partiality, because there is nothing of  significance in the relationship between 
whites that such reasons could resonate with. The idea could secondly be employed 
as a starting point for thinking further about what exactly could account for the 
special relationship of  common humanity, e.g., a shared history of  encounters and 
a common situation.198 
 It remains to explain how the account of  basic equality building on common 
humanity as family resemblance comes to terms with the challenges of  variation 
and scope. I believe that there are two ways of  responding to the challenge of  
variation. First: Accounting for basic equality in terms of  human family 
resemblance, one may emphasize "that there are certain similarities amongst men, 
not that there are certain qualities which they all possess to the same degree. Thus 
some people are much more sensitive to pain than others. But the egalitarian may 
mean merely that men are all, equally - the commas are important - liable to pain: 
i.e., one man is liable to pain just as another is, not just as much as another 
is" (Wilson 1967, p.83 fn. 5). The problem of  variation arises because the generic 
principle of  justice figures as an important premise in egalitarian arguments. If  the 
property relevant from an egalitarian point of  view is possessed unequally, and one 
ought to treat similar cases alike, possession of  the property will not deliver the 
intended egalitarian conclusion. However, on the common humanity account, the 
respect of  relevant similarity is not found in the possession of  a single (set of) 
characteristic(s), but in human family resemblance. The fact that all bearers of  
egalitarian entitlements are equally human avoids the problem of  variation. Second: 
The special relationship account that explains the significance of  human family 
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198 This idea will have to be worked out more fully. However, I believe it offers a promising direction. 
resemblance also gives us a reason to ignore differences within the human 
species.199 In addition to positive duties and concerns of  partiality, membership in a 
valuable relationship can give rise to a reason to ignore various differences between 
the members, which, absent that relationship, would matter.200 There are two ways 
in which special relationships serve as a source for reasons to ignore differences. 
Firstly, the value of  the relationship may itself  arise from ignoring various 
differences within the group. Membership in some groups is valuable because 
members ignore (certain) differences between themselves. It is, for example, not 
only part of  the significance of  the family to give members of  the family priority 
over strangers, but also to ignore otherwise important differences between various 
family members. A difference that may matter when deciding whom to rescue 
when the life of  two strangers is at stake, for example considerations about who is 
going to contribute more good to society in case of  survival, seem inappropriate 
when having to decide which of  your two children to rescue. Families are valuable 
partly because within them certain differences do not matter. Secondly, taking 
certain differences into account may defeat the purpose of  the relationship in 
question and undermine the values realized in it. Some liberal nationalists argue 
that nations are valuable because they satisfy a desire for "belonging and 
connectedness" (Tamir 1993, p.137). Achieving a sense of  connectedness 
presupposes that certain differences be ignored. Standing in a special relationship to 
somebody mitigates the salience of  otherwise significant differences. If  we ought to 
think of  the relationship of  human family resemblance on the model of  special 
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199 This reason to ignore variation may be understood in analogy to how Ian Carter employs the idea 
of  "opacity respect" in his attempt to justify the Rawlsian range property of  moral personhood. 
200  That is to say the distinction matters both between members of the group and outsiders, and 
between different outsiders, but not between insiders.
relationships described above, we have a reason to ignore differences between the 
members of  that relationship. 
 As I have argued in section 3 above, in fixing the range of  beings to which 
one's preferred egalitarian commitment applies, an account of  basic equality should 
avoid two types of  scope mistakes. The first scope mistake is that of  including 
beings that should not be included. Our egalitarian concern should not, for 
example, encompass mice or dolphins. The second scope mistake is that of  
excluding beings that should be included. Our egalitarian concern should not, for 
example, exclude infants and Alzheimer patients. The common humanity as family 
resemblance account avoids both types of  scope mistakes.201 One may plausibly 
argue that there is a sufficient degree of  resemblance and similarity between infants, 
Alzheimer patients and us, while the relationship of  family resemblance does not 
hold between us and say, mice or dolphins. The general characteristics of  family 
resemblance, and in particular its avoidance of  a small set of  necessary and 
sufficient properties make meeting the dual challenge of  scope possible. Whereas 
advocates of  the traditional Kantian or Rawlsian range property will have to admit 
that a human being who lacks the relevant psychological capacities is excluded from 
the realm of  basic equality,202 those who believe in common humanity can insist 
that lack of  just one of  the many human dispositions and characteristics is not 
sufficient to undermine human family resemblance. And where consequentialists 
who believe that sentience is the feature relevant for the status of  basic equality will 
argue that animals are to be included, proponents of  common humanity can insist 
that sentience is not sufficient to establish the relationship of  resemblance. The 
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201 The significance of  avoiding both types of  scope mistake is underlined by Matthew Liao (2010).
202  As I have argued, various attempts to solve this problem, for example by talking about 
potentiality, fail to convince. 
account of  common humanity as family resemblance succeeds in getting the scope 
right, without giving up on empirical properties. It offers a framework flexible 
enough to deal with cases not (yet?) practically encountered but thought to be 
important test cases of  an account of  basic equality.203 Whether or not aliens or 
hitherto isolated cavemen enjoy the status of  basic equality does not only depend 
on their rational agency, but on the degree to which they resemble us. Similarly, the 
account explains why enhancing a mouse's psychological capacities does not confer 
the status of  basic human equality. The way in which the approach of  common 
humanity as family resemblance approaches the problem of  scope also seems to sit 
well with insights about moral learning provided by recent cognitive neuroscience. 
Emphasizing the importance of  examples and moral prototypes, Paul Churchland 
argues that "one's capacity for recognizing and discriminating perceptual properties 
usually outstrips one's ability to articulate or express the basis of  such 
discrimination in words" (Churchland 1996, p.101). Common humanity as family 
resemblance provides a framework within which this ability may be exercised. 
  I believe that the common humanity as family resemblance account can be 
successfully employed as a premise in all three types of  egalitarian argument, i.e., in 
scope, metric and grounds arguments, and avoid Carter's challenge. As I have just 
argued, the account of  common humanity succeeds in getting the scope right and 
still satisfies the supervenience constraint. Even though there is a normative 
component to the account of  basic equality, there is ultimately a difference in non-
evaluative properties between those who do and do not come within the scope of  
basic equality. The account of  common humanity also supports the relevant 
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203 Both Nozick and Williams discuss our relationship to aliens, see Nozick (1974, chapter 3) and 
Williams (2006, p.149). 
sameness assumption which figures as the third premise in an egalitarian grounds 
argument. Note that common humanity does not in itself  deliver a substantive luck 
egalitarian principle. However, it can be supplemented by considerations of  fairness 
and serve as a premise in a variety of  arguments in support of  the claim that 
nobody should be better or worse off  than anybody else through no fault or choice 
of  theirs. Finally, common humanity supports a luck egalitarian metric and satisfies 
the tracking relationship. The characteristics and dispositions which account for 
human family resemblance support a metric that is both sensitive to considerations 
of  responsibility and aims at compensating for internal endowment deficits. 
Importantly, it does so in a way that avoids Carter's challenge. Carter has argued 
that the reason we have for ignoring variation in people's possession of  the feature 
relevant for basic equality, namely the requirements of  opacity respect, rule out a 
distributive principle which makes comparative responsibility judgements and 
compensates for internal endowment deficits. I have argued above that this 
argument is unsound. However, even if  it were not, the luck egalitarian would now 
be in a position to avoid the problem that Carter has in mind. The way in which the 
common humanity account solves the problem of  variation, for example by arguing 
that the values served in the special relationship of  humanity gives us a reason to 
ignore certain differences between them as irrelevant to status, does not give us a 
reason to refrain from compensating people for internal endowment deficits and 
take into account the extent to which they are responsible for their predicament. It 
seems that by invoking the idea of  common humanity as family resemblance luck 
egalitarians can after all render the idea of  basic equality coherent. 
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9.  Conclusion
This chapter has achieved three things. Firstly, I have explained the 
importance and difficulty of  coming up with a convincing account of  basic 
equality. Anyone relying on the idea of  basic equality faces the threefold 
challenge of  variation, scope and significance. Even though range properties 
seem to offer a promising approach to these challenges, all of  the historically 
familiar versions fail to convince. Secondly, I have deflected the charge that 
egalitarians who aim at both compensating for internal endowment deficits 
and taking considerations of  responsibility seriously, will fail to render 
coherent the idea of  basic equality. Egalitarians have a number of  good 
responses to Carter's claim that the only way to account for the idea of  basic 
equality is to supplement a Rawlsian range property with the notion of  
opacity respect, which would rule out luck egalitarianism. Finally, I have 
defended an account of  basic equality that is compatible with luck 
egalitarianism and meets the threefold challenge of  variation, scope and 
significance. The idea of  common humanity as family resemblance appears 
independently plausible and may be invoked in support of  the claim that 
nobody should be better or worse off  than anybody else through no choice or 
fault of  his or her own.
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